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A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that investors’ behavior is not well described by the tradi-
tional paradigm of (subjective) expected utility maximization under rational expectations. A literature has arisen
that models agents whose choices are consistent with models that are less restrictive than the standard subjec-
tive expected utility framework. In this paper we conduct a survey of the existing literature that has explored
the implications of decision-making under ambiguity for ﬁnancial market outcomes, such as portfolio choice and
equilibrium asset prices. We conclude that the ambiguity literature has led to a number of signiﬁcant advances in
our ability to rationalize empirical features of asset returns and portfolio decisions, such as the empirical failure
of the two-fund separation theorem in portfolio decisions, the modest exposure to risky securities observed for a
majority of investors, the home equity preference in international portfolio diversiﬁcation, the excess volatility of
asset returns, the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles, and the occurrence of trading break-downs.
JEL codes: G10, G18, D81.
Keywords: ambiguity, ambiguity-aversion, participation, liquidity, asset pricing.
1. Introduction
Recent research in ﬁnance has investigated alternatives to standard models of investors’ behavior. Traditional models
assume that investors maximize (subjective) expected utility (EU); that agents are perfectly aware of their own prefer-
ences mapping from utility-relevant states of the world (such as individual consumption streams or wealth levels) into
their perceived welfare; that investors’ expectations are not systematically biased (rational expectations). However, a
growing body of empirical evidence suggests that investors’ behavior is not well described by this traditional paradigm,
since actual choices are normatively questionable in the sense of being incompatible with the (S)EU predictions. One
direction taken by the recent literature is behavioral ﬁnance, according to which the absolute rationality of investors’
is replaced by any number of psychology-based alternatives, such as over-conﬁdence, under-reaction, loss aversion,
etc. (see e.g., Barberis and Thaler, 2003; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Hirshleifer, 2001; Shleifer,
2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Another strand of literature has focused instead on Bayesian model uncertainty
(see, e.g., Pastor, 2000) or econometric learning and incomplete information in ﬁnancial decisions and asset pricing
(see e.g., Guidolin and Timmermann, 2007; Lewellen and Shanken, 2002; Timmermann, 1993, 1996; Veronesi, 1999,
∗Correspondence to: Research Division, P.O. Box 442, St. Louis, MO 63166, United States. E-mail: Massimo.Guidolin@stls.frb.org;
phone: 314-444-8550.2000). This literature replaces rational expectations with beliefs updated through a rational learning rule, for instance
Bayes’ rule, in the light of the arrival of stochastic signals with non-zero correlation with relevant fundamentals.
Under these approaches, investment decisions can diﬀer from standard ones due to the diﬃculty of learning the true
state given a complex generating process (for instance, subject to breaks or instability of other types, like regimes). A
third approach focusses on alternative frameworks of rational decision-making. This literature entertains agents whose
choices are consistent with models that are less restrictive than the standard (S)EU framework, in the sense that the
underlying axioms are less demanding. In this area, particular attention has recently been dedicated to ambiguity and
ambiguity aversion.1 In this paper we conduct a systematic–albeit admittedly incomplete–review of the literature
that has explored the implications of decision-making under ambiguity for ﬁnancial market outcomes, such as portfolio
choices and equilibrium asset prices.
Under (S)EU, if preferences satisfy certain axioms, there are numerical utilities and probabilities that represent
acts (decisions under uncertainty) by a standard weighted sum of the utilities/outcomes deriving from acts in the
possible states of the world, where the weights are (subjective) probabilities for each of the states. As innocuous as
this basic principle may seem, there is a long, rich tradition of questioning whether it describes behavior adequately.
Keynes (1921) was the ﬁrst to draw a distinction between the implications of evidence–the likelihood judgments
that evidence implies–and the “weight” that should be attached to this evidence, or the conﬁdence in the assessed
likelihoods. Keynes wondered whether a single probability number could express both dimensions of evidence. Knight
(1921) distinguished risk, or known probability, from uncertainty. He suggested that economic returns could be earned
for bearing uncertainty but not for bearing risk. However, the modern attack to (S)EU as a descriptive theory was
made most directly by Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox that we describe in Section 2.1. Ellsberg’s (1961) thought-provoking
article stirred a debate and between the 1970s and 1980s led researchers to assemble massive experimental evidence
that indicates that people generally prefer the least ambiguous acts. This implies that the experimental subjects take
their own conﬁdence in estimates of subjective probability into account when making decisions. Such a pattern is
inconsistent with Savage’s sure-thing principle of (S)EU, the axiom by which a state with a consequence common to
a pair of acts is irrelevant in determining preference between the acts.
Why is a survey of the literature on ambiguity in ﬁnancial markets of any use? First, because the last decade has
seen a tremendous growth in the number, breadth, and quality of papers that have exploited ambiguity in connection to
research questions in ﬁnancial economics. In fact, a quick scoring of our own references–as incomplete and deﬁcient as
they may be–reveals that out of a total of 195 references, 86 (i.e., a hefty 44%) have been either written (as indicated
by the year of the working paper in our possession) or published on or after 2003.2 Second, a thought-provoking
paper by Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) has spurred a debate on whether ambiguity-based approaches to economic
modelling would be as sensible as their growing popularity implies. Al-Najjar and Weinstein have been dismissive
1Whether or not preferences reﬂecting ambiguity are “behavioral” is mostly a matter of tastes. However, many researchers that have
used and critically commented ambiguity averse preferences (e.g., Backus et al., 2004) have noticed that most of these preferences do
represent well-deﬁned neo-classical preference orderings. Of course, this is not to be uncritically taken as a “good feature”. On the one
hand, the strong theoretical foundations for ambiguity averse preferences allow a researcher to use all the tools of neo-classical economics,
particularly optimization and welfare analysis. On the other hand, when these preferences come to ignore aspects of human behavior
stressed in other social sciences, particularly sociology and social psychology, they may imply a loss of realism.
2Of course, this is only a very rough scoring system, but we doubt that the stunning percentage we have determined could be much
aﬀected by any other sensible assumption.
2about the potential of ambiguity models in positive economic analyses. This potential may be fully appreciated without
recourse to any presumption about the prescriptive validity of ambiguity-based preference models just by cataloguing
and critically discussing the breadth and depth of applications of ambiguity models in ﬁnance. This is our main goal
and it seems an appropriate time for it. Third, we have noticed that a fraction of the recent papers has connected key
events from the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 to ambiguity in the form of poorly understood information and
to investors’ aversion to diﬃcult-to-quantify uncertainty, as opposed to risk.
Fourth, the background of our eﬀorts and of the endeavour of the scores of researchers involved in advancing our
understanding of ambiguity is the existence in the ﬁeld of ﬁnancial economics of dozens of empirical “stylized facts”
for which standard, (S)EU-based models have been incapable of providing a consistent rationalization. The ambiguity
literature is currently perceived as one of the promising reactions to the generalized dissatisfaction with the empirical
and predictive performance of the (S)EU/rational expectations (RE) paradigm. Indeed, the (S)EU hypothesis faces
serious diﬃculties when confronted with asset markets data. Mehra and Prescott (1985) showed that for a standard
rational (S)EU representative-agent model to explain the high equity premium observed in the data, an implausibly
high degree of risk aversion is needed, resulting in the equity premium puzzle. Weil (1989) showed that this high
degree of risk aversion generates an implausibly high risk-free rate, creating a twin risk-free rate puzzle. In addition, a
number of empirical studies document hard-to-understand links between aggregate asset markets and macroeconomics;
for example, price-dividend ratios move procyclically (Campbell and Shiller, 1988) and conditional expected equity
premia move countercyclically (Fama and French (1989)). Excess returns are serially correlated, mean reverting (Fama
and French, 1988b, Poterba and Summers, 1988) and forecastable (Fama and French, 1988a). Since French and Poterba
(1991), researchers have become acutely aware that investors tend to forego valuable diversiﬁcation opportunities by
biasing their equity portfolios towards domestic stocks.3 It is time to try and collect a series of coherent thoughts on
whether and how models that take ambiguity into account may solve these puzzles.
A survey paper cannot claim to have found any new theoretical or empirical results. Yet, we think that our
scrutiny of the literature on ambiguity has uncovered a number of signiﬁcant advances in our ability to rationalize
important empirical features of asset returns and portfolio decisions as well as episodes of market failures, such as
the market freezes that have characterized the recent “credit crunch.” With regard to portfolio decisions, we have
reviewed and summarized a substantial body of work that has concluded that ambiguity may imply violations of the
classical two-fund separation theorem by which all investors should hold an identical risky portfolio with identical
structure and can diﬀer only in their relative allocations between the riskless asset and this risky mutual fund. This
implies that professional investment advisors may play a key role in the identiﬁcation of the ambiguity their clients
suﬀer from. Many papers have proved that–even assuming constant investment opportunities over time (e.g., the
absence of predictability)–ambiguity will aﬀect the classical Merton-style expressions for optimal portfolio weights
and that under a range of parameterizations we should expect ambiguity to decrease the optimal exposure to risky
securities. The result that classical (S)EU portfolio weights–both in their myopic (mean-variance style) and in their
hedging components–may be severely aﬀected by ambiguity turns out to be robust to the choice of ambiguity averse
3These examples concern research on equity returns and portfolio diversiﬁcation. Many more poorly understood stylized facts exist
with reference to ﬁxed income securities (such as the failure of the expectations hypothesis for risk-free bond yields, after adjusting for
time-varying risk premia) or derivative securities (such as the fact that the volatilities implicit in derivative prices fail to predict subsequent,
realized volatility). Excellent surveys of these literatures are in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1996), and Cochrane (2005).
3preferences and to the parameterization of the problem. A few papers have applied these results to investigate why
investors seem to irrationally bias their portfolios away from foreign stocks–the so-called home country equity bias.
When ambiguity about the joint distribution of domestic and foreign returns is high, small diﬀerences in ambiguity
in favor of national, country-speciﬁc stocks may result in optimal, rational portfolios that are signiﬁcantly under-
diversiﬁed relative to standard mean-variance portfolios. In a similar vein, ambiguity models have been applied to
study ﬂight to familiarity phenomena, which occur when investors suddenly switch towards familiar assets carrying
an inﬂated, seemingly irrational weight in their portfolios.
In the asset pricing camp, there has been considerable interest in the fact that–when the economy is populated
by both (S)EU and by ambiguity-averse investors–equilibrium pricing functions often become discontinuous around
a limited participation region, a range of asset prices for which only (S)EU investors will trade. Moreover, in the
participating equilibria–when both (S)EU and ambiguity-averse investors trade–it has been argued that changes in
“oﬀ-equilibrium” (in the sense that these occur with small probabilities) potential outcomes have the potential to aﬀect
equilibrium prices. Therefore this literature has stressed the importance of regulation and policy interventions aimed
at persuading (ambiguity averse) investors that any extremely negative scenarios may be safely ruled out. Another
recurrent ﬁnding is that whether ambiguity may concern systematic or idiosyncratic “risks” may play a role in the
equilibrium outcomes of ﬁnancial markets. Because the potential for ambiguity aversion to induce limited participation
equilibria depends on the fact that the spread between the highest and the lowest possible return of the idiosyncratic risk
component is larger than the spread between the highest and the lowest possible return of the systematic component,
it has been conjectured that the high risk premia that many papers have explained through ambiguity aversion may
be more the result of ambiguity concerning idiosyncratic payoﬀs than ambiguity on the systematic ones. This may
aﬀect the way in which policy-makers ﬁght the eﬀects of ambiguity. Other papers have analyzed not only the eﬀects
of ambiguity, but also of its “dispersion” across heterogeneous investors. The insight is that a limited participation
equilibrium may exist and that in this equilibrium the rate of participation, the average measure of ambiguity, and the
equity premium all decrease as uncertainty dispersion increases, whereas under full participation, the equity premium
does not depend on uncertainty dispersion. In dynamic, Lucas-type endowment models, ambiguity has also been
found to be a potential cause for asset price indeterminacy and therefore for endogenous volatility (of a “sunspot”
type). However, when assumptions are introduced to avoid indeterminacy, then it has been shown that asset risk
premia can be decomposed in two parts, a standard (S)EU risk premium component that tends to be proportional to
the covariance between asset returns and (appropriate functions of) the rate of growth of fundamentals or the market
portfolio, and an ambiguity premium. This dual structure greatly helps in developing a uniﬁed and elegant solution
to the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles.
Researchers have not only busied themselves to show that simple ambiguity-related concerns may provide a solution
to many of the puzzles that plague the classical consumption (C)CAPM model, but they have also scored progress in
characterizing alternative asset pricing models that formally encompass aversion to ambiguity. For instance, particular
forms of dynamic, recursive ambiguity originate two-factor extensions of the classical, single-factor CAPM in which the
second priced risk factor simply captures the eﬀects of ambiguity on the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
Interestingly, in an ambiguity-adjusted CAPM, it has been proven that while under (S)EU, the law of large numbers
implies that the variance of the market portfolio tends to zero as the number of assets becomes large, under ambiguity,
4the market portfolio does not become less uncertain as the number of assets increases. Ambiguity may be priced in
equilibrium because it is only partially diversiﬁable in the sense that for any asset only its individual contribution to
total market ambiguity will be compensated. Therefore, t h eb a s i ci n s i g h to ft h eC A P M – t h a to n l ys y s t e m a t i cr i s k
may be compensated–would remain valid. Related papers have shown that in general terms, aversion to ambiguity
modiﬁes the standard stochastic discount factor pricing equation, 1 =  [+1+1|F]( w h e r e+1 denotes the
stochastic discount factor) by introducing a multiplicative term 







Of course, under special parametric assumptions, much more can be said on the speciﬁc structure of the term 
+1.
Finally, with reference to the recent ﬁnancial crisis, papers old and new within the ambiguity literature applied to
ﬁnancial decisions have oﬀered compelling explanations for recently observed phenomena such as trading break-downs
(when markets freeze and trading stops altogether) and stubbornly high ﬁxed income yields for essentially riskless
assets. It is an old result from the early 1990s that under ambiguity averse preferences, there exists an interval of prices
within which the agent neither buys nor sells short the risky asset. At prices below (above) the lower (upper) limit of
the interval, the agent is willing to buy (sell) the asset, but when equilibrium forces fail to push the asset price outside
the interval, there will be no willingness to trade. This is in sharp contrast with the standard (S)EU framework, where
a risk neutral investor will buy (sell) a positive share of the risky asset if its price is higher (lower) than the expected
v a l u eo fi t sf u t u r ep a y o ﬀs. A suﬃcient condition for ambiguity to induce market breakdowns and limited participation
equilibria is that the spread between the highest and the lowest possible return of the idiosyncratic risk component is
larger than the spread between the highest and the lowest possible return of the systematic component. It is possible
that it may not be ambiguity per se that causes the existence of limited participation equilibria, but instead the fact
that markets tend to be characterized by much stronger ambiguity concerning idiosyncratic payoﬀs than ambiguity on
the systematic ones. These early ﬁndings have been recently revived to show that when there is more heterogeneity,
an equilibrium with no-trade is more diﬃcult to establish and that bid-ask spreads may derive entirely from ambiguity
and not only from asymmetric information, as commonly assumed.
Before moving on to the core of our review, let us mention that a few papers exist that have reviewed the literature
on ambiguity (Camerer and Weber, 1992; Epstein and Schneider, 2010; Etner, Jeleva and Tallon, 2009; Gilboa,
Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 2008; Mukerji and Tallon, 2004; Wakker, 2008). However, at least in our reading, none
of these papers has the speciﬁc focus of our work. For instance, Camerer and Weber (1992), Etner, Jeleva and Tallon
(2009), and Wakker (2008) have an explicit focus on deﬁning ambiguity, ambiguity aversion, and how to best model
such preferences, with a special focus issues of axiomatization of the resulting criteria and preferences. In our view,
Epstein and Schneider (2010) is the most closely comparable survey, although their attention is more on the mapping
between the “smoothness” (or lack thereof) of ambiguity averse preferences and their potential implications in ﬁnance
applications–which is clearly a key aspect–than on the breadth of the implications of ambiguity aversion for portfolio
choice and asset pricing. Because their potential to aﬀect ﬁnancial decisions is maximum within the known class of
ambiguity preferences, Epstein and Schneider focus on applications of multiple-prior preferences, while our review
encompasses a broader spectrum of ambiguity preferences.
Our claim that we somewhat diﬀer from existing surveys, means in no way we are “better”. There are at least two
5dimensions in which we feel any interested Reader will ﬁnd precious companions in the papers referenced above. First,
our treatment of the decision-theoretic aspects of ambiguity is cursory at best because we only care for a Reader to
appreciate how and why the preferences entertained in the ﬁnance literature diﬀer from standard (S)EU preferences.
In this sense, we explain in greater depth what ambiguity means than the average ﬁnance paper can aﬀord to do.
However, that remains our benchmark–to understand enough to be able to appreciate the applied results. Second, we
have devoted only occasional attention to the rich experimental literature on ambiguity (more generally, violations of
the sure thing principle). This does not contain any implicit judgement on the relevance of such a literature. Camerer
and Weber (1992) and Etner, Jeleva and Tallon (2009) review the experimental literature.
We have one ﬁnal note of caution on terminology. In the literature, ambiguity and uncertainty are not always
distinguished, nor are they clearly deﬁned. In this survey, we will use both terms equivalently. Uncertainty or ambiguity
is meant to represent “non probabilized” uncertainty–situations in which the decision makers is not given probabilistic
information about the external events that aﬀect the outcome of a decision–as opposed to risk, which is “probabilized”
uncertainty. We will concentrate on situations in which there is too little information to pin down probabilistic beliefs,
as opposed to risky situations, in which objects of choice (gambles, lotteries) are formulated in terms of probability
distributions. Another issue revolves around the diﬀerence between ambiguity aversion and a “concern” (preference)
for robustness. As we shall explain in Section 2.4, the two notions are not completely equivalent and their origins can
be usefully told apart. However, for our purposes we will treat the literature on robust ﬁnancial decisions as a speciﬁc
strand of the general ambiguity literature, and insist more on the points for which the two approaches are similar than
on the diﬀerences. Hansen and Sargent (2007) is the authoritative reference on robustness.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 reviews a few key deﬁnitions relating to the concept of ambiguity,
its diﬀerence from risk, and how aversion to ambiguity might be measured. The purpose of this Section is to allow all
Readers to understand the rest of the paper. Section 3 reviews papers that have addressed issues related to optimal
portfolio choice under ambiguity aversion. We start with simple, static models that introduce us to the idea that under
ambiguity, the best trade may easily be no trade at all. We connect ambiguity models to classical mean-variance asset
allocation. We then extend the analysis to robust asset allocation, to how it may best to introduce robustness
in technical terms, and to large scale problems. We also explore the relationships between portfolio choice under
incomplete information and ambiguity. Section 4 is devoted to models of equilibrium asset prices under ambiguity.
The main distinction here is between simple, static two-period models and dynamic models. The latter have forced
researchers to deal with a number of diﬃcult but intriguing logical and technical issues, such as dynamic consistency
and rational updating of ambiguous beliefs. We also review models that have not just priced stocks and short-term
riskless bonds, but also other asset classes, such as equity options, the term structure of nominal, real riskless bonds,
and foreign currencies. Section 5 is dedicated to recent advances in ﬁnancial microstructure theory under ambiguity.
Section 6 discusses policy and regulatory implications. Section 7 concludes and discusses the likely (hopeful) impact
of ambiguity models on ﬁnancial economists and policy-makers’ approaches to applied issues.4
4As a ﬁnal note of caution, let us stress that our review has no ambition of being complete in the sense of discussing in adequate depth
all the relevant papers. For instance, in this paper we say nothing about auctions under ambiguity whereas a number of interesting ﬁndings
have been published (e.g., the failure of the classical Revenue Equivalence Theorem by which ﬁrst and second price auctions are Pareto
equivalent), see e.g., the seminal paper by Lo (1998) and the introduction to the relevant issues in Mukerji and Tallon (2003). Similarly,
we have not covered the papers that have applied ambiguity to macroeconomic issues, unless they explicitly concern either asset allocation
62. Generalities and Deﬁnitions: What is Ambiguity?
Let’s introduce some bits of notation that will become handy later on. A decision problem is structured on a state
space, an outcome space, and a preference relation. The state space Ω, whose elements are called states of nature,
represents all the possible realizations of future uncertainty. Sets of states of nature,  ⊂ Ω, are called events. The
outcome space F contains the possible, random results of any conceivable decision. The outcome space can be rather
abstract: although in many applications we can take F to be the set of real numbers (e.g., wealth), in principle it
could be any relevant aspect of a decision problem.5 A preference relation % is deﬁned over the mappings from Ω to
F, these mappings are called acts or decisions and they associate to each state of nature  ∈ Ω a possible consequence
()( o r).  %  means that the decision maker weakly prefers decision  to decision ;  ∼  means that the
decision maker is indiﬀerent between  and  Most of the time–we will clearly note when this is not the case–all
preferences we consider are assumed to be complete (i.e., a decision maker is always able to rank decisions), reﬂexive
( % ) and transitive (i.e., if a decision maker prefers  over  and  over , then she also prefers  over ). We
generally denote by  a standard VNM utility index, and we label by BM standard Brownian motions.
2.1. Early Literature: Ellsberg’s Paradox
That a useful distinction might be drawn between standard (SEU) and more general decision-making models has been
known to economists since the seminal work by Knight (1921). According to Knight’s well-known distinction, there
are two kinds of uncertainty: the ﬁrst, sometimes called risk, corresponds to situations in which all relevant events are
associated with a (objectively or subjectively) uniquely determined probability assignment; the second, often called
Knightian uncertainty, corresponds to situations in which some events do not have an obvious probability assignment.
Such a distinction is meaningful since, in reality, in most economic contexts where agents face uncertainties, no
probabilities are actually given or easily computable.
The experimental relevance of the distinction between risk and uncertainty has been formally discussed by Ellsberg
(1961), whose ﬁndings have induced researchers to elaborate a range of new preference classes to accommodate for
Knightian uncertainty, now more commonly known as ambiguity. In the simplest formulation of the paradox, an
individual is given the opportunity to bet on the draw of a ball from one of two urns: urn  h a s5 0r e da n d5 0b l a c k
balls, urn  has 100 balls which are from some unknown mix of red and black. First, subjects are oﬀered a choice
between two bets: $1 if the ball drawn from urn  is red and nothing if it is black; or $1 if the ball drawn from urn
 is red and nothing if it is black. In experimental implementations of this setting, the ﬁrst bet has been generally
preferred over the second by a majority of the subjects. Therefore, if the agents have a prior on urn ,t h ep r e d i c t e d
probability of red in urn  must be (strictly) less than 05. Next, subjects are oﬀered a choice between two new bets:
one pays out $1 if the ball drawn from urn  is black and nothing if it is red; the other pays out $1 if the ball drawn
from urn  is black and nothing if it is red. Again the ﬁrst bet has been generally preferred in experiments. Therefore,
if decision makers have a prior on urn , the predicted probability of black in urn  must be less than 05; equivalently,
or asset pricing. See Backus, Routledge and Zin (2004) for an introduction to the role of ambiguity in macroeconomic research.
5It will sometimes be convenient to assume that F is a set of lotteries. Thus, the result from a decision could for instance be: “if state
 realizes, get a lottery that yields some amount  with probability  and some amount  with probability 1 − ”.
7the probability of red in urn  must be (strictly) higher than 05. This probability assessment is inconsistent since a
unique prior cannot simultaneously assign to the event “red from urn ” a probability that is strictly less and also
strictly more than 05! Ellsberg’s (1961) original interpretation was that people are simply averse to the ambiguity
about the odds for the “ambiguous” urn : as a result, they would prefer to bet on events with known, rather than
ambiguous, odds, consequently ranking bets on the unambiguous urn  over equivalent bets related to .6
Another popular version of the Ellsberg’s paradox clearly shows that ambiguity might induce a violation of the
standard independence axiom of (S)EU theory, according to which for any triplet of bets ,  and ,a n df o ra l l
 ∈ (01), if  º ,t h e n +( 1− ) º  +( 1− ),w h e r e +( 1− ) is the two-stage lottery that returns
with probability  bet , and with probability (1 − )b e t.7 Speciﬁcally, a ball is drawn from one urn containing
three balls, one which is certainly red and two that can be either white or green. The bets among which the decision
maker is asked to express her preferences are as follows:
 : win 100$ if the green ball is drawn and 0 otherwise;
 : win 100$ if the red ball is drawn and 0 otherwise;
0 : win 100$ if the green or the white ball is drawn and 0 otherwise;
0 : win 100$ if the red or the white ball is drawn and 0 otherwise.
The experimental evidence shows that people generally prefer  to ,a n d0 to 0. This behavior represents a violation
of expected utility since it is incompatible with any assignment of a probability distribution over random payoﬀs. As
a matter of fact, the preference  over  shows that the event “a red ball is drawn” is considered more probable than
the event “a green ball is drawn”, so that () ().8 On the contrary, the preference for 0 over 0 shows that
the event “a red or a white ball is drawn” is to be considered less probable than the event “a green or a white ball
is drawn” and must reﬂect the subjective probability assignment ( ∪ ) ( ∪ ). This is not consistent with
any probability assignment since the three events are mutually exclusive, so that (using the fact that () ())
( ∪ )=()+() ()+()=( ∪ )( 2 )
should hold (as the ball cannot be at the same time green and white,  ∩  = ®).
These illustrations of Ellsberg’s paradox are important because they can be used to arrive to a formal deﬁnition
of ambiguity and of aversion to ambiguity. Consider a decision maker who places bets that depend on the result of
two coin ﬂips. The ﬁrst coin is well known, while the second one is provided by some unknown intermediary. Given
that the agent is not familiar with the second coin, it is possible that she would consider “ambiguous” all the bets
whose payoﬀ depended on the result of the second ﬂip. For instance, a bet  that pays $1 if the second coin lands
with head up, or, equivalently, on the event {} (here  denotes the head outcome and  the tail outcome),
can be seen as somewhat less desirable than bets that are “unambiguous”, such as a bet that pays $1 if the ﬁrst coin
6Interestingly, Ellsberg had not run carefully designed experiments in the modern sense of the term. His were mostly introspective
experiments, supported by abundant casual evidence. However, starting with Becker and Brownson (1964), an experimental literature has
developed conﬁrming the introspective intuition originally described by Ellsberg (1961). A number of these experiments and of resulting
stylzed facts are described in Camerer and Weber (1992).
7In this example,  is the gamble: ”win 100$ if the green ball is drawn and 0 otherwise”; 0 =  +( 1− ) and 0 =  +( 1− ).
8 (),  (), and  () represents the subjective probability of a red, green or white ball being drawn from the urn.
8lands with head up, or, equivalently, on the event {}. If the decision maker is given the possibility of buying
“shares” of bets that rely on the second coin only (namely the bet that pays only if {} obtains and the one
that pays if {} occurs), so that she is oﬀered a bet that pays $050 on {} and $050 on {},s h em a y
prefer it to either of the two ambiguous bets. In fact, such a bet has the same contingent payoﬀso fab e tw h i c hp a y s
$050 if the ﬁrst coin lands with head up, which is unambiguous. That is, a decision maker who is averse to ambiguity
may prefer the equal-probability “mixture” of two ambiguous bets to either of the bets. Formally, Schmeidler (1989)
called ambiguity averse a decision maker who prefers any mixture  +( 1− )  ∈ [01] of two ambiguous bets 
and  that she would otherwise (i.e., in the absence of ambiguity) consider indiﬀerent,  ∼ :  +(1− ) %  ∀ ,
 when  ∼ . This decision maker is averse to ambiguity because she beneﬁts from the fact that the mixture induced
by the weight  ∈ [01] reduces the overall ambiguity of the two ambiguous bets  and .
An alternative perspective on ambiguity can be obtained by adopting as a benchmark a model that captures the
way in which risk is commonly represented in the standard (S)EU framework. EU assumes that the probabilities of
outcomes are known. If preferences follow a set of simple axioms, they can be represented by a real-valued utility
function–preferred choices have higher utility numbers–and the utility of a choice is the expected utility of its possible
outcomes, weighted by their probabilities, see Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). Under SEU, probabilities are
not necessarily objectively known, so SEU applies more widely than EU.9 The SEU axioms show the conditions under
which preferences can be represented by a numerical expected utility that uses subjective probabilities of states to
weight consequence utilities (see Anscombe and Aumann, 1963): the stochastic consumption stream generated by the







() ≡ ()[()] (3)
where the s are the subjective probabilities of each of the possible |Ω| states and (·) is a Von Neumann-Morgenstern
(VNM) utility index. The fact that axioms exist under which (3) obtains cannot be down-played: in Savage’s model, a
decision maker behaves like a EU-subject who possesses a probability distribution over the states of the world, even if
she is not actually aware of either probabilities of her own utility index. This implies that decisions under uncertainty
can always be reduced to decisions under risk, with one caveat: beliefs are here a purely subjective construct, and can
be interpreted as themselves part of the “preferences” of a decision maker.
To accommodate for some early experimental evidence of inconsistency of actual behavior with the key postulates
(axioms) of rational choice under (S)EU, Quiggin (1982) had proposed early on a generalization of (3) based on the
relaxation of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern/Savage independence axiom. Given the (subjective) probability distri-
bution {}
|Ω|
=1, Quiggin assumed the existence of a strictly increasing and continuos probability weighting function
(·) (also called capacity)w h i c hr e ﬂects the “sensitivity” of people towards their own uncertainty on the quantiﬁcation
of probability.10 Under Quiggin’s rank dependent utility (RDU), the risky bet ,w i t hs t a t e - d e p e n d e n tp a y o ﬀs 1 ≥
9People are assumed to have subjective, or “personal” probabilities of the states, which may legitimately diﬀer across people. In fact,
de Finetti (1931) and Savage (1954) showed that probabilities can be deﬁned in the absence of statistics, by relating them to observable
choice. For example, using the so-called Laplace’s “principle of indiﬀerence”, ()=0 5 can be derived from an observed indiﬀerence
between receiving a prize under event  and receiving it under not- (the complement of ).
10In general, a capacity  over Ω should satisfy the following properties: (i)  (·) ∈ +; (ii) for  ∈ F s.t.  ⊆  then () ≤ ()
(monotonicity); (iii) (∅)=0a n d(Ω)=1a n d( i v )

∈Ω () ≤ 1. Probabilities are special cases of capacity functions that satisfy
additivity: ( ∪ )=()+() − ( ∩ )




[(1 + 2 +  + ) − (1 + 2 +  + −1)]() (4)
Hence, a bet  is preferred to  ( % )i fa n do n l yi f() ≥ (). It can be shown that, as long as the
capacity function (·) is convex, the preference functional in (4) is consistent with rationality and solves many of the
experimental puzzles that had created early discomfort with the (S)EU framework (e.g., the Allais’ paradox, see Allais,
1953). Under convexity, outcomes receive more weight when they are ranked worse, reﬂecting pessimism: convexity
implies low evaluations of prospects relative to sure outcomes, enhancing risk aversion. For instance, when  =2 ,
if (2)  (2)a n d(1)  (1), provided that (2)  2 and (1 + 2) − (2)  1,R D Ua l l o w sf o rt h e
ordering  % ,e v e ni f[()]  [()].11 It turns out that Quiggin’s (1982) generalization of the standard (S)EU
framework would play a considerable role in the development of the theory of rational decisions under ambiguity.
2.2. Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) and Multiple Prior Preferences (MPP)
At the core of Ellsberg’s paradox there is the awareness that–when she has too little information to form a single
prior–a decision-maker may plausibly consider a set of probability distributions and not a unique prior. Schmeidler
(1989) formalized this intuition starting from the observation that the probability attached to an uncertain event may
not reﬂect the heuristic amount of information that has led to that particular probability assignment. For example,
when there are only two possible equiprobable events, they are usually given probability 12 each, independently of
whether the available information is meager or abundant. Motivated by this consideration, Schmeidler suggested the
use of Quiggin’s weighting approach to assign non-additive probabilities, or capacities, to allow for the encoding of
information that additive probabilities cannot represent. In the context of a bet  with only two possible mutually-
exclusive outcomes, say 1 or 2, a capacity  is any assignment to the events {neither 1 nor 2 occur}, {1 or 2
or both occurs}, {1 and 2 both occur}, {1 occurs}, {2 occurs}, such that: i) (·) ≥ 0a n d(1)+(2) ≤ 1; ii)
(neither 1 nor 2 occurs) = 0; iii) (1 or 2 or both occurs) = 1. Schmeidler’s preference representation is based
on the concept of Choquet integral, that in our simple example reduces to
()= m i n
∈()
[ (1)+( 1− ) (2)]
()={ ∈ [01] ≥ (1) 1 −  ≥ (2)} (5)
where ()i st h ecore of .12 In the example, the individual acts as if she were only able to establish for each outcome
 ( =1 2) the minimal probability of occurrence (). Because of the existence of ambiguity, she considers a multi-
valued set of probability distributions uniquely deﬁned by (). Ambiguity aversion is reﬂected by the use of the
 operator, in the sense that–to protect herself against the possibility of mistakes–the agent considers the most
unfavorable probability distribution. To express the degree of ambiguity that characterizes the capacity assignment
11Such a ranking is in fact compatible with the idea that 1 is so low that the two (higher) outcomes 1 and 1 can be approximately
considered impossible. Hence the decision maker under-weights the probability 1, assigning lower weight (1 + 2) − (2)  1,a n d
makes her choice considering only the ranking between 2 and 2 (and consequently over-weighting the probability 2,a sr e ﬂe c t e di nt h e
capacity assignment (2)  2).
12The core of a capacity  consists of all ﬁnitely additive probability measures  that event-wise dominate .
10((1)(2)), Schmeidler suggested the use of an index A() ≡ 1 − (1) − (2), that measures how much overall
“faith” should be given to the outcomes 1 and 2.
In general, CEU preferences are of the multiple-prior type, in the sense that in practice, under CEU a rational
decision-maker evaluates expected utility using a multi-valued set of priors, for instance as deﬁned by  ∈ ().
Schmeidler (1989) proved that–when the capacity  deﬁn e do nas t a t es p a c eΩ is convex (i.e., given two events 





while the ambiguity index is A() ≡ max∈() ()−min∈() () (see Fishburn, 1993, and Mukerji, 1997). Hence
ambiguity aversion coincides with and it is measurable as the convexity of the capacity function. Because the capacity
 ∈ () needs not be additive, the objective in (6) cannot be computed using a standard Lebesgue integral.
Another interesting connection is between CEU preferences and RDU. Because a Choquet integral is evaluated as
Z
 () = (1)+[ (2) − (1)](2 3|Ω|)+ +[ () − (−1)]( +1 |Ω|)+
+ +[ (|Ω|) − (|Ω|−1)](|Ω|)
(|Ω| is the total number of states and |Ω|      −1    1, the outcomes are ranked from worst to
best), a decision maker evaluates  by considering ﬁrst the lowest outcome and then adding the successive increments,
weighted by her estimation of their occurrence, as captured by a capacity . Due to the non-additivity of the capacity,
the weight of an outcome will depend on its place in the ranking. Clearly, CEU is a special case of RDU. Note that
under an additive capacity, we get back to subjective expected utility, because, for |Ω|, ()[( +1|Ω|)




 ()Pr() a standard (S)EU Lebesgue integral.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) further extended the CEU model by suggesting the following representation
 %  if and only if min
∈ [()] ≥ min
∈ [()] (7)
where [(·)] is a standard (S)EU-operator when the probability measure is  ∈ .  is a convex set whose size
can be interpreted as representing the level of perceived ambiguity.13 The intuition is that–because of ambiguity
aversion–agents are considering as valid and relevant the prior which is most unfavorable. Given the multi-valued
nature of the set , preferences represented by (7) have became commonly known as multiple prior preferences (MPP).
MPP can be shown to be equivalent to CEU when the capacity is convex, since weighting outcomes by sub-additive
capacities expresses the same kind of pessimism as taking the minimum (S)EU over  (see e.g., Camerer and Weber,
1992). However, strictly speaking, neither approach is a special case of the other.14
13Already in 1950, Wald had developed the ﬁrst max-min decision criterion based on the compelling intuition that any decision problem
under unknown probabilities can be modeled as a two-player, zero-sum game. More speciﬁcally, the two players are the decision maker
and a malevolent Nature whose choice set is a particular subspace  of the space of all probability distributions over outcomes. In 1951,
Hurwicz had proposed a “generalized Bayes-minimax principle” that relates to Wald’s min-max decision rule. However, such min-max
decision rules have been axiomatized in their rational foundations only by Schmeidler (1982) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
14As noted by Wakker (2006) and others, the (S)EU-like formula (7) is at ﬁrst easier to understand than CEU. The ﬂexibility of not having
to specify precisely what “the” probability measure is, while usually perceived as an advantage, may however turn into a disadvantage when
applying the model. One has then to specify exactly what “the” set of probability distributions  is, which may be more complex than
specifying only one probability measure or a capacity. The distinction between probability measures that are either possible (contained
in ) or impossible (not contained in ), on the one hand adds to the tractability of the model, but on the other hand cannot capture
cognitive states where diﬀerent probability measures are plausible to diﬀerent degrees. Multiple priors are, however, well suited for general
theoretical analyses where only general qualitative properties of the model are needed.
11It is worth noticing that Bewley (1986) had anticipated a few of the intuitions later developed by Gilboa and
Schmeidler. Speciﬁcally, Bewley had developed a class of preferences characterized by the multi-valued nature of the
set of priors and by uncertainty aversion, but while most of the ambiguity literature has stressed that it is the bad
quality of the information that is responsible for violations of the (S)EU axioms, Bewley suggested the idea that
the lack of information renders diﬃcult the ranking of alternative bets, determining preference incompleteness. The
intuition of Bewley’s framework is that one bet is preferred to another if and only if its expected value is higher under
all probability distributions that may be employed to capture risk.15 When lotteries are non comparable, Bewley
assumes choices are made by inertia: the current choice, or status quo, is only abandoned if a new choice appears that
is certainly better (i.e., that has higher expected utility for all possible probability distributions), which is consistent
with the experimental evidence of a status quo bias (e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Knetsch, 1989).
The 1990s have witnessed a number of extensions and critiques to the seminal deﬁnition of ambiguity provided
by Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002)
have criticized Schmeidler’s (1989) notion of ambiguity aversion based on the convexity of the capacity ,s h o w i n g
that convexity is nor necessary nor suﬃcient to generate behaviors that are compatible with the intuition behind
ambiguity aversion. Considering the three-ball version of the Ellsberg’s paradox, Epstein noticed that even though
CEU preferences characterized by the capacity
()=8 24 ()=()=7 24 ( or )=1 3 24 ( or )=( or )=1 2
lead to a Ellsberg’s type ordering among bets,  is not convex. Viceversa, if the capacity is ,s u c ht h a t
()=1 12 ()=()=1 6 ( or )=1 3 ( or )=( or )=1 2
then the ranking among bets under CEU is exactly opposite to the one showed by Ellsberg, and nevertheless  is
convex. Wakker (2008) shows that in fact convexity of  is required to resolve the Allais’, not Ellsberg’s paradox.16
Motivated by these considerations, Epstein and Ghirardato and Marinacci proposed a comparative notion of
ambiguity aversion that is closely related to the one of risk aversion.17 The key idea is to use a set of events which
are exogenously known to be unambiguous as “benchmarks”. Acts (bets) that only depend on these events are called
unambiguous, since the probability distributions over their possible payoﬀs are objectively known.18 Assuming that
15Aumann (1962) showed that incomplete preferences can be represented by expected utilities over sets of probabilities. Then  ˜  if
and only if (()|)  (()|) for all probability distributions ,o t h e r w i s e and  are “incomparable”, as a result of preference
incompleteness. Schmeidler (1989) has later argued that the most troubling axiom underlying (S)EU is not the infamous independence
axiom but the more common assumption of completeness; the critical role of the independence axiom is to extend preferences from choices
that seem obvious to those that do not, i.e., it just helps to deliver completeness.
16Epstein (1999) and Wakker (2001, 2006) have argued that the Ellsberg paradox does not speak of convexity of the capacity in an absolute
sense, but only in a relative (within-person) sense, suggesting more convexity for unknown probabilities than for known probabilities. To
obtain Ellsberg’s paradox, it is then possible that the capacity is concave, and not convex, for both known and unknown probabilities, but
is less concave (and thus more convex) for the unknown probabilities.
17In standard (S)EU theory, given a gamble , a preference relation º2 is more risk averse than º1 if for any certain gamble ¯  (that is,
a gamble that pays ¯  with probability 1), ¯  º1  ⇒ ¯  º2 . In particular, a preference relation º is risk averse if it is more risk averse
than any risk neutral preference ordering º. As usual, a preference relation is risk neutral if the corresponding utility index is linear.
18Formally, given the set Ω of the states of the world, an algebra of subsets of Ω called events, and a set F of outcomes, an act  is a
ﬁnite-valued measurable function  : Ω → F.G i v e na n y¯  ∈ F,a na c t is said to be constant , if ()=¯  for all  ∈ F. Finally, given a
set of unambiguous events U,t h ea c t is said to be unambiguous if for any pair of events   ∈ U, ()=() ∀ ∈ ,  ∈ F.T h a ti s ,
on any ambiguous event,  yields the same outcome.
12a collection U of unambiguous bets is exogenously given (for Ghirardato and Marinacci such U corresponds to the set
of constant acts), the preference º2 is more ambiguity-averse than º1 if, for any  ∈ U,
 º1  ⇒  º2  (8)
meaning that if any unambiguous act is ever preferred to an ambiguous one according to preference º1,t h es a m e
ordering will be reﬂected by º2 w h i c hm u s tt h e nb ee v e nm o r ea v e r s et oa m b i g u i t y .I np a r t i c u l a r ,i nE p s t e i n ’ sf r a m e -
work a preference relation º is ambiguity-averse if it is more ambiguity-averse than any probabilistically sophisticated
order º, that can be heuristically interpreted as an uncertainty neutral order,19 while in Ghirardato and Marinacci’s
setting the reference for ambiguity neutrality is represented by some benchmark (S)EU preference. Ghirardato and
Marinacci also proved that a CEU preference ordering is ambiguity-averse if and only if its capacity  has a non-empty
core, a strictly weaker property than convexity.
2.3. Robust Control and Variational Preferences
Well after the seminal papers by Gilboa and Schmeidler had gained popularity (see e.g., the early review by Camerer
and Weber, 1992), Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (1998, 2003) and Hansen and Sargent (2001) noted that multiple-
prior criteria also appear in the robust control theory used in engineering. Robust control theory speciﬁes the set
of probabilities  by taking a single “approximating model” and statistically perturbing it. This reﬂects a situation
wherein agents have a speciﬁc model of reference and, acknowledging the possibility of errors in it, they seek robustness
against misspeciﬁcations. Usually,  is implicitly parameterized through some coeﬃcient  such that the higher is ,
the less importance is given to alternative models deviating from the approximating one. Hansen and Sargent (2001)
pointed out that the concern for the possibility of model-misspeciﬁcation may derive from ambiguity and the poor
quality of information used to select the approximating model. Therefore  can be thought of as an ambiguity aversion
index since it measures the fear of model misspeciﬁcation: the lower is , the higher is the degree of ambiguity aversion.
Hansen and Sargent and a number of co-authors have developed a class of preferences that may be represented as





where ∆(Ω)i st h es t a n d a r ds i m p l e x , is the approximating, baseline probability distribution, and (·||)i st h e
Kullback—Leibler divergence between any probability distribution over the reference state space and . For instance,
(·||) may be specialized to be the entropy of  relative to , i.e., (||) ≡
P|Ω|
=1 ()ln[()()] = [ln()] ≥ 0
so that  =  implies (||) = 0, which is the expected diﬀerence in log-likelihoods between the reference and
transformed models, with the expectation based on the latter. In (9), the term (||)a c t sa sap e n a l t yt e r m :
intuitively, agents consider a range of models  in alternative to ,b u tt h e ya s s i g nah i g h e r“ w e i g h t ”t om o d e l st h a t
are close in a statistical sense–as measured by the Kullback—Leibler distance–to the approximating model, .20 The
19A preference relation º is probabilistically sophisticated if it ranks gambles only on the basis of a possible (compound) probability
distribution assigned to the payoﬀso ft h eg a m b l e .
20In technical terms, the use of entropy imposes that alternative probability distributions have to be absolutely continuous with respect
to the reference one and, in a diﬀusion setting, absolute continuity restricts the class of alternative models to those diﬀusions that only
diﬀer in terms of the drift function with respect to the approximating process. Increasing penalization of larger departures from the
approximating model is consistent with the experimental results in Yates and Zukowski (1976), who ﬁnd that increasing the range of
possible experimental probabilities increases ambiguity aversion.
13formulation in (9) is often referred to as the “penalty problem”. An alternative methodology used in the robust control
literature consists instead in formulating a “constrained problem”, i.e., deﬁning the set  of alternative distributions
by constraining the relative entropy of the elements  ∈  with respect to the reference model  to be lower than a
parameter . According to this second approach, individual’s preferences can be represented by




[()]  = { ∈ ∆(Ω):(||) ≤ } (10)
which is a particular case of MPP. Hansen and Sargent (2001) showed that (10) and (9) are connected via the Lagrange
multiplier theorem, since the preference orderings implied by the two approaches diﬀer, but the two optimizations lead
to identical decisions.
The Hansen-Sargent model (9) is highly suitable to applications as it can be embedded into intertemporal continuous-
state-space frameworks, in particular let B be a -dimensional BM on a probability space (ΩF) and  as t a t e -
dependent variable which is assumed to evolve according to  = ( )+σ( )B. The actions of a decision








s.t.  = ( ) + σ( )B (11)
where  is a standard subjective discount factor. When ambiguity-aversion is introduced, the BM B is replaced by
ˆ B+
R 
0 θ where ˆ B is another BM, and θ is used to transform the probability distribution  into a new distribution
 that is absolutely continuous with respect to , since its Radon-Nikodym derivative, 
 ≡ ,i s






























Hence, a possible, alternative “twisted” model can be represented as:
x = μ(xc) + σ(xc)[θ(x) + B] (14)




















s.t.  = ( ) + σ( )B (15)
where the problem in (15) has the same structure as (11) with two key amendments: expectations are computed under
the measure  and deviations from  are penalized by  times the Kullback—Leibler entropy measure, ().
Hansen-Sargent robustness preferences (9) have been axiomatized only subsequently by Maccheroni, Marinacci,
and Rustichini (2006) who have formally proven that robustness preferences are in fact a speciﬁc sub-class of what they
have labeled variational preferences (VP). VP are characterized by a grounded (with zero inﬁmum value), convex, and
14lower semi-continuous function  deﬁned on the standard simplex ∆(Ω).  is called ambiguity index, since diﬀerent
functional forms of  determine diﬀerent attitudes towards ambiguity. According to the VP criterion:
 %  if and only if min
∈∆(Ω)
[()] + () ≥ min
∈∆(Ω)
[()] + () (16)
In words, agents consider all possible probabilities in ∆(Ω), giving weight () to each of them, and the minimization
over  ∈ ∆(Ω)r e ﬂects ambiguity aversion. The cautious attitude featured by VP agents can also be interpreted
as the outcome of a two-player zero sum game between the decision maker and a malevolent Nature (with the goal
of minimizing the agent’s utility), that, for any selected act , chooses a probability , incurring a cost ()w h i c h
depends on the speciﬁc probability measure she has selected. Furthermore, two pairs (0;0)a n d( ;)r e p r e s e n tt h e
same preferences if and only if there exist 0a n d such that  = 0 +  and  = 0, which nicely extends the
usual linearity property of VNM ordinal utility indices. VP are characterized by uncertainty aversion as deﬁned by
Schmeidler, and ambiguity aversion comparisons are based on the following criterion: %
1 is more ambiguity averse
than %
2 if the associated ambiguity indexes 1 and 2 are such that 1() ≤ 2(), ∀ ∈ ∆(Ω).
The tight relationship between VP and Hansen-Sargent robustness preferences is far from unique: VP have the
advantage of nesting many of the known preferences structures that (may) capture ambiguity-aversion. For instance,
setting ()=1i f ∈  and ()=0i f 6∈ , one obtains MPP. Obviously, noting that (||) is a convex
function and setting ()=(||) one derives Hansen-Sargent (HS) robust preferences. Another feature of VP is
that they include as a special case Monotone Mean Variance Preferences (MMVP) that extend outside their domain
of monotonicity the classical Mean Variance Preferences of Markowitz and Tobin.2122
2.4. Dynamic Representations of Ambiguity-Averse Preferences and Alternative Approaches
With the exception of Hansen and Sargent continuous time modelling of robust preferences, a major concern with most
of the advances reviewed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 is that these are static settings. However, preference functionals that
take ambiguity into account have also been proposed within truly dynamic settings, which are important in ﬁnancial
applications. However, because ambiguity leads to (and stems from) violations of the Sure-Thing Principle, deﬁning
updating and ensuring dynamic consistency for CEU/MPP or similar models is a non-trivial task and it has been
extensively debated. For instance, it is easy to put together simple two-period extensions of Ellsberg’s paradox in
which an individual with Ellsberg-type preferences ends up displaying a dynamically inconsistent behavior as she will
fail to ex-post follow the path she has decided ex-ante, see e.g., the examples in Etner et al. (2009, pp. 32-33).
To see what the concern is, consider the following example adapted from Backus et al. (2004). Consider a simple
model with three periods ( =0 12) and in which–in each period–only two states are possible, from the set
Ω = {12} This is obviously a standard binomial tree with three dates and a total of four ﬁnal possible nodes. Date
21Preferences characterized by functional representation  ()=m i n ∈∆(Ω) []+(||)a r eas p e c i ﬁc subclass of VP called Monotone





  ()= m i n
∈∆(Ω)
[]+(||)
where (||) is the relative Gini concentration index. Section 4.1 describes applications of MMVP.
22Because most models of ambiguity are based on relaxations of the independence axiom, Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci and
Montrucchio (2009) have developed a general class of uncertainty averse preferences that completely do away with the independence axiom.
151 probabilities are (1 =1 )=(1 =2 )=1 2; they are not ambiguous. Date 2 (conditional) probabilities depend on
1 and an autocorrelation parameter , for which the agent has point-wise priors on the values +1 and −1. As a result,
the conditional probabilities of the four date 2 possible states are (2 =1 |1 =1 )=(2 =2 |1 =2 )=( 1+)2
and (2 =2 |1 =1 )=(2 =1 |1 =2 )=( 1− )2. The probabilities depend on whether 1 and 2 are the
same or diﬀerent and whether  is +1 or −1. With these probabilities, consider the value of an asset that pays 1
unit of the consumption good if 2 = 1 and 0 otherwise, i.e., a simple state-contingent Arrow-Debreu security. For
convenience, let ()=, a simple risk-neutral linear utility index and set the subjective discount factor to 1. If
any two recursive–over times and nodes of the tree–and date zero valuations of the asset diﬀer, at least one set of
preferences must be dynamically inconsistent. Consider recursive valuation ﬁrst. At the node corresponding to the
event 1 =2 ,t h ev a l u eo ft h ea s s e ti s( 1+)2. Minimizing with respect to ,a si si m p l i e db ys t a n d a r dM P P / m a x -
min preferences, implies  = −1 and a value of 0 for the Arrow-Debreu security. Similarly, the value at the node
corresponding to 1 = 1 is also 0, this time based on  = +1. The value at date zero is therefore 0 as well: there is no
ambiguity, so the value is (12)(0)+(12)(0) = 0. Now consider a (naive) date zero problem based on the two-period
probabilities of the four possible two-period paths: (1+)4, (1−)4, (1−)4, and (1+)4. Ambiguity on these
probabilities is again represented by . Since the asset pays 1 if the ﬁrst or third path occurs, its date zero value is
[(1+)4]+[(1−)4] = 12  0, which is not ambiguous. The date 0 value (1/2) is clearly larger than the recursive
value (0), so preferences are dynamically inconsistent. Here the problem is that the ﬁrst, recursive valuation approach
has allowed  to diﬀer across date 1 nodes, while the date 0, one-shot valuation does not. This may happen because
giving the agent access to date 1 information increases the amount of information but also increases the amount of
ambiguity, which reduces the value of the asset. Therefore any resolution of this dynamic inconsistency problem must
modify either the recursive or date 0 preferences.
Epstein and Schneider (2003) have proposed the latter approach. They show that if we expand the set of date zero
probabilities in the right way, this will lead to the same preferences as in a MPP criterion, restoring dynamic consistency.
In general, preferences depend on probabilities over complete paths, which in our example you might associate with
the four terminal nodes {0 1 =2  2 =2 } {0 1 =2  2 =1 }{0 1 =1  2 =2 } and {0 1 =1  2 =1 }.E p s t e i n
and Schneider introduce a condition–called rectangularity–that instructs us to compute the set of probabilities
recursively, one period at a time, starting at the end. At each step, we compute a set of probabilities for paths given
our current history. In our example, the main eﬀect of this approach is to eliminate any connection between the values
of  at the two date 1 nodes. The resulting date 0 probabilities are (1+1)4 (1−1)4 (1−2)4 and (1+2)4.
The value of the asset is therefore (1+1)4+( 1−2)4=1 2+(1 −2)4. An ambiguity-averse investor will set
1 = −1a n d2 = +1 and the value is zero, the same value we computed recursively. In short, expanding the date
0 set of probabilities in this way reconciles date 0 and recursive valuations and resolves the dynamic inconsistency
problem. One puzzling consequence of rectangularity is that it can induce ambiguity in events that have none to begin
with. For instance, in our example it is obvious that (2 =2 )=(2 =2 |1 =2 ) +(2 =2 |1 =1 )=( 1+)2+
(1 − )2=1 2, for which there is no ambiguity. Yet, under Epstein and Schneider’s rectangularity, (2 =2 )=
[(1+1)4]+[(1−2)4] = 12+(1−2)4 and ambiguity seems to oddly persist. The apparent puzzle is resolved if
we realize that the date-zero rectangular set does not represent date 0 ambiguity, but the date 0 probabilities needed
to anticipate preferences over future ambiguity.
16Chen and Epstein (2002) have extended these intuitions to develop a time consistent, continuous-time intertemporal
version of MPP that has been crucial in a number of asset pricing papers. In their model time varies over [0]a n d
uncertainty is represented by a probability space (ΩF). There is a single consumption good at each point in time
and  denotes the consumption process. B =( B)i sa-dimensional BM on (ΩF). A density generator is a
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Chen and Epstein generalized the notion of stochastic diﬀerential utility introduced by Duﬃe and Epstein (1992)












where the function  is an aggregator as in Duﬃe and Epstein (1992). With this deﬁnition for  
 ( ≥ ), intertemporal
MPP is represented as the lower envelope of 












0 ≤  ≤  (19)
Under some regularity assumptions on the domain Θ, the ambiguity-aversion preferences in (19) are dynamically
consistent, allowing for a recursive representation of the utility process. Whilst the important paper by Chen and
Epstein (2002) extended in a dynamically consistent fashion the MPP introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler, it was
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2007) who introduced dynamic VP. Recalling the previous interpretation of a
two-players zero sum game against Nature, Maccheroni et al. show that a VP-decision maker is dynamically consistent
if and only if she thinks that Nature is also dynamically consistent in its malevolence. As a corollary, it can be derived
that dynamic MPP and Hansen and Sargent’s robustness preferences are dynamically consistent.
An alternative approach to the deﬁnition of ambiguity is the multi-stage, multi-lottery approach. Notice that
by construction any two-stage lottery is simply deﬁned a special bet with outcomes (at the end of the ﬁrst stage)
that can be thought of as further lotteries. One early example of the connection between two-stage lotteries and
ambiguity was oﬀered by Segal (1990). Segal used two-stages lotteries to model ambiguous bets for which the ﬁrst
imaginary stage is a lottery over the possible values of the probability measure  that characterizes the second-stage
lottery. Accordingly, in Ellsberg’s experiment the decision maker considers the urn with unknown composition as
sampled from a set of urns. Segal showed that agents who are (S)EU-maximizers in the second stage and display
anticipated utility preferences (AUP) in the ﬁrst stage, exhibit Ellsberg’s behavior. AUP (see, e.g., Quiggin, 1982) is
an extension of the expected utility framework based on the relaxation of the independence axiom, that allows for the
representation of choices that are incompatible with standard theory.24 In Segal’s framework, this is precisely what is
23Here, and only for simplicity, we treat Θ as exogenous. For more details on its construction, see Chen and Epstein (2002).
24AUP permits the analysis of phenomena associated with the distortion of subjective probability, since it is based on a weighted sum
of state-contingent utilities formed using decision weights. Each weight is derived from the entire distribution over the reference state
space and not from the individual probabilities. Hence, when extreme events are overweighted, some intermediate outcome must be
underweighted (even if it has same objective probability to occur).
17needed to avoid the reduction of compound, multi-stage lotteries into simpler, single-stage lotteries (this would happen
if agents were (S)EU-maximizer also in the ﬁrst stage, because of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom).25 In
particular, Ellsberg’s behavior would be primarily related to a decision maker’s attitude towards second-order risk
(informally deﬁned as “ambiguity” by Segal, 1987), that is, risk aversion in the ﬁrst stage.
Ergin and Gul (2004) and Nau (2006) have extended the seminal intuitions by Segal and identiﬁed ambiguous
bets with compound lotteries whose uncertainty derives from independent issues. To motivate their approach, they
used the three-ball version of the Ellsberg’s paradox presented in Section 2.1. Speciﬁcally, they note that two types of
uncertainty can be described: ﬁrst there is the issue of which ball is chosen (red or non-red), second there is the issue
of the color of the non-red balls. In their view, the violation of the expected utility paradigm arises because agents
are comparing bets that are based on diﬀerent issues:  and 0 are based only on the issue of which ball is chosen
(the knowledge of the composition of the urn is not relevant), while  and 0 are based on both issues. Ergin and Gul
associated to each possible bet a new compound two-stage lottery, where each stage is identiﬁed with the resolution
of one issue. By ranking the compound lotteries, agents are implicitly ranking also the original ones. Speciﬁcally,
ambiguity-aversion translates into the preference for bets based only on the ﬁrst issue (red or non-red). The link
with the traditional approach towards ambiguity is established by the fact that ambiguity aversion over original bets,
implies risk aversion over compound lotteries.
Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) have elaborated these multi-stage ideas by proposing that the ambiguity
of a risky act  is characterized by a set  = {1} of subjectively plausible cumulative probability distributions
for .L e t t i n g denote the random variable distributed as ,  =1  based on her subjective information, the
decision maker associates a distribution (1)o v e r,w h e r e is the subjective probability of  being the true
distribution of . The resulting preferences (call them KMM) have the representation26















where (·) is an increasing real-valued function, whose shape describes the investor’s attitude towards ambiguity. First
the decision maker evaluates the expected utility of  with respect to all the priors in : each prior  is indexed by
 so in the end, we get a set of expected utilities, each being indexed by . Then, instead of taking the minimum of
these expected utilities, as MPP would, take an expectation of distorted expected utilities. The role of  is crucial
here: if  were linear, the criterion would simply reduce to (S)EU maximization with respect to the combination of
the probabilities s and possible distributions s. When  is not linear, one cannot combine sa n dst oc o n s t r u c t
a reduced probability distribution. In this event, the decision maker takes the expected “-utility” (with respect to )
of the expected “-utility” (with respect to the s). A concave  will reﬂect ambiguity aversion, in the sense that it
places a larger weight on bad expected “-utility” realizations.27
25The reduction of compound lotteries axiom states that any two-stage lottery is equivalent to a simple lottery yielding the same prizes
with the corresponding (and appropriately) computed total probabilities. This principle is key in the reductionist approch to ambiguity,
as described in Camerer and Weber (1992) and ﬁrst discussed by Marshack (1975). There is abudant evidence that the reduction axiom
is systematically violated in experiments (e.g., Camerer and Ho, 1991).
26Kreps and Porteus’ (1978) risk-sensitive preferences–that have received considerable attention in the asset pricing literature–have a
functional representation similar to KMM preferences. However Kreps and Porteus’ preferences are not directly concerned with ambiguity,
but are instead motivated by issues of time resolution of uncertainty in the classical (S)EU framework. The model extends of the standard
(S)EU-framework since the agent is allowed to display a particular preference for an earlier (or later) resolution of uncertainty.
27Ergin and Gul (2004), Nau (2006) and Neilson (2010) have interpreted (20) to stress that second stage events are from a diﬀerent
18One important implication of the two-stage approach is that the decision maker is not forced to be so pessimistic as
to select the act that maximizes the minimum expected utility as a consequence of the separation between ambiguity
and the decision maker’s attitude toward ambiguity. In this sense KMM preferences may be interpreted as a “smooth”
extension of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s classical MPP. MPP is a limiting case of (20): up to ordinal equivalence, MPP
is obtained in the limit as the degree of concavity of  increases without bound. Further, a very simple criterion for
ambiguity aversion comparisons can be derived within the KMM framework: %
1 is more ambiguity averse than
%









1, or, equivalently, if 1 is more concave than 2.28 Contrary to MPP and RDU preferences, in the KMM model
beliefs and (ambiguity) attitude parameters are explicitly separated. For instance, it is the function (·)t h a tc a p t u r e s
aversion to (or a preference for) ambiguity. Moreover, in the smooth ambiguity representation, beliefs may be seen
to have precisely the same connection to a decision maker’s subjective information as in subjective expected utility
representation and standard Bayesian theory routinely applied in economics. The possibility to obtain a clear and
time-consistent separation between beliefs and aversion to ambiguity in KMM framework, clearly represents a key
advantage over MPP, which has attached considerable attention in applied work in ﬁnancial economics (see Sections
3.6 and 4.4). However, a number of recent papers have drawn the attention on the fact that KMM may often imply
counterintuitive behaviors when the agent can bet directly on what the true model is.29
Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2002) have recently returned to work on the seminal intuition by Quiggin
and Schmeidler that ambiguity is a phenomenon that must captured as and related to the properties of capacities
used in the representation of preferences. They suggest the use of non-extreme outcome (NEO) additive capacities
to model optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty. After providing a weighting scheme for objective
probabilities to derive neo-additive capacities, Chateauneuf et al. (2002) axiomatized a model based on Choquet
expected utility with neo-additive capacities. For simplicity, consider an act ,w h o s ep a y o ﬀ can be either 1 or 2,
with 1  2. The decision maker beliefs are such that she is able to derive a probability distribution for the two
outcomes, say (1)a n d(2). The NEO additive weighting scheme is
()= +( 1−  − )()  ≥ 0 +  ≤ 1 (21)
where  and  are parameters that capture pessimism and optimism, respectively. The above assignment can be
re-interpreted as a convex combination of a probability and two capacities on two extreme outcomes: one is complete
ignorance in everything but certain events (0), and the other is complete conﬁdence in everything but the null
(impossible) event. Speciﬁcally, assuming the existence of a set  () of events that are considered virtually impossible
(certain to occur), and letting for any event  0 ()=1i f ∈  and 0 otherwise, and 1 ()=0i f ∈  and 1
otherwise, then ()=0 ()+1 ()+(1−  − )() The Choquet expected value of  under  is:

()=[  +( 1−  − )(1)]1 +[ 1−  − (1 −  − )(1)]2
From this expression it is easy to see that  = 0 corresponds to pure pessimism, when the weight assigned to the
source of ambiguity than the ﬁrst-stage events. A concave (·), for instance, suggests stronger preference for certainty, and more ambiguity
aversion, for the ﬁrst-stage uncertainty than for the second. Seo (2009) has recently circumvented this issue and proposed an axiomatization
in which the domain on which decisions are deﬁned is simply the intuitive state space (i.e., in Ellsberg example, the color of the ball drawn).
28Notice the similarity with the standard, SEU-style analysis of (local) risk aversion, as in Arrow and Pratt (1952).
29We refere the Reader to Epstein (2010) for an interesting example.
19better outcome 1 is (1 − )(1) ≤ (1), while  = 0 corresponds to pure optimism since the weight assigned to the






 +( 1−  − )[] (22)
Therefore, the payoﬀ of any strategy is given by a weighted average of the expected payoﬀ under the probability ,
plus maximal and minimal payoﬀs over the reference state-space Ω. The additive part of (), [], can be
interpreted as the agent’s belief and (1−−) as (her) degree of conﬁdence in that belief which nicely connects with
Keynes’ (1921) distinction between the likelihood implied by the evidence and the weight to be assigned to it.
2.5. Learning and Ambiguity
In the early stages of the literature, it was common to stumble in the (as we shall see, sometimes erroneous) speculation
that ambiguity might be an asymptotically irrelevant phenomenon if agents were allowed to learn about their stochastic
environment. For instance, it was observed that in the classical Ellsberg paradox, it is obvious that any decision maker
could beneﬁt from repeated independent draws from the ambiguous urn. However, reality is often complex enough
that even related events over time cannot be interpreted as independent, repeated draws from a stationary urn that
never changes. More interestingly, there are also technical issues because, under non-additive probabilities, the notion
of “independence” is not always well-deﬁned. More speciﬁcally, in the context of the Ellsberg’s experiment, successive
independent random draws could correspond to two very diﬀerent experiments (see Dow and Werlang, 1994):
1. Balls are drawn (with replacement) from an urn with an uncertain fraction of red and black balls;
2 .O n eb a l li sd r a w nf r o mas e q u e n c eo fu r n s .T h ef r a c t i o no fr e da n db l a c kb a l l si nt h eu r n si su n k n o w n .
While in the case of experiment 1, it is obvious that the agent’s subjective beliefs would become less ambiguous
over time, and eventually converge to a limit, under experiment 2 the notion of independence might be more properly
described as “lack of known dependence”. Under this particular situation, uncertainty will fail to disappear because
standard recursive drawing schemes might be applied but without inducing any change in the agent’s belief. For
example, in the CEU-model, for a given capacity  o v e rt h es t a t es p a c e ,t h eB a y e s ’r u l ef o ru p d a t i n g is given by
(|)= m i n
∈()
 ( ∩ )
 ()
()  0
but the core of (·|),  ((·|)), is not necessarily “smaller” than  (), hence ambiguity is not progressively reduced
by subsequent draws. Therefore, if the structure of the environment is suﬃciently complex, ambiguity does not trivially
disappear with the passage of time. In fact, models of ambiguity are known to cause a number of curious problems
(see e.g., Gilboa, 1989, and Etner et al., 2009) to standard updating algorithms, which interfere with the possibility
“to learn ambiguity away”.30 In particular, there are instances in which the standard Bayes rule fails, which makes
modelling learning in the presence of ambiguity much harder than under (S)EU. For instance, Gilboa and Schmeidler
30See Al Najjar and Weinstein (2009). The issues are not limited to updating algorithms. For instance, in a CEU framework it is easy
to check that if probabilities are nonadditive, then maximizing (·) is not necessarily the same as minimizing −(·), as preference orders
may diﬀer when two diﬀerent kinds of Choquet expectations are taken.
20(1991) have studied how to update non-additive probabilities and have deﬁned a family of pseudo-Bayesian updating
rules. When probabilities are additive, each rule coincides with Bayes’s rule, but in general this correspondence fails.
Epstein and Schneider (2007) have tackled these issues and formally introduced the eﬀects of learning in a Epstein-
Chen ambiguity set up, when the distinction between risk and ambiguity matters and the data are generated by the
same memoryless mechanism in every period. Speciﬁcally, they contend that standard Bayesian learning models are
extreme in the sense that they describe agents who are implausibly ambitious about what they can learn in complicated
environments. On the opposite, Epstein and Schneider developed a learning model based on recursive MPP with three
realistic features: ﬁrst, people prefer risky bets to ambiguous ones with ﬁxed composition in the short run, but not
in the long run (so that Ellsberg-type behavior is observed in the short run only); second, risky bets are preferred
to ambiguous bets with changing composition in both the short and the long run; ﬁnally, ambiguous bets with ﬁxed
compositions are always preferred to bets with changing composition. The proposed learning model allows decision
makers to express conﬁdence about the changing environment and yet ambiguity needs not vanish in the long run:
if some time-varying features of the model remain impossible to know even after many observations, then the agent
moves towards a state of time-invariant ambiguity, where she has learnt all that she can.
In a setting characterized by a ﬁnite state space identical at all times, Ω = Ω,o n es t a t e ∈ Ω is observed in
every period. At time , the agent’s information consists of the history  =( 1) .As t a n d a r dB a y e s i a nm o d e l
of learning about a memoryless mechanism is summarized by a triple (Ξ 0), where Ξ is a parameter space, 0 is
ap r i o ro v e ri t ,a n d is the likelihood. Ξ collects features of the data-generating mechanism that the decision-maker
is trying to learn, while 0 represents initial beliefs about them. For a given parameter value  ∈ Ξ,t h ed a t aa r ea n
independent and identically distributed sequence of signals {}, where the distribution of any signal  is described by
the probability density (·|). Beliefs on (payoﬀ-relevant) states are represented by a process {} of one-step-ahead











where  represents history up to time  and  is the posterior belief about  derived via Bayes’ Rule. When agents
are ambiguity-averse, ambiguity is introduced in the initial beliefs about parameters, represented by a set 0 of
probability measures on Ξ (and not by a unique 0) .T h es i z eo f0 reﬂects the decision-maker’s (lack of) conﬁdence
in the prior information on which initial beliefs are based. A set of likelihoods  represents the agent’s a priori view
of the connection between signals and the true parameters. The multiplicity of likelihoods in  captures complexity
of the environment that prevents the agent to learn properly, since every parameter  ∈ Ξ is associated with a set of
probability measures, (·|)={(·|): ∈ },w h e r ee a c h : Ξ → ∆(Ω) is a likelihood function. The dynamics of










where  is a parameter (0 ≤ 1) that governs the extent to which the decision-maker is willing to re-evaluate her
views about how past data have been generated in the light of new sample information. To fully derive the updating
rule that determines the construction of the set (), once the sequence  has been observed, the elements of 
 ()
have to be speciﬁed. To do so, consider a decision-maker at time  looking back at the sample : in general, she
21views both her prior information and the sequence of signals as ambiguous. As a result, she will typically entertain
an u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent theories about how the sample has been generated: speciﬁcally, a theory is a pair (0 ),
where 0 is a prior belief on Ξ and  =( 1) ∈  is a sequence of likelihoods. Attitude towards past and
future signals are allowed to be diﬀerent: on the one hand,  is the set of likelihoods possible in the future; on the
other hand, the decision-maker may re-evaluate her views about what sequence of likelihoods has been relevant for
generating the data. To formalize re-evaluation, Epstein and Schneider suggested the following two steps procedure.
First, how well a theory (0 ) explains the data is captured by the (unconditional) data density evaluated at 
as
R Q
=1 (|)0(). Here conditional independence implies that the conditional distribution given  is simply
the product of the likelihood values =1 . Prior information is taken into account by integrating out the
parameter using the prior 0. The higher the likelihood of the data, the better is the observed sample  explained by
the theory (). Next, the posterior (·; 0 ) is derived from the theory (0,) by Bayes’ Rule given the data








−1(·;−1 0 −1) (25)
Recursive re-evaluation of the agent’s beliefs takes the form of a likelihood-ratio test. The decision-maker discards
all theories (0 ) that do not pass such a test against an alternative theory that puts maximum likelihood on the
sample. Posteriors are formed only for theories that pass the test and are given by:

 ()={(;0 ):0 ∈  ∈ }
Z  Y
=1




˜ (|)˜ 0 (26)
This two-step process captures Epstein and Schneider’s eﬀort at integrating standard Bayesian learning within a MPP
set up. Section 4 illustrates a few applications of this result to key questions in the theory of ﬁnance.31
3. Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Decisions under Ambiguity
3.1. Trading Breakdowns and Limited Participation under Ambiguity
The seminal paper on the eﬀects of ambiguity on optimal portfolio choice is Dow and Werlang (1992), who studied
a stylized two-period portfolio problem by considering a market with one ambiguous asset and one safe bond. Their
result is path-breaking: while under (S)EU, portfolio trades will occur generically, which means that empirically
trading will be widespread, ambiguity may induce the existence of wide and persistent intervals for prices, for which
the net demand for the asset is zero. Of course, such intuition is very important to understand the existence of market
freezes, situations in which trading endogenously stops.
It is instructive to take a closer look at Dow and Werlang’s (1992) result. In a standard (S)EU framework, a risk
neutral investor will buy (sell) a positive share of the risky asset if its price is higher (lower) than the expected value
of its future payoﬀs; therefore the threshold between optimal purchases and sales is represented by a single price (as
31Let us mention that alternative ambiguity preferences have often required less eﬀorts. For instance, updating using Bayes’ rule does
not represent a problem in KMM dynamic preferences.
22known since Arrow, 1965). On the contrary, under CEU-preferences, there exists an interval of prices (and not a
single point as it would be under SEU) within which the agent neither buys nor sells short the risky asset. At prices
below (above) the lower (upper) limit of the interval, the agent is willing to buy (sell) the asset, but when equilibrium
forces fail to push the asset price outside the interval, there will be no willingness to trade. The intuition behind this
ﬁnding may be grasped from the following example. A risky asset pays oﬀ either 1 =1o r2 = 3, and the capacity
 is such that (1)=0 2a n d(2)=0 4. The investor is risk neutral, so that the expected payoﬀ from buying a
unit of the risky asset is given by (buy) = 06 × 1+0 4 × 3=1 8; this derives from the fact that in a max-min
perspective, the weight is placed on a capacity of 0.4 in the good state and, as a result, of 0.6 in the bad state. On
the other hand, the payoﬀ from selling the asset is higher if the state underlying 1 is realized; therefore (sell) =
02×1+08×3=2 6; this derives from the fact that in a max-min perspective, the weight is placed on a capacity of
02 in the bad state and, as a result, of 08 in the good state. Hence, for prices in the interval (18 26), the investor
would strictly prefer a zero position in the asset to either going short or long.
Given two capacities  and , Dow and Werlang deﬁned the capacity  to be at least as uncertainty averse as  if
for all events  ⊂ Ω, A() ≥ A(). In particular, it is easy to show that the no-trade interval, or, equivalently,
the bid-ask spread (see Section 5 for further elaboration on this interpretation), associated to , −[−]−[],
is wider relative to the one derived under .32
Another simple attempt at using basic ambiguity-related intuitions to tackle the empirical evidence of under-
participation in (risky) asset markets and of biases in portfolio decisions has been recently proposed by Easley and
O’Hara (2009). They investigate the problem of portfolio diversiﬁcation between a riskless and an uncertain asset
whose payoﬀ  is normally distributed, with mean  and payoﬀ variance 2. In their model, the two assets’ net supplies
are 0 and , respectively. The  investors in the market display constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) negative
exponential utility, with unit risk aversion parameter. An ambiguity averse investor holds beliefs that are compatible







Due to ambiguity aversion, the optimal portfolio of this investor is chosen by maximizing the minimum expected utility
over sets of possible parameters, which is compatible with static versions of MPP. Simple algebra shows that–given













Therefore the decision of ambiguity averse investors to participate in the market for the risky asset is determined by
min and max, in the sense that when the price falls in the compact interval [min, max] there is no demand for
the risky asset by the ambiguity averse traders. Hence, a region of possible beliefs for the expected payoﬀ of risky
assets may exist such that ambiguity averse investors abstain from trading and a limited participation equilibrium is
possible. In a limited participation equilibrium, only (S)EU investors participate and trade the asset. Of course, if we
32Another interesting implication of Dow and Werlang (1992) concerns insurance choices. Under (S)EU, an agent who can buy actuarially
fair insurance in any amount will always choose to be fully insured. Instead under CEU-type ambiguity, a range of premium costs will
exist at which the agent is not willing to get fully insured, which is a susprising result that may reconcile the widely observed tendency
by risk averse agents to under-insure with rational decisions under uncertainty. Camerer and Weber (1992) have noticed that starting in
the 1980s American insurance ﬁrms began raising premiums dramatically (or refusing to sell insurance at all) for several classes of highly
ambiguous risks, like environmental hazards or manufacturing defects.
23were to assume that all investors in the market are identically ambiguity averse, then when the prices falls in [min,
max] the market will freeze and all trading will stop.33
Guidolin and Rinaldi (2009) have extended the results in Easley and O’Hara (2009), using a similar model. However,
Guidolin and Rinaldi stress the distinction between two types of uncertainty: uncertainty that aﬀects the entire market
(systematic uncertainty) and uncertainty that just reﬂects circumstances peculiar to speciﬁc ﬁrms/stocks (idiosyncratic
uncertainty). The systematic component of the stock payoﬀ is normally distributed, with mean  and variance 2
.
Also the idiosyncratic component is normally distributed, with parameters  and 2
.C a l l the total payoﬀ on the
stock. Because systematic and idiosyncratic risks are independent,  ∼ ( +  2
 + 2
). If agents are (S)EU
maximizers, they consider as plausible a unique probability distribution for the idiosyncratic component of the asset’s
payoﬀ and (2
)0 is a suﬃcient statistic for the distribution of idiosyncratic risk. In that case, the demand function






(where the exogenous inﬂation rate in Guidolin and
Rinaldi has been set to zero). The classical result by which the sign of  depends on the relation between the
price of the asset and its expected payoﬀ– ≶ 0 if and only if  ≷ ( + )–and a zero net demand represents
a knife-edge case, obtains. As in Easley and O’Hara (2009), the ambiguity averse agents act as if they have a set of

















 0i f min +  





 0i f max +  
 (28)
a n da l s oi nt h i sc a s ea ni n t e r v a lo fp r i c e s ,[ min +  max + ], exists for which it is optimal not to trade the risky
asset. Because  ≤ max, the position in the risky asset held by ambiguity averse agents is always smaller (in absolute
value) than the one held by (S)EU agents; because min ≤  ≤ max, when it is optimal for an ambiguity averse agent
to buy the risky asset, so it is for a (S)EU agent. Similarly, when it is optimal for an ambiguity averse agents to sell
the risky asset, so it is for a (S)EU agent. Guidolin and Rinaldi (2009) have also generalized their results to the case in
which ambiguity averse investors also perceive ambiguity deriving from the uncertainty on the systematic component
of the risky payoﬀs. They prove that a suﬃcient condition for ambiguity to induce market break-downs and limited
participation equilibria is that the spread between the highest and the lowest possible return of the idiosyncratic risk
component is larger than the spread between the highest and the lowest possible return of the systematic component.34
It may not be ambiguity per se that causes limited participation equilibria, but instead the fact that markets tend to
be characterized by much stronger ambiguity concerning idiosyncratic payoﬀs than ambiguity on the systematic ones.
Guidolin and Rinaldi’s results on the relative importance of systematic vs. idiosyncratic risk in driving portfolio
and limited participation results are consistent with the analysis of Mukerji and Tallon (1999). Mukerji and Tallon
have considered an economy populated by ambiguity averse agents with CEU preferences in which risky assets are
aﬀected by both systematic and idiosyncratic uncertainty.35 In their model there are two periods: one for trading
33The decision to participate does not depend on 2
max. In addition, portfolio allocations will depend on 2
max only, and not on any






. Section 4 will return on Easley and O’Hara’s paper to illustrate their equilibrium implications.
34Under a few technical restrictions, they prove that–if the ambiguity concerns only the systematic risk component–then there will be
always trade even when investors are ambiguity averse, which is the generic SEU outcome.
35Mukerji and Tallon’s ﬁndings are not a mere generalization of Dow and Werlang’s (1992) no-trade result since simply “closing” Dow
and Werlang’s model to clear markets is not suﬃcient to obtain a no-trade equilibrium.
24(time 0), and one for consumption (time 1). The ﬁnancial market is characterized by  non-redundant risky assets
and by a safe bond. The value of the payoﬀ of each risky asset is aﬀected by circumstances peculiar to that speciﬁc
security (idiosyncratic uncertainty), and others that aﬀect the overall market (systematic uncertainty). At time 1,
uncertainty unfolds, and the overall market can be in a high ()o ral o w( ) state, with known probabilities  and
1 − , respectively. Hence, the possible realizations of the systematic component are  and ,w i t h  .
At time 1, agents also receive a stochastic endowment which is aﬀected by systematic uncertainty. The possible
realizations of the idiosyncratic component in the assets’ payoﬀ are (1) and (0), with (1)  (0). These realizations
are ambiguous, however, a capacity ((1) (0)), with associated ambiguity level A(), is exogenously given.
Assuming ( −)  ((1)−(0)), Mukerji and Tallon (1999) prove that there exists an ambiguity level ¯ A,s u c h
that, if A()  ¯ A, in equilibrium the investment level in each risky asset is 0 for all investors, so that the market breaks
down and agents are suboptimally left exposed to (endowment) aggregate risk. Instead, under (S)EU, the equilibrium
allocation would approximate a complete market allocation, since usual diversiﬁcation arguments would imply that all
idiosyncrasies are washed away when the number of assets becomes arbitrary large. Under CEU preferences this result
no longer holds and trading in the well-diversiﬁed portfolio collapses. The intuition is that the law of large number
is still at work but agents’ beliefs on the payoﬀ of the well diversiﬁed portfolio converge to diﬀerent values depending
on their speciﬁc (short or long) position.36 Hence, ambiguity leads to a collapse in the trade of ﬁnancial assets whose
payoﬀ is greatly aﬀected by idiosyncratic risk when the range of variation of the idiosyncratic component in the asset’s
payoﬀ is large relative to the range of variation of the systematic one, provided that the ambiguity level is suﬃciently
high. Interestingly, it does not matter whether ambiguity concerns also aggregate, systematic, risk. Viceversa, the
presence of an idiosyncratic component in assets’ payoﬀs is necessary for trade to collapse, even if the ﬁnancial market
is already incomplete to begin with, and agents are ambiguity averse. Indeed, what is crucial in determining the
collapse in trade is the fact that, for each agent, there is an interval of prices that supports the optimal decision not
to invest in the risky asset. Removing idiosyncratic risk, such an interval collapses to a point.3738
3.2. Mean-Variance Analysis Under Ambiguity
The historical workhorse for the development of most modern ﬁnance theory has been the simple and yet powerful
mean-variance framework, in which (S)EU investors like expected portfolio returns and dislike variance–taken as a
summary of risk–of portfolio returns (see e.g., Markowitz, 1959). Kogan and Wang (2003) have generalized the simple
intuitions in Dow and Werlang (1992) and Easley and O’Hara (2009) to a general multivariate portfolio set-up, oﬀering
important insights on the implications of ambiguity (that they refer to as model uncertainty) for the cross-sectional
properties of stock returns in a simple, single-period mean-variance framework.
36Laws of large numbers for ambiguous beliefs have been studied by, among others, Walley and Fine (1982), Dow and Werlang (1994),
Marinacci (1996) and Marinacci (1999).
37Rinaldi (2009) has shown that these results are crucially related to the non-diﬀerentiability of the functional representation of CEU
preferences. In particular, ambiguity is in general not suﬃcient to generate the no-trade result. However, for non-diﬀerentiable VP
preferences a similar (more general) no-trade result holds.
38Mukerji and Tallon (2003) have subsequently proven that the seminal results in Dow and Werlang (1992) on the existence of no-trade
intervals for asset prices is strictly caused by ambiguity aversion and does not derive from any speciﬁc functional representation of their
preferences. In practice, they show that trading will break down if and only if the investors behave in ways consistent with Ellsberg’s
paradox and therefore must exhibit some form of ambiguity aversion.
25Consider a standard one-period representative agent economy, characterized by  risky assets and one riskless
bond. Recall from Introductory Finance that under (S)EU and assuming that R ≡ [1 2 ]0 follows a joint
multivariate normal distribution with known variance-covariance matrix Σ and known vector of means μ, a mean-














Σ−1(μ − ι) (30)
Kogan and Wang (2003) extend this result to the case in which the investor does not have perfect knowledge of the
distribution of the returns R; speciﬁcally, R follows a joint multivariate normal distribution with known variance-
covariance matrix Σ,a n dunknown vector of mean returns, μ. The agent displays MPP and some incomplete sources
of information are available, so that she is able at least to estimate reference probabilistic models (and hence reference
mean returns) for the joint distributions of asset returns. Following the constraint approach (10), and assuming a
unique source of information, so that the agent is able to derive only a reference joint normal distribution of asset
returns, ˆ f ∼  (ˆ μΣ), the set of eﬀective priors (ˆ f)i s
(ˆ f)=
½





where  captures ambiguity aversion (a larger  means higher aversion), and  [·] is the standard expected value









{[()]} s.t.  =[ ω0(R − ι)+( 1+)] (32)
(ω0ι =1 )w h e r eω is the vector of assets’ holdings,  is ﬁnal wealth, and the set (ˆ f) constrains the statistical
models for the vector process R to be “not too distant” from the benchmark ˆ f, with maximum distance given by .
Letting θ ≡ μ− ˆ μ be the divergence between one of the possible mean vectors under MPP and the vector of expected











0Σ−1(R − μ + θ)
¾
 (33)
subject to a budget constraint, which is an interesting transformation of the constraint on the set of admissible models
under the parameter  into a (multiplicative) factor that appears in the objective function. A measure of aversion to
ambiguity implied by a given choice of portfolio weights ω can then be derived by solving:




Denoting by ω∗and θ(ω∗)≡ (ω∗)
0μ − ˆ μ the optimal solutions to the problem, the following pricing condition holds
in the absence of arbitrage opportunities,
[0( − ∆(ω∗))(R − ι − θ(ω∗))] = 0 (35)
39In what follows  is a  × 1 vector of ones, so that  is a  × 1 vector that repeats  everywhere.
26which modiﬁes that standard Euler condition to account for the existence of ambiguity. Even though a closed-form
solution for optimal portfolio weights fails to exist, using (35), and denoting by ω the composition of the market
portfolio, Kogan and Wang show:










 [00 ( − ∆(ω))]
 [0 ( − ∆(ω))]
2
 =
 [00 ( − ∆(ω))]







Σ (ω)θ(ω)w h e r e Σ (ω)  θ(ω)=[ Σ (ω)]ω (36)
This elegant result shows that the risk premium on any risky asset can be written in a simple two-factor representation:
(i) the standard, static CAPM component with structure β, where  is the market risk premium and β is the vector
of standard betas measured with respect to returns on the market portfolio; (ii) a new component given by β
where  is the risk premium on ambiguity and β can be interpreted as a vector of betas the measure the exposure
to the ambiguity contained in the market portfolio and quantiﬁed by θ(ω)≡ω0
μ − ˆ μ. Ambiguity is only partially
diversiﬁable in the sense that, in equilibrium, for any asset only its individual contribution to total market ambiguity
will be compensated. Finally, since the investor bears both risk and what they call “Knigthian/Keynesian uncertainty”
(ambiguity), two assets with the same beta with respect to the market risk may still have considerably diﬀerent
equilibrium expected returns, which Kogan and Wang interpret as highly realistic in the light of the voluminous
literature on the empirical shortcomings of the standard (static) CAPM.
Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2007, henceforth GUW) have further extended the ﬁndings in Kogan and Wang
(2003) modeling ambiguity through a MPP approach–as opposed to Kogan and Wang’s constrained robust approach
(10)–and using a “conﬁdence interval” framework that has become popular in the literature. GUW’s starting point
is that in reality the parameters of the joint normal density characterizing the ambiguous asset returns R have to
be estimated. Assuming that a time series of length  of past asset returns h is available, the conditional density
distribution of returns (R|h) must be derived. Assuming that the returns depend on some unknown parameters θ,





















the resulting portfolio is of a Bayesian type and it will take into full account the existence of parameter uncertainty
(see, e.g., Barberis, 2000). The portfolios in which only parameter uncertainty is considered often perform poorly out of
sample, even in comparison to portfolios selected according to some simple ad hoc rules, see e.g., Garlappi, DeMiguel,
and Uppal (2009). One reason for this result is that the vector of expected asset returns μ is hard to estimate with
27any precision. This induces GUW to introduce ambiguity on the appropriate statistical model, as identiﬁed here by







s.t. f(μ ˆ μΣ) ≤ ηω 01=1  (40)
where f is a vector-valued function, and ˆ μ is the estimate of μ derived from the predictive density (R|h). GUW
(2007) prove that the max-min problem above is equivalent to the simpler maximization problem
max




where ˆ μ − μ is the “adjusted estimated expected return” (the adjustment has the role to incorporate ambiguity),


















The adjustment depends on the precision with which parameters are estimated, the length of the data series, and the
investor’s aversion to ambiguity (η). Even though the adjustment in (42) may seem to make the optimization problem
practically as simple as a classical mean variance program–with ˆ μ replaced by ˆ μ−μ–this impression is incorrect
because of the complex deﬁnition of μ: the vector of adjusted expected returns depends from the vector of portfolio
weights ω. Therefore (41) has to be solved numerically because ω enters the problem in non-linear fashion.40
Kogan and Wang (2003) and GUW (2007) are mean-variance papers under MPP in which ambiguity concerns some
features of simple statistical models–such as a multivariate Gaussian distribution for asset returns–that are typical in
ﬁnance. Wang (2005) has extended this line of work to the case in which ambiguity (he calls it Knightian uncertainty)
concerns the underlying asset pricing models that are potentially generating asset returns, and has pursued the portfolio
implications of such a framework. Notice that while the frameworks in Kogan and Wang (2003) and GUW (2007) are
simple enough to be potentially “closed” to deliver asset pricing implications under ambiguity (as we have seen possible
in Kogan and Wang’s case), Wang’s (2005) framework is instead of a partial equilibrium nature. In particular, Wang
(2005) considered the structure of optimal equity portfolios when there is ambiguity on whether returns are generated
by a Fama-French three-factor model (in which portfolios mimicking the exposure to size and book-to-market “risks”
act as factors additional to the CAPM market portfolio, see Fama and French, 1992) and in which ambiguity aversion
is captured through MPP. Assume there are  risky assets and  factor portfolios, with x1 and x2 their respective
vectors of excess returns over the risk-free rate during period ,w h e r ea l s ot h e factor portfolios are investable. The
vector time series of  observations R = {r}=1 = {(r0
1 r0
2)0}=1 is assumed to follow a multivariate normal
distribution with mean μ and variance Σ. The corresponding mean and the variances are derived from the regression
(-factor) model x1 = α + Bx2 + u,w h e r eα is the  × 1 vector of Jensen’s alphas (which capture the portion
40GUW (2007) present an interesting international asset allocation application in which the portfolio optimizer is called to choose among
eight international equity indices–a problem with structure and scope typical in the literature. The portfolio weights for each strategy
(that is, with and without accounting for ambiguity) are determined on each month using moments estimated from a rolling-window of 120
months. The resulting out-of-sample period spans the interval January 1980 to July 2001 and risk aversion is set to 1. The results show
that the model with MPP exhibit uniformly higher ex-post means, lower volatility, and, consequently, substantially higher Sharpe ratios.
In particular, the standard Bayesian model performs poorly because it puts too much weight on the estimated expected returns.
28of excess returns which is not simply explained by exposure to risk), B is the  ×  matrix of factor loadings, and
u is the  × 1 vector of residuals with constant covariance matrix equal to the  ×  North-West submatrix of
Σ. By construction, an exact -factor model holds if and only if x1 = Bx2 + u which means that on average,
excess returns can only be generated by exposures to the risks captured by x2. A c c o r d i n gt ot h es t a n d a r d( S ) E U
approach, investors who do not believe in (trust) the asset pricing model will estimate the parameters without (with)
the restriction α = 0. In the (S)EU/Bayesian framework, a ﬁxed positive number  is assumed to control the variance
of the prior distribution of the Jensen’s alphas, so that [x+1|R]a n d [x+1|R] are the mean and variance
of the predictive distribution, and diﬀerent prior beliefs in asset-pricing models (i.e. diﬀerent s) will lead to diﬀerent
predictive distributions. The investors’ optimization problem is as usual
max
 [(;)] (43)
subject to a standard budget constraint. If the agent is ambiguity averse, instead, she will behave as if she had a set





Wang (2005) uses a shrinkage approach to evaluate the impact of prior beliefs on the predictive distributions in the
standard Bayesian framework and, allowing for MPP, he also investigates the eﬀects of model uncertainty. Speciﬁcally,






where c  is the highest Sharpe ratio on the eﬃcient frontier spanned by the sample mean and variance of the factor
portfolios. Wang shows that  can be interpreted as the weight assigned to the restricted model in which α = 0:i f
 =1(  = 0), full weight is assigned to the restricted (unrestricted) model. Wang shows that the predictive mean
[x+1|R] will be a weighted average of the restricted and the unrestricted predicted means, while the predictive
variance of excess returns will be a quadratic function of the shrinkage factor, ; the predictive covariance between
the assets and the factors will be proportional to the weighted average of restricted and unrestricted estimates.





and that the particular 
∗ that solves the max-min problem is the optimal shrinkage factor to be used that takes into
account the aversion to model ambiguity. Wang uses these results to analyze a simple portfolio problem that allocates
wealth between the value-weighted market index portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks and the riskless
asset over the period July 1963 - December 1998. He ﬁnds that, when aversion to model uncertainty is incorporated,
the optimal portfolio is very diﬀerent from the market portfolio prescribed by the CAPM, and also very diﬀerent from
the portfolio based on the unrestricted Bayesian sample estimate.
The static portfolio problems in Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2007), Kogan and Wang (2003), and Wang (2005) all
have clear connections to the classical mean-variance approach. Even though their way of capturing ambiguity is to
some extent ad-hoc,P ﬂug and Wozabal (2007) have recently directly generalized Markowitz’s mean-variance approach
29to take ambiguity into account. As introduced in the seminal paper by Markowitz (1959), the basic portfolio selection
problem consists in maximizing expected portfolio returns under a risk constraint. Pﬂug and Wozabal suggested to
describe such a constraint through the concept of an acceptability function. Speciﬁcally, for any portfolio (deﬁned by
the weights ω), the acceptability (ω) is a concave, monotonic, translation-invariant and positively homogeneous real
valued function deﬁned on the payoﬀs space, such that (ω) is the maximal shift in the distribution of the return of the
portfolio deﬁned by ω that still keeps the return acceptable according to the mean-variance criterion. Hence the goal
of a portfolio choice problem is to ﬁnd an allocation that maximizes returns and leads to high acceptability. Assuming
that  is a reference probabilistic model for assets returns, and  is a positive threshold constant for acceptability, the

















 =1  ≥ 0 (47)
Standard theory often quantiﬁes the robustness of the solution of the optimization problem through stress testing. The
stress test consists in ﬁnding a plausible set of probabilistic models,  (called the ambiguity set), and in computing
the expected value and the acceptability of the optimal portfolio under any model ∈. To specify the ambiguity
set ,P ﬂug and Wozabal assumed that a reference model  can be found by estimation from historic data and what
they call “consistency” considerations, so that any other alternative model  should be not too distant from ,t h a t
is,  ={ : () ≤ },f o rag i v e n. The particular metric () used in the paper is the Kantorovich distance,






¤¯ ¯ ≤ (). The size of the ambiguity neighborhoods may be chosen to correspond to a probabilistic















≥  ∀ Ä () ≤ 
 X
=1
 =1  ≥ 0 (48)
In numerical simulations based on six randomly selected Dow Jones stocks, Pﬂug and Wozabal’s robust portfolios turn
out to be more diversiﬁed than standard, stressed-tested portfolios. The worst case expected return decreases as more
weight is given to robustness, as captured by an increasing ; however, the overall expected return only slightly drops.
Further, for this data set, the price (loss of ex-post expected return) of model robustness remains very small while the
portfolio composition changes dramatically with the increase in the size of  induced by increases in .
3.3. Robust Portfolio Decisions
Although Pﬂug and Wozabal’s (2007) paper is couched in a mean-variance framework, their results target the notion
of characterizing robust portfolios, which are portfolios suboptimal under the selected reference model, but that may
perform well under similar models. This is obviously suggestive of the possibility of studying portfolio decisions within
an explicit dynamic framework that incorporates the robustness ideas by Hansen, Sargent, and their co-authors.
One of the early examples of this strategy is Trojani and Vanini (2000), who have used the constraint framework
(10) of Anderson et al. (2003) to analyze a robust version of the classical Merton’s (1969) model in continuous time. In
their set up, a representative agent can invest either in a riskless asset, with risk-free rate , or in a risky asset, whose
price dynamics is described by a simple Geometric Brownian motion (GBM), with BM  and constant parameters 
30and . This model is the continuous time version of the random walk with drift model for stock prices postulated by
much classical ﬁnance literature under the eﬃcient market hypothesis. Letting  be the proportion of current wealth
 invested in the risky asset, the budget constraint can be expressed as
 = {[ + ( − )] − } +  (49)
where  is the consumption rate per inﬁnitesimal period. For any given initial wealth-price pair (0 0), it is possible
to deﬁne the operator {}≥0 such that:
((0 0)) =  [( )|(0 0)] (50)
The operator process {} is important because it allows to deﬁne a continuum of alternative probabilistic models
by “contamination” of some baseline, approximating model characterized by a non-negative random variable  ≥ 0,






 ()= () (). The relative entropy of the -model with











As typical in the robust control literature, a preference for robustness is induced by choosing from a set of admissible
-models the one that minimizes expected utility, where the admissible set is deﬁned by constraining the relative
entropy computed from the reference model to be lower than some parameter, . Hence the inﬁnite-horizon investor’s















subject to the postulated dynamic processes for the stock price and for wealth. The constrained minimization in 
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 (53)
subject to the distorted dynamics:





 + ( −  −
p
2)] − } +  (54)
Trojani and Vanini prove that the optimal distortion has the simple structure
√
2. Assuming an isoelastic utility
index ()=1−(1 − )( w i t h ∈ (01)), Trojani and Vanini derive the optimal robust solutions:
∗ =
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i.e., under ambiguity aversion (here, preference for robustness) and  ∈ (01), the share of the risky asset will be lower
than the share that would be optimal under (S)EU ( = 0), while the investor will consume a higher fraction of her
wealth. Moreover, it is easy to prove that ∗  0a n d∗  0, so that additional caution appears to be
31induced by aversion to ambiguity; in a sense, it is as if 0 helps mimicking the optimal portfolio selection of an
investor that is simply more risk averse than what can be capture by the parameter  appearing in her utility index.
Maenhout (2004) has further explored the eﬀects of model uncertainty on dynamic portfolio/consumption decisions
by postulating and solving a problem similar to Trojani and Vanini’s (2000) with the diﬀerence that the investor has
a ﬁnite horizon ,  is unconstrained (apart from 0, capturing risk aversion), while the penalty framework (9)
of Anderson et al. (2003) is used. Preferences are characterized by the isoelastic utility index 
1−
 (1 − )a n d
ambiguity aversion degree .41 Maenhout (2004) derives consumption-portfolio rules that perform reasonably well if
there is some form of model misspeciﬁcation. In particular, while the state equation for wealth under standard (S)EU
is the usual (49), under HS-type preferences this process must be adjusted by adding a speciﬁcd i ﬀusion term which is
endogenously chosen to minimize the sum of the expected intertemporal utility and of an entropy penalty. Anderson
et al. (2003) have shown that this distorted wealth-process can be written as
 = () + ()[ ()()]
()=( + ( − )) −  ()= (56)
where the drift adjustment  is the solution to:
inf





2 ()2 () (57)
D is the standard inﬁnitesimal generator of the HJB equation (see, e.g., Merton, 1971) applied to the value function
 . Hence, the ﬁrst two terms in (57) represent the expected continuation payoﬀ when the dynamics of wealth is
described by (56). The penalty applied to models that are “too distant” from the reference one is reﬂected in the
third term, the derivative of relative entropy.
Maenhout notices that a major drawback of HS preferences is the lack of homotheticity in case of a power-utility
index, so that the resulting optimal portfolio is not independent from the wealth level.42 To overcome this problem,
the ambiguity aversion coeﬃcient  is re-scaled at any time-state pair, and replaced by  ≡ [(1 − ) ()].43


























As long as 0, the optimal share of the risky asset ∗ will diﬀer from the standard (S)EU (Merton) demand
function, a result qualitatively similar to Trojani and Vanini’s, even though the speciﬁcs of the expression for ∗ are
diﬀerent because of the diﬀerent (ﬁnite horizon) nature the problem and the way in which robustness is modelled. The
simulations in Maenhout (2004) stress that a preference for robustness may dramatically decrease the portfolio demand
for equities and lead to an additional hedging-type demand, so that the equilibrium equity premium increases.44
41In Maenhout (2004),  is the reciprocal of  in (9), hence higher ambiguity aversion is represented by higher values of .
42Preferences are homothetic if ∀0,  ∼  ↔  ∼ .
43Maenhout (2004) provides excellent intuition for this operation.
44Further results from Maenhout (2004) will be presented in Section 4.3. Notice that whether or not the share of wealth to be optimally
consumed is increased or decreased by ambiguity aversion depends on whether  Q 1 Another interesting property–which however entirely
depends on the special utility index adopted in Manheout (2004) as well as in Trojani and Vanini (2000)–is that when  =1  the presence
of ambiguity aversion (0 in Trojani and Vanini’s work, 0i nM a n h e o u t ’ s )w i l ln o ta ﬀect consumption decisions.
323.4. Does Constraint vs. Penalty Matter, and How?
Section 3.3 has emphasized that adopting the HS-type constraint framework (10) or the penalty framework (9) may
make a diﬀerence for the structure of optimal investment and consumption rules. Trojani and Vanini (2004) have
carefully investigated these diﬀerences and compared the eﬀects of ambiguity aversion on asset pricing in the two
robustness-frameworks. They have explicitly re-considered the model in Maenhout (2004) under the constraint problem
in Anderson et al. (2003) noting that two frameworks diﬀer in the intertemporal structure of the representative agent’s
attitude towards ambiguity. Trojani and Vanini’s key insight is that the speciﬁc way in which ambiguity aversion is
modelled has no major qualitative implications for optimal consumption choices but aﬀect in diﬀerent ways the optimal
portfolio rules. In both frameworks, the asset menu isc o m p o s e do fap u r ed i s c o u n tb o n dw i t hr i s k - f r e er a t e and
an ambiguous stock with ex-dividend price .  represents the exogenous primitives of the economy and it inﬂuences




























where 0 is the state- and wealth-dependent ambiguity aversion function. As in Maenhout (2004),  → 0+ (from
the right) implies that any perturbations brought about by θ will carry enormous penalties, so that the standard
(S)EU framework obtains; on the opposite, if  →∞ ,i n ﬁnite aversion to ambiguity results. The second, Anderson et
















0θ ≤  (60)
As usual, the larger , the higher aversion to ambiguity.  = 0 implies (S)EU consumption and portfolio choices.
The value function  ()t h a ta ﬀects ( ) and solves (59) can be expressed in terms of another function
that in general cannot be computed in closed form. However, Trojani and Vanini show that optimal consumption
is not aﬀected by ambiguity aversion while optimal investment is. In particular, the consumption policy can be
interpreted as the optimal consumption of a (S)EU-investor with elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1, while
the investment policy ∗ corresponds to the optimal investment policy of a (S)EU-investor with relative risk aversion
artiﬁcially increased to  +  The optimal investment ∗ is the sum of the myopic demand (say ∗
 ())and the
hedging demand (say ∗
 ()). Comparing both demands to the standard ambiguity-free, (S)EU case (that is, with
∗
 (0) and ∗
























Hence ambiguity aversion always reduces myopic portfolio exposures because of the increased eﬀective risk aversion
parameter  + .T h e t e r m ( 1 −  + )(1 − )  1 in the hedging demand arises because, under the worst case
probability, the dynamics of  is diﬀerent from the reference one, so that optimal intertemporal hedging is modiﬁed
accordingly. The term ( +)  1 measures the reduction in hedging demand that is made necessary by the lower,
33baseline myopic portfolio rule. Whether total hedging demand under ambiguity is increased or decreased by taking
ambiguity into account will eventually depend on the relative strength of the two eﬀects, i.e., on whether the term
[ (1 −  + )][(1 − )( + )]  1o rn o t .
The value function  () that solves (60) can be expressed in terms of a function () that cannot be computed
in closed form too. Again, optimal consumption is not aﬀected by ambiguity, while the optimal investment policy is.
However, the linearized portfolio rules are not identical. Trojani and Vanini obtain that the portfolio rule corresponds
to the optimal investment policy of a (S)EU investor with relative risk aversion artiﬁcially increased to  + ,i na
constraint-style problem the optimal portfolio rule can be re-interpreted as the optimal strategy of an investor with
an eﬀective risk aversion coeﬃcient of  +
p
2(), which is made state-dependent via the function (). This is
a key insight: in a constraint-style framework, ambiguity aversion aﬀects optimal portfolio choices in a non-uniform
way over the relevant support of . In fact, the myopic and hedging demand functions (∗
 ()a n d∗
 ())
are related to those of the ambiguity free case (∗
 (0) and ∗






















and while it is unequivocal that ambiguity aversion has the power to structurally reduce myopic demands, the net eﬀect
on hedging demands depends on the balance of the terms (+
p
2())  1a n d( 1−+
p
2())(1−)  1.
3.5. Applications to Large-Scale Problems: Can Ambiguity Explain the Home Country Bias?
The papers by Trojani and Vanini’s (2000, 2004) and Maenhout (2004) drew the attention of researchers on the
possibility to derive closed-form solutions for portfolio/consumption problems under ambiguity, at least when the
aversion to uncertainty is captured in the form of a preference for robustness. However, these papers did propose and
solve stylized problems in which the portfolio decision is between one risky asset and a riskless bond. Uppal and Wang
(2003) showed instead that it is possible to use ambiguity aversion to solve realistic portfolio problems and to shed light
on unresolved questions in empirical asset allocation. In particular, Uppal and Wang (2003) solve an intertemporal
portfolio choice problem characterized by investors with a preference for HS robustness who display diﬀerent levels of
ambiguity across diﬀerent assets, and derive implications for the so-called home country bias puzzle, which refers to
the tendency of investors to bias their portfolio decisions in favor of assets issued in their countries (or even regions
and cities, see for instance Coval and Moskowitz, 1999) and away from optimal allocation weights implied by standard
(S)EU models (e.g., the widely invoked mean-variance framework); see e.g., Lewis (1999) for a review of the literature.
Uppal and Wang’s approach is simple. When investors are (S)EU-maximizers, their recursive utility in a dynamic
problem may (under appropriate conditions) be represented as
(ω)= ()+ [+1(+1ω+1)] (63)
where  is a reference probability measure, (ω) is the value function, and  is the subjective discount factor.
When investors have a preference for robustness, in the case of a single source of misspeciﬁcation, the representation
34(63) is replaced by
(ω)=()+ inf
 {(
 [+1(+1ω+1)])Ψ( ()) +  [+1(+1ω+1)]} (64)
where  ≥ 0 is an ambiguity aversion parameter, (·) is a normalizing factor,  is the Radon-Nikodym derivative with
respect to the reference probabilistic model , Ψ( ()) is the relative entropy of the distribution ()v s .,a n d()
is such that ()=. As in Section 2.3, as  →∞(→ 0+, i.e., from the right) ambiguity declines (increases); in
fact a  →∞imposes an inﬁnite penalty to any divergence (as measured by relative entropy) of  from ,a n da ss u c h
it forces the decision-maker to use the benchmark , as postulated under (S)EU.
Uppal and Wang prove that when  →∞ , the optimal risky portfolio is identical to the standard Merton’s portfolio;
when  → 0, the investment in the risky asset drops to zero. This means that when ambiguity diverges, pervasive
and non-diversiﬁable model uncertainty will advise an investor to avoid all security risks. More generally, when 0
but is ﬁnite, the total investment in the risky assets is less than what it would be in absence of ambiguity, which can
be interpreted as a multivariate generalization of Maenhout (2004). Uppal and Wang consider the standard case in
which the investor can consume a single good, invest in  risky stocks, and borrow or lend at an exogenously given
riskless rate 

 = (Y), where Y is the state of the economy. The return process of the  stocks is
R = μ(RY) + σ(RY)B
Y = μ (Y) + σ (Y)B (65)














Uppal and Wang write the investors’ indirect utility function as  (RY) and use an appropriate drift adjust-
ment to specify the HJB equation for the investor’s utility maximization problem, which is the standard (S)EU Bellman
equation augmented by the terms
Ψ( )




and v ≡ [0
 0
]0.T h et e r m0 5Ψ( )v0Φv is the penalty function for the robustness-driven distortions, while the next





























Without the term v∗
, the portfolio rule reduces to the standard Merton’s (1971) formula, indeed v∗
 is the drift
adjustment to μ induced by ambiguity. Similarly, when the coeﬃcients  tends to inﬁnity for  =1 2, Φ−1
goes to O and we obtain the familiar Merton’s result.
A number of intriguing results can be derived when ambiguity is the same across all assets,  =  ∀, all moments
are constant, there is no predictability, and the utility index is negative exponential with (absolute) risk aversion
coeﬃcient 0. In this case, the optimal multivariate portfolio shares will be identical to those implied by an











 (μ − ι)=ω (69)
35This means that–at least in the case in which  is common across assets–ambiguity generally reduces the demand
of all risky assets, and that this is isomorphic to a generalized increase in the degree of aversion to risk, as measured
by the factor (1 + 1)  1 Consistently with our earlier remarks,  →∞implies that this factor goes to 1, while
 → 0 implies that the factor diverges and drives ω∗ to a vector of zeros.
Uppal and Wang calibrated their model to the data on international equity returns from French and Poterba’s
(1991) paper on the empirics of the home country bias and compared the resulting optimal assets allocations to the
standard Bayesian mean-variance style Merton portfolios. The calibration shows that when the overall ambiguity
about the joint distribution of returns is high, then small diﬀerences in ambiguity for the marginal return distributions
of national, country-speciﬁc stock return series will result in a portfolio that is signiﬁcantly under-diversiﬁed relative
to the standard mean-variance portfolio. This is a powerful explanation of the home country bias puzzle: modest
heterogeneity in the ambiguity perceived by investors across diﬀerent national asset markets may induce massive and
yet optimal portfolio biases which are consistent with the data.45
Although only in the context of a simple two-period (heterogeneous) two-agent economy, Epstein (2007) has shown
that the intuition in Uppal and Wang (2003) extends to other frameworks that can be used to capture ambiguity, such as
MPP. In particular, the macroeconomics literature has shown that another puzzle is associated with the home country
bias in portfolio choice: individual country GDP (or consumption) growth rates tend to be insuﬃciently correlated and
they seem to massively respond to idiosyncratic, country-speciﬁcs h o c k s ,r e ﬂecting relatively modest and sub-optimal
risk-sharing (see Lewis, 1999).46 Epstein considers two countries and two periods (−1a n d) populated by investors
with log-utility indices, and uncertainty that has resolution at time  so that for each country the realized state can
be either −1 or 1. Countries display MPP, i.e., the agent in country  =1 2 assigns to its own country-speciﬁcs t a t e
space a unique probability distribution [121 2]0, while–with respect to the foreign country–she is only conﬁdent
that the probability of each possible outcome lies in the interval [(1 −)2(1 + )2], where 0    1. The set of
eﬀective priors considered by country  is denoted by  and the aggregate stochastic endowment by [−1 ]0,w i t h
expected growth rate 
− 1. Under (S)EU, individual consumption 
 is an increasing linear function of ,a n d
therefore it is perfectly correlated across countries. Further, if preferences are homothetic, in equilibrium consumption




−1 +  min
∈ [ln
] (70)
Solving the planning problem, Epstein ﬁnds that individual country consumption will be non-negatively correlated
with shocks in both countries, and that consumption growth rates will not be perfectly correlated across countries.
Uppal and Wang’s (2003) intuition that small amounts of heterogeneity in the ambiguity investors perceive “across”
diﬀerent asset types may cause important eﬀects has been recently further explored by Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and
Wang (2009) who study the role of ambiguity (or assets’ “familiarity” to a decision maker) in determining portfolio
underdiversiﬁcation and “ﬂight to familiarity” episodes. Consider a mean-variance (or equivalently, CARA/Gaussian)
45Epstein and Miao (2003) is another paper that has exploited ambiguity to discuss the home country bias in international equity
portfolios. We will review Epstein and Miao’s contributions in Section 4.2.
46In a complete markets benchmark, investors worlwide should use asset markets to diversify away all idiosynchratic risks, including their
national, business cycle risks. As a result, consumption growth processes across countries should become highly (in the limit, perfectly)
correlated. Of course, if investors fail to internationally diversify their portfolios will display a home-country bias and shocks to their
national markets (economies) will be strongly reﬂected in their consumption decision, with a limited amount of international risk-sharing.
36portfolio problem in which the asset menu is composed of  identical risky assets and one riskless asset. Each asset
has (unknown) expected excess return , and common volatility .  is a common correlation coeﬃcient across assets
and Σ is the implied covariance matrix, with generic element oﬀ the main diagonal given by 2. Using the framework











≤  ω0ι = 1, (71)
where μ is a -dimensional vector that collects the individual expected returns, ,  =1 . Under this speciﬁ-
cation, the ambiguity problem can be interpreted in terms of classical statistical analysis because–letting ˆ  be the
estimated value of the mean return of asset  =1  obtained by using a return time series of length ,a n d2
ˆ  the
variance of ˆ –it is possible to deﬁne the conﬁdence interval { ( − ˆ )
2 2
ˆ  ≤ } for expected returns. Hence,
√ is the critical value determining the size of the conﬁdence interval that can be interpreted as a measure of the
amount of ambiguity about the estimate of expected returns. A larger √ determines a larger conﬁdence interval and
a larger set of possible distributions to which the true returns may belong. Without loss of generality, if we assume that
the ﬁrst asset is more familiar to the decision maker, and the remaining  −1 assets are all equally less familiar (i.e.,
1 =  and 2 =  = ,   ), the structure of the portfolio allocations will depend on a condition involving
the quantities ˆ ˆ  and √ +(1−)−1(√ −√), which can be interpreted as a scaled measure of “excess” un-
familiarity”. To simplify the notation, let’s assume that ˆ ˆ  =ˆ ˆ .W h e nˆ ˆ   √ +(1−)−1(√ −√)
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and 1  1  ,  =2 .I f√  ˆ ˆ  ≤ √ +(1−)−1(√ −√) (that is, ambiguity is relatively low
for asset 1 and relatively high for all other assets), then
1 =1  =0  ≥ 2,
and a 100% investment goes into the familiar asset. Finally, if 0  ˆ ˆ  ≤ √ (that is, ambiguity is relatively
high for all the assets), then 1 =0= ( ≥ 2) and 100% of wealth ought to be invested in the riskless asset. In
this case, ambiguity is so high across the board (including the case of familiar assets) that complete non-participation
arises. Interestingly, in the ﬁrst case the weight on the familiar asset exceeds that of each of the other assets. So, the
investor holds familiar assets (as ﬁrst advocated by Keynes) but balances this investment by holding also a portfolio
of all the other assets (as advocated by Markowitz) which remains biased toward more familiar assets. The relative
investment between the familiar asset and the unfamiliar portfolio depends on the relative ambiguity regarding the
return distributions, as captured by the term √ − √. When the number of assets becomes arbitrarily large, it
can be shown that the weight for the more familiar asset approaches a positive constant that depends on √ −√.
In contrast, the weights for each of the other less-familiar assets approach zero as the number of assets increases, while
the total weight in these ( −1) unfamiliar assets approaches a positive fraction. Hence, familiarity of a speciﬁca s s e t
37implies that its holdings do not decrease to 0, even if  →∞ , while the existence of gains from diversiﬁcation implies
that an investor should hold only an inﬁnitesimal amount in each of the remaining unfamiliar assets. Furthermore,
Boyle et al. (2009) show that in both the ﬁrst and second cases, portfolio variance will exceed what would be obtained
in absence of ambiguity, since the investor’s portfolio is less diversiﬁed. The additional risk in case 1 increases with the
diﬀerence √ −√ and the extent of average idiosyncratic risk characterizing the risky assets. Finally, an increase
in correlation leads to an increase in the holding of the familiar asset (the so-called “ﬂight to familiarity”) since the
unfamiliar assets become decreasingly useful for diversiﬁcation purposes.
3.6. Smooth Recursive Preferences
One further approach to modelling ambiguity in asset allocation decisions has been recently pursued by Ju and Miao
(2008) who capture ambiguity aversion through a generalization of KMM’s recursive smooth preferences. In Ju and













where (·) is an increasing function, and  is a non-singleton set of probability distributions over the reference
state space. The agent holds a prior  over  and attitudes towards ambiguity are characterized by the shape of (·).
Generalizing the previous, static representation to an inﬁnite horizon, dynamic framework, the recursive representation
of preferences in Ju and Miao (2008) is












where  is the time- realization of a state variable  that determines the set  of eﬀective measures.
In this framework, Chen, Ju and Miao (2008) consider a risky asset and a risk-free bond with returns +1 and
+1, respectively. Two possibly misspeciﬁed models of stock returns are considered. The ﬁrst is characterized by
identically and independently distributed (IID) returns and implies the absence of predictability; the second model
is of a vector autoregressive (VAR) type, with a single zero-mean predictor variable (for instance, the de-meaned
dividend yield as in Fama and French, 1988) for excess stock returns:








+1 − +1 =  +  + 2+1
+1 =  + 3+1
[2+1 3+1]








The investor is uncertain as to which model is correctly speciﬁed, even when she can learn on the relative merits of
the two processes by observing past data. Time is ﬁnite and discrete ( =0 1), and the investor’s only source of
income is her ﬁnancial wealth (). In each period  she decides how much to consume and how much to invest in
the risky market portfolio, and at time  she will consume her total wealth. Using the updating rule in (73), beliefs
evolve as follows: if the predictive variable is above average (  0), the VAR model predicts above average excess
returns. Assuming that the volatility of returns are similar in the two models, a high realized return will be more
likely in the VAR model than in the IID model. Thus, the investor revises downward her belief about the IID model.
The opposite will occur if the predictive variable is below average (  0).
38Chen et al. (2008) calibrate their model using annual data from the U.S. stock market over the period 1926-
2005. Preference parameters are set through hypothetical experiments a’ la Ellsberg. The ambiguity-averse investor’s
optimal investment strategy is intuitively a robust strategy, and the calibration compares it to a IID strategy (i.e.,
when the investor is sure that the IID model is the data generating process), a VAR strategy, and a Bayesian strategy
(which ignores ambiguity imposing a linear (·)). The results show that the robust stock allocation depends on the
investment horizon, the beliefs about the model for stock returns, and the predictor. Compared to the Bayesian
strategy, the robust portfolio rule is more conservative, inducing a lower rate of participation in the stock market.
Indeed, both Bayesian and robust portfolio weights can be decomposed into a myopic demand and an intertemporal
hedging demand. The former depends on the one-period ahead expected return, which is a weighted average of the
expected excess returns from the two competing models 1 and 2. The hedging demand can be further decomposed into
two components: the ﬁr s ti sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hv a r i a t i o n si ni n v e s t m e n to p p ortunities captured by the predictive variable;
the second is the demand that hedges model uncertainty. While high (low) realized returns lead the Bayesian investor
to shift her posterior beliefs towards (away from) the VAR model when the predictive variable is large and positive
(small and negative), which generally makes his hedging demand negative (positive), the ambiguity-averse investor
makes investment decisions using endogenously distorted beliefs, and not the actual predictive distribution. For a given
non-degenerate prior, the distortion in beliefs is large when model uncertainty is high, so that both the myopic and
hedging demands implied by the robust strategy can be quite diﬀerent from those implied by the Bayesian strategy.
For example, when the predictive variable takes a suﬃciently high value, the VAR strategy advises the investor to
allocate all her wealth to the stock. By contrast, the robust strategy advises the investor to sharply decreases her
stock allocation to a level below that implied by the IID strategy, even when there is a small prior probability that
the IID model is the true model of the stock return.
3.7. Incomplete Information vs. Ambiguity: Comparative Analysis and Interaction Eﬀects
Before the advent of research on ambiguity and optimal asset allocation decisions one of most fruitful directions of
investigation had focussed on solving dynamic portfolio choice/ consumption problems under incomplete information,
when the investor cannot observe one or more features (either parameters or state variables) of the underlying environ-
ment and can only rationally learn/ﬁlter this information out of past data on asset prices and/or fundamentals (e.g.,
dividends). Among many others, seminal papers are Feldman (1986), Gennotte (1986), and David (1997). Recently,
a few researchers have started to introduce ambiguity in incomplete information problems with at least two questions
in mind. First, when and how will it be possible to characterize the eﬀects of both incomplete information as well as
of ambiguity on optimal portfolio weights and consumption decisions. Second, whether there can be any “interaction”
or compounding eﬀects between hedging demands caused by incomplete information and by ambiguity aversion. A
few papers have made remarkable steps towards addressing these questions.
Miao (2009) has studied optimal consumption/portfolio choices under incomplete information and ambiguity,
assuming that agents display dynamic MPP as in Chen and Epstein (2001), with their -ignorance speciﬁcation (see
Section 4.2 for details). In his framework, time is continuous, there is a single good and  denotes consumption.






,w h e r eF
 ⊂ F, which is generated by 0  -dimensional BM ˆ B = {ˆ B}. In particular, there are
 + 1 securities consisting of one riskless bond and  non-dividend-paying stocks. The price of the riskless bond is
given by 
0 = , while the vector return process of the stocks, R (where 
 = 

), follows a multivariate GBM
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is a measurable version of the conditional expectation of μR with respect to F
 .H e n c e ,t h e
agent’s perceived return dynamics is R = ˆ μ
R
  + σRˆ B so that the budget constraint becomes
 =( [  + ω0
(ˆ μ
R
 − ι)] − ) + ω0
σRˆ B (76)









Hence, under (S)EU, the investor solves the maximization problem under the constraint (76). When ambiguity is taken
into account, the -ignorance speciﬁcation, leads to a density generator (vector) process θ that induces a distorted
probability measure .S p e c i ﬁcally, denoting by θ
∗ the generator that corresponds to the optimal consumption process









 + σRˆ B (78)



















The ﬁrst term represents what Miao’s deﬁnes estimation (incomplete information) risk,a n dt h es e c o n dt e r mr e ﬂects
ambiguity. Because these terms are time-varying, investment opportunities change over time and two separate hedging
motives will arise, namely for ambiguity and estimation risk.
























 } is the unique solution to the stochastic diﬀerential equation HH = μH
 + σH
 ˆ B (H = 0),
where μH
 is a complex function of the preference parameters, θ
∗
, ˆ η,a n dσH
 i st h em a t r i xo fd i ﬀusion coeﬃcients of
the optimal consumption process. The last two terms in the expression for ω∗
 in (80) are the hedging demands, which
are visibly aﬀected by both ambiguity (represented by θ
∗














40Ambiguity distorts mean returns at time  by σRθ
∗
 under the adjusted belief. As  → 1, the optimal portfolio
processes converges to the one that is optimal in the logarithmic case. In particular, when  =1 ,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
σH
 = 0, and the agent behaves myopically so that there is no hedging demand against future changes of investment









 so that an ambiguity hedging
demand will be present also in the logarithmic case, contrary to what found under incomplete information. Miao also
















where κ is the vector of security-speciﬁc -ignorance parameters. (82) is interesting because it indicates that under
complete information, ambiguity does not induce any hedging demand, in the sense that the terms that is not in
the classical Merton’s mean-variance style solution, −1 ¡
(σR)0¢−1 κ, fails to be time-varying and to depend from the
state of the economy. It is therefore the interaction between incomplete information and ambiguity that induces the
hedging demand −−1 ¡
(σR)0¢−1 θ
∗
 in (80): unless the incomplete information hedging demand disappears because
the investor is rationally myopic and does not care for estimation risk ( = 1), under MPP with -ignorance, one
needs both incomplete information and ambiguity for the latter to generate a non-zero hedging demand. Of course, it
remains to be seen whether this intriguing result may generalize beyond the case of MPP with -ignorance.
A related paper is Liu (2009), who examines a continuous-time portfolio problem for an investor with recursive
MPP and -ignorance (see Section 4.2 for this speciﬁcation of MPP), when the expected return of a risky asset
is unobservable and follows a hidden Markov chain. The investor takes into account incomplete information risk
(resulting from time-varying precision of the conditional estimates of the unobservable state) and the ambiguity on
the process that governs the dynamics of ﬁltered probabilities of the underlying state. In Liu’s paper, the investor
treats ﬁltered probabilities as ambiguous and has multiple beliefs with respect to the states resulting from continuous
Bayesian updating. She obtains the conditional estimates of the unobservable state by observing past and current
asset prices and employs a non-linear recursive ﬁlter to extract regime probabilities that are updated according to
Bayes rule and used to represent the approximating reference model, . Alternative models (as parameterized by a law
of motion ) are obtained as a perturbation of this benchmark. The asset menu is composed of a riskless bond paying
an instantaneous return  and of a risky asset with Ito dynamics. The drift process  follows a continuous-time
M a r k o vc h a i nw i t ht w os t a t e s ,  ,a n di n ﬁnitesimal generating matrix with generic element  ( =0 1).47
The investor can observe neither the expected return ,n o rt h eB M. Instead, she can only observe the asset price
. Given an initial prior 0 over the 2 regimes, the investor estimates the unobservable state, that is, the probability
of the current state being in the high-mean-return regime, based on the observed asset prices,  ≡ Pr( = |F).
Under the alternative model , the distorted law of motion of the estimate  is





 − ) (83)
where 

 is the BM under , the distorted probability induced by the density generator .I n t h e -ignorance
speciﬁcation for recursive MPP, the set of density generators is characterized through a positive coeﬃcient ,t h a tc a n
be thought of as a measure for ambiguity aversion.
47The inﬁnitesimal generating matrix governs the dyanmics of the Markov switching between states of high drift (expect returns) in the
stock process and states of low drift.
41Liu (2009) explicitly characterizes the optimal consumption and portfolio rules. Speciﬁcally, assuming that the lower
bound of the conditional market price of risk adjusted for ambiguity is always nonnegative, that is, (−)− ≥ 0,
under power utility the optimal demand may be decomposed as
 =










where  is the standard constant relative risk aversion coeﬃcient (the expressions of the terms hedge, hedge
a r eo m i t t e dt os a v es p a c e ) .T h eﬁrst term is the standard myopic demand for the risky asset under Markov switching,
which is instantaneously mean-variance eﬃcient and depends on the estimate of the unobservable state. The second
term reﬂects ambiguity on the myopic component, which is a function of the magnitude of the perceived ambiguity,
. Under the assumption that the conditional market price of risk must be non-negative, a larger  implies that
the investor allocates a smaller proportion of wealth to the risky asset when she behaves myopically by ignoring
time variation of the conditional estimates. Together, the ﬁrst two terms form the ambiguity-adjusted myopic demand.
When returns are IID, and expected returns are fully observable, the optimal portfolio policy is given by the ambiguity-
adjusted myopic component only. Interestingly, this result gives rise to a form of observational equivalence, in the
sense that an increase in the size of ambiguity is equivalent to a decline in the eﬀective market price of risk:

















However, under incomplete information, this equivalence fails because ambiguity also has an impact on the intertem-
poral hedging demand. The term (hedge+ hedge)q u a n t i ﬁes the intertemporal hedging demand, which
insures the investor against future time variation of the conditional estimates of the unobservable state. A notable
diﬀerence between these solutions and those derived in a standard (S)EU portfolio problem under Markov switching
(see e.g., Guidolin and Timmermann, 2007, in discrete time and Honda, 2003, in continuous time) is that the intertem-
poral hedging demand is driven, not only by incomplete information risk, but also by ambiguity. The term hedge
is obtained setting  =0 ,w h i l ehedge accounts for the diﬀerence between hedge and the total hedging
demand. In this way, hedge is solely attributed to intertemporal hedging of incomplete information risk, while
hedge is purely driven by ambiguity. Whilst the hedging term hedge will also exist in a (S)EU framework
with incomplete information such as Honda’s (2003), hedge will not. As far as consumption is concerned,
two competing eﬀects are generated by ambiguity: on the one hand, the investor will lower her consumption because
a given level of wealth can deliver a smaller ﬂow of consumption due to the perceived deterioration in investment
opportunities. On the other hand, the agent is less interested in investing in the risky asset and tends to increase
consumption. When 1( 1), the former (latter) eﬀect dominates, and ambiguity aversion decreases (increases)
the consumption-to-wealth ratio. Further, the myopic and the hedging demands are both reduced. Additionally, as
the aversion to ambiguity () increases, the size of hedge increases, this term turns out to be non-monotonic
and displays a mild hump-shape with respect to the estimate of the probability of the unobservable Markov state.
Liu (2009) has extended the ambiguity literature to consider continuous time models in which the process for the
uncertain asset returns in non-linear, for instance according to a Markov switching model. Faria, Correia-da-Silvaz
and Ribeirox (2010) have investigated another type of non-linearity, when the volatility of the uncertain asset is
stochastic. Faria et al. extend the (S)EU framework of Chacko and Viceira (2005) to allow for MPP and study the
42eﬀects of ambiguity about stochastic variance or, more precisely, on its expected value. Their ﬁndings show that if
the investor is able to continuously update her portfolio as a function of the observed instantaneous variance, then her
optimal allocation will not be aﬀected by ambiguity, which is the same result as in Chacko and Viceira. Otherwise
ambiguity on the variance becomes relevant, even if the agent can observe the instantaneous variance. Assuming that
the investor uses her expectation about future variance, Faria et al. prove that ambiguity reduces the demand for the
risky asset and this demand can be decomposed into three components, namely, myopic demand, hedging demand, and
ambiguity demand. The same calibration of Chacko and Viceira (based on monthly excess stock returns on the CRSP
value-weighted portfolio over the T-Bill rate from January 1926 to December 2000) shows that ambiguity hedging is
larger than the intertemporal hedging demand.
As we have seen, Chen, Ju and Miao (2008) have systematically compared portfolio shares and realized recursive
performance from Bayesian vs. their robust strategy. A number of authors have examined the diﬀerences between
(estimation) risk in a Bayesian framework and uncertainty, when ambiguity is taken into account. This is an important
i s s u eb e c a u s eas t r a n do ft h ee m p i r i c a lﬁnance literature (see e.g., Pastor, 2000) had powerfully drawn the attention of
academics and practitioners on the eﬀects of model uncertainty–where “model” may stand both for a range of asset
pricing models and for alternative statistical representations of the law of motion of asset returns–on optimal portfolio
choice in Bayesian frameworks. One may suspect that a typical (S)EU/Bayesian approach to model uncertainty
would generate implications that are at least qualitatively similar to ambiguity approaches to uncertainty. It turns
out that this intuition is incorrect even to a ﬁrst approximation, because the two approaches diﬀer both in their
methodological underpinnings and in their practical implications. For instance, Uppal and Wang (2003) perform a
thorough comparison of their ambiguity-averse dynamic portfolio model that accounts for model misspeciﬁcations with
the traditional (S)EU Bayesian approach that incorporates the eﬀects of estimation risk (e.g., Barberis, 2000). In the
Bayesian approach, model misspeciﬁcation can only be captured in the form of parameter uncertainty. Suppose that a
model of the probability law for asset returns is estimated and there exists one parameter which cannot be estimated
precisely, say .L e t(X;) be the probability distribution function for the state vector X.G i v e nt h a t is unknown,
in a typical Bayesian framework the issue faced by an investor is how to take estimation uncertainty into account.
For instance, suppose () is a prior on the unknown parameter. Under standard Bayesian (S)EU preferences, the
expected utility from a given consumption stream  is:
(ω)=()+{(X;)[+1(+1ω+1)]} (86)
In contrast, in Uppal and Wang’s (2003) framework, one need not restrict model misspeciﬁcation to uncertainty
regarding a particular parameter and need not assume that model misspeciﬁcation, as a subjective matter, can be
represented by a probability distribution, which leads to consumption/portfolio problem
(ω)=()+ inf
 {(
 [+1(+1ω+1)])( ()) +  [+1(+1ω+1)]} (87)
where , (·) and (()) are deﬁned in Section 3.5. A number of papers–here we have reported implications
from Chen, Ju and Miao (2008)–have stressed that the qualitative and quantitative asset allocation implications of
Bayesian frameworks of model uncertainty and of models of ambiguity aversion may be strikingly diﬀerent.
433.8. Learning, Ambiguity and Portfolio Choice
As we have argued in Section 2.5, one of the frontiers of research on the eﬀects of ambiguity on ﬁnancial decisions
and prices consists of the interaction between learning dynamics and ambiguity. While the papers reviewed in Section
3.7 are mostly concerned with the interaction between the need to ﬁlter from the data some unknown features of the
environment and a concern for ambiguity, a recent literature has also investigated how learning may aﬀect recursive,
dynamic portfolio decisions. In this new strand of the literature, the path has been opened by Epstein and Schneider
(2007), who have used their learning model to introduce and solve an intertemporal asset allocation problem under
ambiguity in which the investor can rebalance her portfolio in the light of new information that aﬀects both beliefs
and conﬁdence (i.e., the perception of ambiguity).
Consider an investor who believes that the equity (market) risk premium is ﬁxed, but unknown, so that it must
be estimated from past returns. Intuitively, one would expect the investor to become more conﬁdent the longer
is the observed series of returns used to derive the estimate. As a result, a given estimate should lead to higher
portfolio weights on stocks, the longer is the available data. Similarly, one might expect the weights on stocks to
be higher as the posterior variance of the equity premium declines. Bayesian analysis has tried to capture these
intuitions by incorporating estimation risk into portfolio problems. However, learning seems to have moderate eﬀects
on investment decisions. In stationary environments (i.e., in the absence of either regime switching a’ la Veronesi, 2002,
and Whitelaw, 2002, or of breaks a’ la Guidolin, 2006) learning produces eﬀects that quickly dissipate over time. For
instance, Guidolin’s (2005) Bayesian dynamic model of international portfolio diversiﬁcation can be directly contrasted
to Uppal and Wang’s (2003) application of ambiguity to solve the home country bias: Guidolin obtains strong but
highly transient eﬀects from Bayesian learning under histories of diﬀerent length, while Uppal and Wang obtain
ﬁrst-order and stationary eﬀects in models with small heterogeneity across domestic vs. foreign perceived ambiguity.
Epstein and Schneider (2007) argue that a Bayesian model often generates counter-intuitive results because a declining
posterior variance as the sample size expands fails to adequately capture changes in conﬁdence, in the sense that even
with expanding data sets it is plausible that an investor’s conﬁdence may remain time-varying.
In Epstein and Schneider’s (2007) model there are  trading dates in a ﬁxed period (say, a month), and the state
space is simply Ω = {}, where the high state has a probability  ∈ (01). Correspondingly, the log-return




,a n dt h el o gr i s kf r e er a t ei s.
The investor wants to maximize the utility that she derives from her ﬁnal wealth +, where her utility index
is logarithmic, (+)=l n + The portfolio can be rebalanced ( − ) times between dates  and .A t
any rebalancing date, the investor takes into account that she will learn in the future; therefore, the optimal portfolio
weights at date , ∗
, depend on the calendar date, on the investment horizon, and on the number of future portfolio
adjustments. In a standard Bayesian framework, the investor is assumed to have a prior over the probability of the
high state, so that the posterior mean of  is ˆ . In the limit as  →∞(if continuos rebalancing is possible), under
(S)EU–here simply identiﬁed with Bayes’ rule–Epstein and Schneider derive that the optimal portfolio allocation at




¯  + 1
22 − 
2  (88)
44where ¯  is the monthly equity premium estimated as of time . Allowing for ambiguity, beliefs are represented by (Ξ
0  ), where Ξ is a parameter space, 0 is a set of probability measures on Ξ (not necessarily unique), and  is
a set of likelihoods that represent the agent’s a priori view of the connection between the signals and parameters. The
size of 0 reﬂects the decision-maker’s (lack of) conﬁdence in the prior information. Diﬀerently from the (S)EU case,
when 0 does not degenerate in a unique prior, the set of likelihoods  is directly dependent on ,a n dt h e r ei sa n
additional parameter () that captures the investor’s updating speed. Under ambiguity, the mean monthly log return
is perceived to be equal to  +  (for  ∈ Ξ), where  is a ﬁxed parameter that can be learned, while the investor











 ||  ¯ 
¾
 (89)
¯ 0 represents the presence of ambiguity, and each  parametrizes a diﬀerent likelihood 
.S p e c i ﬁcally, ¯  is a
measure of the amount of information that the investor is expecting to learn in the future: if ¯  = 0, already today she
is conﬁdent that she will completely learn the equity premium; if ¯  →∞no learning is anticipated. The posterior set
for the realized sequence  is 
()=
£ ¯  − −(12) ¯  + −(12)
¤
,w h e r e2
 = −2ln. From the deﬁnition
of 
(), it is immediate to compute the lowest conditional mean log return for  →∞ ,t h a ti s , ¯ −¯ −−(12).
Epstein and Schneider (2007) prove that learning under ambiguity aﬀects portfolio choice in two ways: directly
through the optimal weights, and indirectly through the length of the investment horizon. To see this, consider ﬁrst




1( ¯ )=m a x {

 − −2(¯  + −(12))0} +m i n {

 + −2(¯  + −(12))0} (90)
Hence, a myopic ambiguity-averse investor goes long in stocks only if the equity premium is unambiguously positive.
The optimal position is then given by the ﬁrst term in (90). This implies that an ambiguity-averse investor who goes
long behaves as if she were a Bayesian who perceives the lowest conditional mean log return ¯  − ¯  −−(12).T h e
optimal weight depends on the sample through the Bayesian position 

 , since, conditionally on participation, the
optimal response to news is the same in the two models. However, ambiguity also introduces a trend component, in
the sense that the optimal position increases as conﬁdence grows and the standard error − 1
2 shrinks to zero: ∗
1
approaches the Bayesian position 

 (from below) in the long run, but, unless ¯  =0( t h a ti s ,w i t h o u ta m b i g u i t y ) ,
it remains smaller. In this respect, Epstein and Schneider’s conclusion is identical to the conclusion reported by many
papers before: aversion to ambiguity–under log-preference–unequivocally reduces the demand for the risk asset.
However, Epstein and Schneider explicitly link this ﬁnding to the strength of the learning process, both past (via the
sample size ) and perspective (via the parameters ¯ ). The second term in (90) reﬂects short selling when the equity
premium is unambiguously negative. Interestingly, non-participation in the stock market–here, a zero demand for
the risky asset–is optimal if the maximum likelihood estimate of the equity premium is small in absolute value so
that both terms in the  and  operators in (90) are 0, that is, if | ¯  + 1
22 −|  ¯ +−(12) In particular,
an investor who is not conﬁdent that the equity premium can be learnt (¯ 0) need not to be “in the market” even
after having seen a large amount of data, i.e., even when  →∞  This result is clearly reminiscent of the early ﬁndings
in Dow and Werlang (1992), in which states could exist in which an investor would simply abstain from trading.
The second important eﬀect of learning under ambiguity is a new inter-temporal hedging motive that induces more
45participation as the investment horizon becomes longer. For MPP investors, the myopic and long horizon positions
coincide if the equity premium is either high or low enough to induce participation of the myopic investor. However,
for intermediate estimates of the premium, the myopic investor stays out of the stock market, while the long horizon
investor takes “contrarian” positions and she goes short (long) in stocks for positive (negative) equity premia. For
the relatively experienced investor that beneﬁts from a large number of observations , horizon eﬀects will be small.
However, for an inexperienced investor (who is likely to be characterized by a wide non-participation region), there can
be sizeable diﬀerences between the optimal myopic and long horizon weights. Intuitively, agents with a low empirical
estimate of the equity premium know that a further low return realizations may push them towards nonparticipation,
and hence a low return on wealth. To insure against this outcome, they short the asset. As a result, the optimal
intertemporal portfolio policy involves dynamic “exit and entry” rules: recursive updating shifts the interval of equity
premia, and such shifts can make agents move in and out of the market, in terms of her participation decisions.
4. Equilibrium Asset Prices under Ambiguity
It is often possible to “close” models of portfolio and consumption decisions to generate asset pricing models, i.e., to
yield implications for the mappings between the state of the economy and equilibrium (no-arbitrage) asset prices. To
review papers that have performed this operation is our goal in this Section. Our opening statement alerts a Reader
that a portion of the models and results that we are about to review will overlap to frameworks and papers that we
have covered in Section 3. In these cases we will try to economize on the details concerning the assumptions and
solutions of each model and aim at immediately jumping to their asset pricing implications, counting on the good-will
of a Reader to review the relevant material from Section 3.
4.1. Static Models
The simplest possible eﬀort at developing equilibrium asset pricing implications of ambiguity is the two-period paper
by Easley and O’Hara (2009). As discussed in Section 3.1, simple algebra shows that–given some current price 
for the risky asset–the AA investors’ demand for the risky asset is characterized by a non-participation interval, see
(27). This outcome reduces the risk-sharing abilities of the market and it may consequently induce an increase in the
equilibrium risk premium, since states exist in which the whole risk must now be born by the (S)EU-agents. Indeed,
when the market is characterized by limited participation–which means that demand and supply are equated by a
price that falls in the interval [min, max]–such an equilibrium price is





where the relevant parameters are simply the estimates by the (S)EU investors. Of course, this is the classical
CARA/Gaussian result, with the only minor diﬀerence of the (1 − ) weighting. On the opposite, when both groups
of investors are in the market, the equilibrium price is:
 =
ˆ 
2min +( 1− )2
maxˆ 
(1 − )2






max + ˆ 
2 (92)
46Clearly, this is a weighted average (the weights are (1 − )2
max and ˆ 
2) of expected payoﬀs minus a weighted average
of perceived variances times the risky security’s supply. An increase in the fraction of AA investors  will decrease
both  and . In a non-participating equilibrium, an increase in  does not necessarily induce full participation,
however, because in the face of a shrinking number of active investors, the price must decrease to compensate the lower
number of traders for the higher per-capita risk that they need to absorb to clear the market. However, if  falls
enough, the equilibrium might shift from a nonparticipating to a participating one, as in (27)  may eventually
move below the threshold min. Moreover, changes in the set of variances considered by AA investors have clearly no
eﬀect if the economy is a nonparticipating equilibrium. Viceversa, if the economy is in a participating equilibrium,
increases in 2
max will reduce the price because the demand of AA investors shrinks when 2
max increases. If the market
is in a limited participation equilibrium, increases in min have no aﬀect on  as long as AA investors are not
induced to trade. However, if AA traders participate in the market, increasing min increases  since  increases.
Finally, an increase in min can cause the market to switch from a nonparticipating to a participating equilibrium.
Hence, changing the perception of extreme events may have large eﬀects on equilibrium outcomes, because AA agents
attach great importance to worst case models.
Guidolin and Rinaldi (2009) have used their Easley and O’Hara (2009)-type model to solve for equilibrium prices
when ambiguity may concern either the systematic risk or the idiosyncratic risks, or both. Also in their case, it is
possible that the equilibrium price may fall in the region in which no AA agent expresses a non-zero demand for the
risky asset, in which case the equilibrium price  is:












































 +( 1− )2
max
 (94)
This is a participation equilibrium. Interestingly, among the parameters that aﬀect the (S)EU-only price, we also ﬁnd
, the proportion of AA investors. Therefore, even when the AA agents are not trading, their mere existence will
aﬀect the equilibrium stock price. Moreover, when both types participate, both the single-prior (, , 2
, 2
)a n d
the multiple-prior (min , 2
max) parameters enter the expression for .
Guidolin and Rinaldi (2009) have worked out expressions for (real) expected returns. However, in the presence of
ambiguity, there are two notions of risk premium that can be considered. One is an objective notion and corresponds
to an aggregate, market viewpoint that is based on true expectations for risky payoﬀs. This is also the risk premium
anticipated by an external observer that understands the structure of the model and solves for the equilibrium.
Naturally, this is the notion of risk premium relevant to an econometrician interested in understanding the data. The
other is a subjective notion and corresponds to the expectation–obviously diﬀerent across (S)EU and AA investors–
of the premium that each individual investor will form before (or without) understanding the overall structure of the
model and the outcomes generated by the interaction of (S)EU and AA investors. Starting with the ﬁrst, objective
notion, Guidolin and Rinaldi show that real expected returns are
 [1 + ]=
(1 − )( + )




47in the limited participation equilibrium and
 [1 + ]=
( + )
[min +( 1− ) + ] − 
 (96)
where  ≡ 2




 and  ≡ 2
max + 2
 in the equilibrium in which both types of
investors trade. Required returns on the risky asset are increasing in the proportion  of AA agents because, given
total supply, a smaller fraction of (S)EU-only investors will have to absorb the entire supply. (95) and (96) are derived
assuming knowledge of the objective market outcome and–by the law of large numbers–correspond to the average,
realized real excess returns on the risky asset if a long sequence of systematic and idiosyncratic shocks were to be
drawn. However, these are diﬀerent from the risk premia which are perceived by both categories of investors. The
(S)EU investors perceive an ex-ante risk premium of ˜ [1 + ]=[1 + ]. This means that every time a
participation equilibrium outcome obtains, the (S)EU-maximizers will be surprised by the level of the average realized
real excess returns. In particular, (S)EU agents–in this sense they are akin to most in the economics profession–
will systematically ﬁnd that the realized real excess returns are “too high” in the light of the underlying economic
environment, as they perceive it. Of course, this is due to the existence of an additional source of uncertainty–
ambiguity, indeed–that is priced in equilibrium and of which the (S)EU investors are not aware, while AA investors
are. The AA investors perceive instead a real expected return of:
˜ [1 + ]=
(1 − )(min + )




Guidolin and Rinaldi show that
˜ [1 + ]  [1 + ]  [1 + ]= ˜ [1 + ] (98)
i.e., AA agents demand a risk premium which is higher than what (S)EU agents’ expect to receive. Therefore AA
investors are always negatively surprised by the realized real excess returns, even when the investors themselves
participate in the market. Because (S)EU investors believe that the risky asset is under-priced, and thus that it oﬀers
abnormally high excess returns and ambiguity-averse traders believe that the asset is over-priced, and thus that it
oﬀers abnormally low excess returns in equilibrium, both types of traders will hold portfolios which diﬀer from the
market portfolio in their attempt to take advantage of the perceived mispricing. Finally, because Guidolin and Rinaldi
(2009) argue that the ability of ambiguity aversion to induce participation equilibria depends on the fact that the
spread between the highest and the lowest possible realization of idiosyncratic risk is larger than the spread between
the highest and the lowest possible realization of systematic risk, the high risk premia may be more the result of
ambiguity concerning idiosyncratic payoﬀs than ambiguity on the systematic ones.
Also Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005) investigate the role of model uncertainty in determining limited participation
and high equity premia. Their contribution consists of the adoption of a set up for ambiguity that gives an explicit role
t oam e a s u r eo funcertainty dispersion, i.e., the heterogeneity in the perceived ambiguity across market participants.
Their setting is a heterogeneous agent economy, in which investment decisions are made at time 0 to maximize utility
of consumption at time 1. Agents can trade in a riskless bond and in a risky stock priced at ,w h o s ep e rc a p i t a
initial endowment of shares is 0. The payoﬀ of the stock is normally distributed with mean  and variance 2.
2 is precisely known, while  is not. Agents display MPP (with heterogeneous degrees of aversion to uncertainty),
48characterized by a CARA utility index with risk aversion coeﬃcient . As in Kogan and Wang (2003), the set of priors
 considered by each agent can be characterized in terms of conﬁdence regions: speciﬁcally, each agent considers as
possible all mean returns (ˆ  + ), where ˆ  is an approximating estimate common to all agents, and  is such that

2 ≤ 22
 for some parameter  that measures the uncertainty perceived by investor .  is assumed to be uniformly
distributed among investors on the interval [¯  − ¯  − ], for given ¯   such that ¯  ≥ .  can be interpreted as a


















2 (ˆ  −  − )i f ˆ  −  
0i f ˆ  −  ≤  ≤ ˆ  + 
1
2 (ˆ  +  − )i f ˆ  +  
 (100)
Also in this case, for prices in the interval [ˆ  −  ˆ  + ] agent  will not trade. In case of full participation, the
equilibrium asset pricing equation that derives from the usual clearing condition is:
ˆ  −  = 2 + ¯  (101)
where ˆ  −  may be interpreted as a risk premium and ¯  is the average level of uncertainty perceived in the market.
The term 2 is the standard risk premium, while the second term ¯  is the uncertainty premium. Instead, when
some agents optimally decide to avoid trading, the pricing equation becomes:
ˆ  −  =2 
√
 +( ¯  − ) (102)
Cao et al. (2005) show that in the limited participation equilibrium the rate of participation, the average measure of
ambiguity, and the equity premium all decrease as uncertainty dispersion  increases, whereas under full participation,
the equity premium does not depend on uncertainty dispersion. Indeed, in the equilibrium with limited participation
there are fewer active investors that have to bear all the market risk, so they demand a higher risk premium. However,
only investors with relatively low uncertainty want to trade and they are willing to accept a lower uncertainty premium.
Hence, the net eﬀect on the equity premium depends on which force dominates.
Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2009) is another mean-variance style paper that can be “closed” to generate
interesting asset pricing implications. In the setting described in Section 3.2, there are  agents each of which is familiar
with only one particular asset and (equally) unfamiliar with respect to the others, in particular agent  is familiar
with asset  only, and her degree of familiarity with respect to asset  is 
 . Investors are assumed to be symmetric
in their attitude towards ambiguity, so that for any two agents  and , 
 = 
 =  and 
6= = 
6= = .I f
ˆ ˆ   √+ (1 − )−1(√ − √), ambiguity is relatively low with respect to the reward-to-risk ratio of each
asset and each individual holds both the familiar asset and the portfolio made by all the unfamiliar ones. In this case





2 ( − 1) + ˆ 
√





Hence, the equilibrium risk premium has three components: the conventional risk premium, −1( − 1)2 which
tends to 2 as  →∞(here  is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion); a second term which is due to the concentration of
49the portfolio in the familiar asset, the ambiguity premium relative to the unfamiliar assets (−1( − 1)ˆ 
√); an
ambiguity premium relative to the familiar asset (−1ˆ 
√). When  becomes arbitrarily large, each agent holds
all the assets only if √  √ + 2ˆ  and the excess return of each risky asset is
lim
→∞
ˆ  = 2 + ˆ 
√
 (104)
Therefore the premium for portfolio concentration in the familiar asset vanishes since the number of unfamiliar assets
is large enough to compensate the eﬀect of the ambiguity-induced portfolio bias towards the familiar asset.
If √  ˆ ˆ   √+ (1 − )−1(√ − √) each agent considers unfamiliar assets as extremely ambiguous
and therefore she holds only the familiar one. Hence, the equilibrium excess return does not reﬂect any ambiguity
premium related to the unfamiliar assets, which implies ˆ  = 2 + ˆ 
√,e v e nf o rﬁnite . Finally, under the
condition 0  ˆ ˆ   √, the ambiguity level is so high for both familiar and unfamiliar assets that nobody is
willing to trade, there are no equilibrium prices as the market collapses.
Maccheroni, Marinacci, Rustichini and Taboga (2009) have derived an interesting version of the CAPM under
ambiguity. They solve a Markowitz-style portfolio problem for an ambiguity averse agent that displays Monotone
Mean Variance Preferences (MMVP). MMVP are a speciﬁc subclass of VP that expands Mean Variance Preferences
(MVP) outside their domain of monotonicity. Indeed, while classical MVP are theoretically questionable because they
may fail to be monotone, violating rationality and opening the door to the existence of unexploited arbitrage oppor-
tunities, MMVP are monotone everywhere and always agree with MVP where the latter are economically meaningful
(i.e., monotone), but may depart from MVP when this is required to bar the existence of arbitrage opportunities.
Furthermore, Maccheroni et al. (2009) have shown that MMVP representation is the minimal (and so the most
cautious) monotone extension of the MVP functional and its best possible monotone approximation. Denoting by R
the -dimensional vector of risky returns, and by  the gross return of a risk-free bond, the optimal portfolio of a





{[R]}−1 ( [R − ι]) (105)











) is future wealth expressed as a function of the selected portfolio, (ω)=( R−ι)ω+,a n d

∗ is a constant determined jointly with ω by solving the non-linear system:
(
Pr((ω) ≤ )[R|() ≤ 
∗]ω =  [R − ι|(ω) ≤ ]
 [−min(0(ω) − )] = 1
 (107)
While the ﬁrst equation has a purely technical meaning, the second guarantees that the optimal choice of the portfolio
will deliver a wealth process constrained to the monotonicity domain. The use of conditional moments instead of
unconditional ones implies that a MMVP agent ignores the part of the distribution where wealth is higher than the
threshold parameter , meaning that she will not take into account those high payoﬀ states that contribute to increase
48Over the domain of monotonicity of MVP,  and  simply coincide. However, whenever MMVP diﬀer from standard MVP, it is better
to distinguish them and to label  as an uncertainty-aversion parameter.
50the mean return, but give an even greater contribution to increase the variance and that imply an absurdly negative
marginal utility of wealth. Maccheroni et al. (2009) prove that |ω∗
| ≥ |ω∗
| so that MMVP-optimal portfolios
are always more leveraged than MVP-ones, simply because some favorable investment opportunities are discarded by
MVP-agents (because of preferences’ non-monotonicity) and exploited by MMVP-investors.49
Under MMVP, Maccheroni et al. derive a monotone version of the standard CAPM. Speciﬁcally, for each asset
the following pricing equation will hold,




where  is the return of the market portfolio and  is the stochastic discount factor given by
 = − min[0  − ] (109)
where the pair () is a solution to a nonlinear system involving market quantities only. The monotone CAPM
satisﬁes the standard two-fund separation property, since the optimal portfolios of risky assets held by agents with
diﬀerent degrees of uncertainty aversion are all proportional to each other, and, in equilibrium, the only diﬀerence
between two agents is the amount of wealth invested in the risk-free asset. Furthermore, the monotone CAPM is truly
arbitrage-free (because of monotonicity of MMVP), and it has the same empirical tractability of the standard CAPM
since the variables , , ,  can all be fully computed from market data, while the betas can be estimated.
4.2. Dynamic Asset Pricing Models
Although rich insights have often been gained from simple, two-period models such as those reviewed so far, a number of
researchers have strived to generalize truly intertemporal asset pricing models under ambiguity aversion. In particular,
the standard Lucas’s (1978) endowment economy has attracted intense eﬀorts. One of the seminal contributions is
Epstein and Wang (1994), in which MPP are consistently generalized to a multiperiod-discrete time framework.
Epstein and Wang consider the case in which at each date  a representative agent observes some realization  ∈ Ω.
Beliefs about the evolution of the process {} are drawn from a time-homogeneous Markov chain. In standard models,
this would imply a unique Markov probability kernel for the conditional probabilities of time  + 1 events. However,
under ambiguity, beliefs conditional on  are too vague to be represented by a unique prior and are therefore modeled
as a probability kernel correspondence , which is a (multi-valued) function such that, for each , ()i st h es e t
of probability measures representing beliefs about the next period state. The recursive speciﬁcation of utility under
















where  denotes history up to time , i.e.  = {0 1}. At each date the agent receives a stochastic endowment
 = {0} and can trade in  securities, each of which is in 0-net supply and has dividend and price processes







  is meant to indicate that each component of the MMVP-portfolio is greater in absolute value than
the corresponding component in the MVP-portfolio.
51An equilibrium is characterized by a process p = {p}, such that the endowment corresponds to the optimal
consumption-investment plan for all times and states, and markets clear. The max-min criterion implicit in MPP
leads to non-diﬀerentiability of the representation  . Nevertheless, one-sided Gateaux derivatives (a generalization of
the standard concept of directional derivative) of  at  in any direction h ≡ [1 2 0 0 ...]
0 are deﬁned as:


( + h )
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Assuming that {p} is an equilibrium, any variation from the optimal policy {0} should leave the agent worse oﬀ.











(p+1 + d+1) (112)
Epstein and Wang prove that this double inequality is also suﬃcient for an equilibrium. Therefore, under recursive
MPP the optimality conditions take the form of inequalities, just because  (·;) is generally non-diﬀerentiable, unless
the correspondence  : Ω → (Ω) is a probability kernel (unless there is no ambiguity).50 In general, these Euler
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 (113)
Intuitively, we would expect a link between indeterminacy of assets prices and intertemporal price volatility. This
intuition can be easily formalized in the special case of “IID beliefs”, that is, when  is independent from . Under
this restriction, if a security has a time-homogeneous dividend process and the price is determinate, the latter must
be necessarily constant across time and states; consequently, any ﬂu c t u a t i o ni np r i c ec a no n l yb ear e ﬂection of
indeterminacy. Hence the equilibrium indeterminacy generated by ambiguity aversion may leave room for sunspots or
Keynesian animal spirits to determine the equilibrium process, leading to higher volatility in asset prices than what
is predicted in the standard Lucas model, and yet providing an avenue to approach the excessive volatility puzzle
alternative to earlier attempts based on either un-modelled time-varying risk premia or learning (see e.g., Grossman
and Shiller, 1982, or Timmermann, 1993).5152
Chen and Epstein (2002) have further generalized these results by building a dynamic, recursive MPP consumption-
CAPM (CCAPM). While their model is more general than Epstein and Wang’s (1994), the convenience of a continuous
50In the standard (S)EU case, () is made of a unique probability distribution, say ,s ot h a t m a x
∈()
 0(+1)




0() (p+1 + d+1) =
 0(+1)
0() (p+1 + d+1). Thefore the inequalities in the main text reduce to the standar vector
of Euler equations, p = 
 0(+1)
0() (p+1 + d+1)
51Epstein and Wang (1995) have extended these results and demonstrated a connection between ambiguity and markets’ extreme
phenomena, such as crushes and booms. Indeed, ambiguity aversion can generate equilibrium prices that are discontinuous processes of the
state variables, so that even small variations in the market fundamentals are responsible for sudden signiﬁcant changes in security prices.
52Dana (2003) has analyzed the eﬀects of ambiguity on equilibria determinacy. In the standard (S)EU-framework, agents’ consumption
rules depend only on the aggregate endowment and are increasing functions of it; hence, the equilibrium is unique and so is the stochastic
discount factor. Similarly, in a CEU/ambigity framework, if there are no states of the world that yield the same aggregate endowment and
agents have the same capacity assignments, then they also share a unique eﬀective probability over the reference state space, and hence
equilibria are determinate, so that the stochastic discount factor is unique. However, if non-aggregate (idiosyncratic) uncertainty exists
and if the intersection of agents’ set of priors is not empty, then a multiplicity of equilibria may obtain due to idiosyncratic risk.
52time framework has also allowed them to obtain a few special cases of great interest. As we have seen in Section 2.4,
under recursive MPP, the utility functional  is the solution to the diﬀerential equation
 =
∙









where  =0 ,B is a -dimensional BM, and σ
 is a × covariance matrix. In Chen and Epstein’s application, the
aggregator function ()i st a k e nt ob e() ≡ [ − ()]()(−),f o r ≥ 0, and parameters  6=0,
with  ≤ 1. There is a single consumption good, a riskless asset with return process 

 and  risky securities, one for
each component of the BM B. The returns R of the risky securities are described by the Ito process:
R = μ + σB (115)
The set of density generators is derived as follows. Fix a vector of parameters κ in R and let Θ(·)={y ∈ R:
|| ≤  for all },s ot h a t can be thought of as a measure of ambiguity aversion relative to asset .M a r k e t
completeness delivers a strictly positive state price process ,
 = 

  + ηB η = σ
−1
 (μ − 

 ι) (116)
where η is the  × 1 vector of market prices of the  sources of uncertainty. The wealth dynamics is described by:





 ι)] − ) + ω0
σB (117)
Letting the optimal consumption  be an Ito process with parameters (
σ
), and rewriting the wealth process in
terms of the market portfolio as  =  + σ · B, the market price of risk and uncertainty becomes:
η = −1[(1 − )σ




If the risk-free rate and the market price of uncertainty are deterministic constants, the optimal consumption process
is geometric, therefore, σ
 = σ
 and η =( 1− )σ
 + θ
∗
,w h e r eθ
∗
 is the solution of the maximization problem
(114). Next, assuming that ambiguity aversion is small in the sense that 0 ≤   |
| for all ,t h e n


  ()0i f
  ()0
ω∗
 =( 1 − )−1(σ
 )−1(η − κ ⊗ (η)) = (1 − )−1(σ
 )−1((μ − 

 ι) − κ ⊗ (η)) (119)
This result implies that optimal portfolio weights diﬀer from the standard mean-variance expression,
ω
 =( 1− )−1(σ
 )−1(μ − 

 ι), (120)













The optimal portfolio is not instantaneously mean-variance eﬃcient and the mutual fund separation theorem holds if
and only if κ is common to all agents. Otherwise, diﬀerent investors that perceive heterogeneous -ambiguity, will
53have diﬀerent optimal portfolio weights. Moreover, although the composition of the risky portfolio is independent of
the risk aversion parameter, it depends on preferences through κ.
Chen and Epstein show that the equilibrium risk premia are:
μ − 

 ι = ση = −1[(1 − )σσ




The right-hand side can be decomposed as the sum of a standard SEU risk premium component, −1[(1 − )σσ

+( − )σσ









 ]  =1 2 (123)
where σ
 is the -th row of the matrix σ. Therefore, the premium is positive if the asset’s return has negative
covariation with ∗
 ∗
 ,w h e r e∗
 is the Radon—Nikodym derivative of the worst-case model with respect to the
approximating one. If the consumption process follows a GBM with constant drift and diﬀusion vector,  =  +
σB, Chen and Epstein show that their results strengthen to deliver additional insights. For instance, the vector
of market prices of risk and uncertainty simpliﬁes to η =( 1− )σ
 + κ ⊗ (σ
). Crucially, the market price of
uncertainty can be large even if consumption volatilities are small because the second term depends only on the sign
of these volatilities and not on their magnitudes. Furthermore, one can prove that the vector of risk premia is:
μ − 










 ) is large, and it is
positive for components  of the driving Brownian process B that are very ambiguous, in the sense of having large
s. Since the equilibrium risk premia depend on the endowment process only via the signs of the covariances 

 ,
 =1  large ambiguity premia can occur even if consumption is relatively smooth. In particular, the excess
return on the market portfolio (i.e., a portfolio exactly mimicking the consumption process itself, a tradable portfolio








The equity premium can be decomposed as the sum of the standard risk premium term (1 − )(σ
)0σ
 and of
the ambiguity premium κ0|σ
|. The ambiguity premium for the market portfolio vanishes as  approaches zero.
However, because it is a ﬁrst-order function of volatility, it dominates the risk premium (a quadratic function) for
small volatilities. Finally, the equilibrium risk-free rate will satisfy














and it will be decreasing in both ambiguity and risk aversion. Therefore, an ambiguity CCAPM has the possibility to
induce relatively low equilibrium (real) riskless rates under moderate degrees of risk and ambiguity aversions, while
increasing the equity risk premium thanks to the separate contribution of the ambiguity premium component, κ0|σ
|





] the ij-component of |
| and 










54Epstein and Miao (2003) have used the recursive results in Chen and Epstein (2002) to study asset pricing and
portfolio choice in a realistic international ﬁnance application. Under special assumptions, Epstein and Miao are
able to describe in closed form the equilibrium for a pure-exchange, continuous-time economy with two heterogeneous
agents (or countries) and complete markets. Two agents display recursive MPP with logarithmic utility indices and
can trade in a locally riskless bond earning the instantaneous interest rate , and in two ambiguous securities, with
(non-negative) dividend streams  1
 and  2
 , respectively. Time varies over [0]. The cumulative dividends of the




























} and 2 = {2
} are two BMs and F is a ﬁltration generated by them. The securities’ prices are represented
at each date by the Ito process  =( 0
 1
 2
 )0,s ot h a t
(S + D)=μ
  + σ
 B (128)
is an Ito Process where B ≡ [1
 2
]0. The riskless rate satisﬁes 

  = 0
 0
 , while the return process for the
ambiguous stocks is R = b + σB (with R ≡ [1
 2
]0), where b is the vector of expected stock returns, a
quantity to be determined in equilibrium. The variable η = σ
−1
 (b − 

 ι2) can be interpreted as the market price
for uncertainty, including risk, and it is possible to deﬁne a state price process:
− = 

  + η · B 0 =1  (129)
The aggregate endowment  ≡  1
 +  2
 is assumed to follow the GBM
 =   +( σ )0B σ ≡ [σ
1 σ
2 ]0 (130)
and to not exhaust aggregate output, in the sense that  =  1
 +  2
 + Φ, where the non-traded quantity Φ is
assumed to be equally divided between the two countries. Country-speciﬁc portfolios at any date are denoted by ω1

and ω2







characterize the set of eﬀective priors considered by each agent, while allowing for heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion,
consider the vectors κ1 =[ 01]0 and κ2 =[ 2 0]0, and for each agent deﬁne the set of density generators
Θ =
n




¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ 
  =1 2
o
 =1 2 (131)
Θ1 and Θ2 determine the set of eﬀective distributions considered by agent 1 and agent 2, respectively. Intuitively,
agent 1 (2) is assumed to be “more familiar” with the ﬁrst (second) security, which in her view is only risky and not
ambiguous, as shown by the null ﬁrst (second) component in 1 (2).
An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is deﬁned as a consumption process for each country, {1
} and {2
},a n das t a t e




























 =1 2  6=  =1 2 (132)
55and the markets for contingent consumption clear, 1 +2 =  .54 To characterize the equilibrium it is useful to deﬁne










2 ¯ . The dynamics of the shadow price of the non-traded endowment can be characterizes as
¯  =¯  + ¯ σ0
B


















































  − ω1
20 2












  + ω1
20 2
  + 1
2Φ
¢i  (135)
measures the distribution of initial endowments in favor of country 2. As usual, ∗1
 denotes the Radon—Nikodym
derivative of the alternative measure with respect to the original one induced by the generator θ
∗1.D e ﬁning the













and the equilibrium price for the bond as 0
 =( 1 ) [|F ], the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium can be implemented
by a Radner equilibrium (i.e., a sequence of temporary equilibria) and it is identical to the one of an heterogenous













 =1 2  6=  =1 2 (137)

























 =1 2  6=  =1 2
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comes from MPP aversion to ambiguity. Such a contribution appears to be monotonically increasing in  (the amount
of ambiguity on the other asset), while the eﬀect of an increase in  will depend on the sign of 

 .H o w e v e r ,a si n
54The (Arrow-Debreu) equilibrium exists under the assumption 0 ≤ 1  
1  0 ≤ 2  
2 , which can be read as imposing an upper
bound on the tolerable amount of ambiguity for trading to take place. In fact, under the assumption of “small ambiguity” the two worst-case
density generators are ∗1
 =( 0  1)0 and ∗2
 =( 20)0.
56the general framework by Chen and Epstein (2002), 
 − 





¢0  → 0
n o rt ob ez e r ow h e n = 0 (i.e., when there is no fundamental risk in the economy). Similarly, the expression for
the equilibrium riskless rate shows that while an increase in the ambiguity measures (the s) is likely (or guaranteed,
when 12








is also likely to convert such growing
ambiguity in lower real interest rates, which is a key to solving the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles.
If we interpret each agent as a representative consumer from a speciﬁc country and, consequently,  as the domestic
shock to the endowment in country  =1 2,   can be thought of as the dividend process on the domestic security of
country , a number of interesting insights can be derived. For instance, it is well known that in standard (S)EU models
with log-utility preferences, each country’s consumption level will be a deterministic function of aggregate endowment,
so that consumption growth rates worldwide should display perfect, unit correlation. However, the empirical evidence
points to the fact that consumption growth rates are only weakly correlated, the so-called consumption home bias.
Interestingly, under recursive MPP, Epstein and Miao show that the assumption 0 ≤ 1  









 0, meaning that the country-speciﬁc growth rate is positively correlated with internal
shocks. Furthermore, the country with higher mean growth rate also has the largest variance of consumption growth.
The higher is the ambiguity faced by country ,t h eh i g h e ri st h em e a ng r o w t hr a t eo fc o u n t r y. In general, ambiguity
also reduces the riskless rate; only when the two countries face the same amount of ambiguity, 

 is constant and
independent on the initial distribution of aggregate endowment. Ambiguity increases the market price for uncertainty,
and, interpreting the -th component of  as the domestic price of uncertainty for country ,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a t

is decreasing in 
 (the domestic share of consumption) in support to the empirical ﬁndings in Campbell (1998)
that risk premia are higher in countries with higher saving rates. Finally, rewriting the return of asset 1 in terms of
































[country 2 perspective]. (140)
Therefore, country 1 will impute a higher expected return to security 1 with respect to country 2 if and only if
211
  112
 , which holds only if country 1 considers its own security less ambiguous than country 2 is (the opposite
holds for security 2). Hence country 1, which is less ambiguity averse with respective to its own security, attaches to it
ah i g h e re x p e c t e dr e t u r nr e ﬂecting a “preference” for it over the foreign one, in accordance with the empirical ﬁndings
(e.g., by French and Poterba, 1991) that show that large distortions in expected return beliefs are needed to support
the observed home country bias.
Recently, Leippold, Trojani, and Vanini (2008) have re-examined the eﬀects of ambiguity on the equity premium
and risk-free rate puzzles in a Lucas exchange economy with a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) representative
agent, who can invest in a single, risky security. Although their analysis is performed at a level of generality that
is inferior to Epstein and Wang (1994) and Chen and Epstein (2002), their ﬁndings are insightful. Assume that–
according to some probabilistic reference model –the security’s dividend process {} follows the simple GBM
 = +  (141)
where  ∈ {1 2},a n d is a -BM. To allow for the possibility of model misspeciﬁcation, for each  in the
57parameter set, the investor entertains a range of alternative speciﬁcations for the dynamics of .I np a r t i c u l a r ,f o r
each  ∈ {1}, she considers the drift-distorted model:
()=()( + ) + ()() (142)
Each distortion  generates a new probability measure , under which the signal is assumed to be unbiased. For any
 in the parameter set, not all the distortions are possible: the agent constrains herself to consider only distortions
for which 1
2
2 ≤ (), for some (). In particular, for each , she considers the drift set:
()=
½






∀ ∈ {1} (143)
T h es i z eo fe a c hn e i g h b o r h o o d() describes the degree of ambiguity associated with any possible reference model for
the drift , in the sense that, the broader is (), the more ambiguous the signals about a speciﬁc dividend drift +
are. The investor considers some probability distribution ()={1} on the space of sets {(1)()}.
Since the investor is basing her beliefs on the whole set of likelihoods implied by (), she considers a whole class of




( + )(): +  ∈ ()∈ {1}
)
 (144)
This set represents the investor’s ambiguity about the true dividend-drift process at time , conditionally on the
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(145)









If  is the risk aversion coeﬃcient, and setting ∗
 ≡  +(  − 1) +0 5(1 − )2
, Leippold et al. show that the
solution of the inﬁmum problem in (145) is 
∗ =
p























Because the factors [+(1−)
p
2()2
]−1 ( =1 ) are monotone decreasing in ()i fa n do n l yi f( 1−) ≷ 0,
the price of any ambiguous state in () is a increasing (decreasing) function of the degree of ambiguity ()i fa n d
only if  ≶ 1. Therefore ambiguity will decrease stock prices if 1, which is normally considered the most plausible
case.55 In addition, ambiguity aversion implies lower equilibrium interest rates, regardless of risk aversion. Therefore,
al o wc o e ﬃcient of risk aversion accommodates for both a higher equity premium and a lower interest rate, so that
both the equity premium and the interest rate puzzles might ﬁnd a rational explanation for moderate amounts of
55However, the intuition according to which 1 would be the sensible calibration overwhelmingly derives from an empirical literature
in which estimation and/or calibration have been performed for (S)EU models. Therefore our claim in the text has to be taken with
caution. The possibility to obtain growing eﬀects on equilibrium asset returns for 1 (or even as  → 0+) is a well-established fact in
the incomplete information and learning literatures, see e.g., Guidolin (2006) and David (2008).
58ambiguity as well as relative risk aversion. In fact, if we call  ∗ the optimal value function of the problem solved by
the investor, the equilibrium equity premium will be expressed as

















where  ≡ 2
 + 2
,a n d,  are coeﬃcients in the dynamics of the worst-case model. The ﬁrst term in the equity
premium expression,  ( +  ∗), is a standard risk exposure and also incorporates the premium attached to the
worst-case state, while the sum of the second and the third terms represents ambiguity premium.
4.3. Robustness
Another, crucial strand of the asset pricing literature has adopted the robustness modelling approach proposed by
Hansen, Sargent, and their co-authors. One of the ﬁrst papers in this camp is the discrete-time, linear-quadratic
permanent income model used by Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) to study consumption/saving rules. Speciﬁ-
cally, Hansen et al. have re-interpreted risk-sensitive preferences as embedding a desire for robustness against model’s
misspeciﬁcation, and showed that large estimates (or calibrated “perceptions”) of market-based measures of risk aver-
sion may result from misspeciﬁcations that ignore the existence of a concern for small speciﬁcation errors by robust
decision makers. To understand the connection between risk-sensitive preferences and robust preferences, consider a
simple control problem whose state transition equation is x+1 = Ax + Bc + Cw+1,w h e r ex is a state vector,
c is the control vector (e.g., consumption and portfolio shares in a portfolio problem) and w+1 is an IID Gaussian
random vector with zero mean and identity covariance matrix. The risk sensitive control problem consists in choosing
the policy rule c to maximize
 = (cx)+R(+1) (149)










¶¯ ¯ ¯ ¯F
¸
(150)
is a risk adjustment operator. Speciﬁcally, when  6=0 ,R makes an additional adjustment with respect to the one
induced by , in the sense that negative values of  c o r r e s p o n dt oh i g h e ra v e r s i o nt or i s kw i t hr e s p e c tt oaV N M
speciﬁcation. Moreover, while under (S)EU the transition equation is represented by x+1 = Ax + Bc + Cw+1,i n
a robust control problem the transition equation is a distorted law of motion,
x+1 = Ax + Bc + C(w+1 + θ) (151)














for a given 0. (152)
56 ˆ [·] is the expectation operator conditional on the distorted law of motion. The assumption that the distortion only aﬀects the mean
of the shocks to the linear system is actually not as restrictive as it may seem. Hansen and Sargent (2007) show that if we were to allow a
general misspeciﬁcation within a Gaussian framework, the optimal distortion would consist of a Gaussian transition density with the same
mean distortion as when the misspeciﬁcation is constrained to aﬀect the mean. Hovever, at least in a discrete time set up, the distortion
would in this case also extend to the covariance matrix of the innovations, if given a chance. However, Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova,
and Williams (2006) have proven that in a continuous time diﬀusion setting, the optimal distortion will not involve the the volatility matrix
because this would be inﬁnitely costly in terms of entropy.
59Hansen and Sargent (1998) have shown that–letting the Lagrange multiplier for the second constraint be equal to
−1–the optimal value function that solves the risk-sensitive control problem and the one that solves the robust
control problem both have a quadratic form in x with a common characteristic matrix. Furthermore, the optimal policy
rule c∗ is the same in both problems. The relationship between the two value functions and the corresponding decision
rules establishes how the risk-sensitive preferences speciﬁcation induces the same behavior that would occur without
the risk-sensitivity adjustment, but with the concern for robustness and the pessimism induced by the distortion
operated by θ. Hence the parameters  and  can be interpreted as indicating a desire for robustness.
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) apply this framework to produce asset pricing results. They prove that
the concern for robustness modiﬁes the standard pricing equation, 1 =  [+1+1|F]( w h e r e+1 denotes the














which means that 
+1 is the density ratio of the distorted relative to the reference probability distribution. Addi-

















i.e., the price of risk is approximately equal to the time  speciﬁcation error, as captured by the distortion θ.
Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) have further extended these results going beyond the linear-quadratic
framework and allowed for more general return and transition functions. In particular, the technique employed by
Anderson et al. (2003) is a generalization of the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation applied to the
pricing equations that twist the probability distribution of the reference model. Such a twist is governed by a single
parameter that measures the set of alternative speciﬁcations that aﬀect the decision maker (we refer the Reader to
Section 2.3). An ambiguity averse agent is attracted by decision rules that will work well across a set of θ’s that are
not implausibly “large”. Therefore the classical utility maximization problem is replaced by a new max-min problem


















where  is a parameter that measures the concern for model misspeciﬁcation. Of course, this is exactly the typical
speciﬁcation for Hansen-Sargent preferences that reﬂect a preference for robustness, in penalty form.
Letting  ∗ be the value function that solves (155) and  = ∗(x) the optimal solution for log-consumption, we
deﬁne ∗(x)a n d∗(x) the drift and diﬀusion of the process x when the optimally distorted control law ∗(x)i s
imposed. Interpreting the state variable x as a vector of assets’ returns, Anderson et al. (2003) derive a decomposition
of the stochastic discount factor which is similar–but obviously more general–than the one in Hansen et al. (1999).
The stochastic discount factor (SDF) between dates  and  +  is the positive random variable









for some appropriate choices of the vectors (x)a n d(x). Equivalently, denoting by (x) the logarithm of the
marginal utility process for the numeraire consumption good, in the standard (S)EU framework
+ = −exp[(x+) − (x)] (157)
60which means that the SDF is a (discounted) transformation of the rate of growth of marginal utility of consumption.
























Σ∗ = ∗(x)(∗(x))0 (158)
it is easy to see that (x)=−(x)a n d(x)=−(x) ,w h i l et h er i s k - f r e er a t ei s−(x)−1
2(x)0(x).








+ is an exponential martingale and can be represented as:




















Hence, in the presence of ambiguity, the implied risk free rate is






where the last term represents the robustness adjustment.
Maenhout (2004) has further progressed on the analysis of equilibrium asset prices under ambiguity within the
robustness framework and homotheticity. Besides making closed-form expressions possible, under homotheticity the
equilibrium worst-case scenario can be characterized to provide guidance on the choice of reasonable values for the
uncertainty aversion parameter, which has been sometimes the Achille’s heel of applied ambiguity research. In addition,
homotheticity makes robustness observationally equivalent to the stochastic diﬀerential utility of Duﬃea n dE p s t e i n
(1992), so that robustness can be interpreted as increasing risk aversion without changing the willingness to substitute
intertemporally.57 As a result, an investor with homothetic robust preferences will be observationally equivalent to
aD u ﬃe-Epstein investor with elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to −1 and risk aversion −1 + ,w h e r e
 is the standard coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and  measures the concern for robustness (or, equivalently,
ambiguity aversion) in (155). Hence, the empirical evidence of substantial pessimism when forming portfolios might be
consistent with rational behavior in the presence of moderate amounts of uncertainty aversion rather than by relative
risk aversion. Therefore cautious portfolios and high equity premia can be obtained by keeping  at reasonable levels
(e.g., below the threshold of 10 argued by Mehra and Prescott, 1985, and Kocherlakota, 1993).
Anderson et al. (2003) prove that a concern for model uncertainty simply adds an endogenous drift ()t o
the law of motion of the state variable , where in Maenhout’s framework stock market returns simply follow a
GBM with constant drift (expected return)  and constant diﬀusion coeﬃcient  so that the state variable is simply
represented by ﬁnancial wealth, and
()=( + ( − )) −  and ()= (161)
57In a ﬁnite-horizon continuous time setting, Skiadas (2003) has proven that the functional representation developed by Hansen and
Sargent in a number of papers admits a recursive representation and that this takes the form of the Stochastic Diﬀerential Utility (SDU)
of Duﬃe and Epstein (1992), independently of the speciﬁc dynamics of the underlaying state-variable.
61is short-hand notation for the drift and diﬀusion of the wealth process. The drift adjustment () is endogenously
chosen and crucially depends on the parameter . The more a decision maker cares for robustness (a lower ), the less
faith she will have in the reference model and the larger will be the set of drift distortions considered when evaluating
her continuation payoﬀs from any given consumption and portfolio rule. Assuming that the endowment process 
follows a GBM with ﬁxed parameters  and , in an equilibrium the excess return on the market portfolio under
the distorted model is given by
 + 

−  =(  + −1) +  (162)
with  ≡ () being the instantaneous covariance between the growth rate of consumption (equal to
endowment in equilibrium, as this is a standard in Lucas model) and the rate of price increase of the market portfolio.
Clearly, the equity premium in (162)–the drift of the excess return process–will exceed the standard expression
for the equity premium in the CCAPM of Breeden (1979), . The diﬀerence is the term −1  0w h i c hi sa
decreasing (increasing) function of the parameter  (ambiguity aversion). The term  + −1 captures the fact that
both market risk and model uncertainty are priced in equilibrium. If we deﬁne the rate of intertemporal substitution
in consumption as  the equilibrium risk-free rate is
 =  +  −
1
2
(1 + )( + −1)2
 (163)
which diﬀers from the standard CCAPM expression, +− 1
2(1+)2
. Clearly, a concern for ambiguity will lower
the risk-free interest rate with respect to the one that derives from the standard CCAPM because (1 + )−12
  0.
Therefore the desire for robustness drives down the equilibrium risk-free rate through a precautionary savings channel,
since the separation between intertemporal substitution and risk aversion (−1 6= )a l l o w sah i g h( b u tr e a s o n a b l e )
value of , without counterfactually producing a high risk-free rate (which would occur with time-additive, constant
relative risk aversion preferences, where −1 = ). In other words, model uncertainty is instrumental in avoiding
Weil’s (1989) risk-free rate puzzle.
As in Maenhout, Sbuelz and Trojani (2008) also introduce a time-state varying constraint in the formulation
(10), specializing the results on the eﬀects of a preference for robustness (ambiguity aversion) to the power utility
case, obtaining further closed-form results. Assume that a state process  represents the exogenous primitives of the
economy and that they follow the Ito process:
 = () + () (164)
The endowment and (cum dividend) stock price processes follow















where B ≡ [ ]0 is a bivariate BM, () measures the correlation between shocks to the state and the endowment
processes, and () captures the correlation between cum-dividend stock valuations and the state variable .T h e
cum-dividend return,  ≡ ( + ), displays a conditional expectation , a conditional volatility , and con-
ditional correlation coeﬃcient  to be determined in equilibrium. The dynamics described in (164)- (165) constitute
62the reference model, Y = μ + ΛB (where Y ≡ [ ]0) of this economy. As in Anderson et al. (2003) and
Maenhout (2004), ambiguity aversion is modelled in the form of a contamination vector, θ ≡ [
 
]0 that perturbs
the BM B so that, under the probabilistic measure induced by θ, the drift term of Y is μ + Λθ:
Y =( μ + Λθ) + ΛB (166)
Following the robust control literature, to limit the concerns expressed by the representative investor to only the models
that are statistically indistinguishable from the approximating, reference model, θ is constrained as 05θ
0θ ≤ 2(),
where  is a non-negative constant and  is a function of the current state  of the economy, that is introduced to
allow for state- and time-dependent ambiguity. Larger values of  represent higher degrees of ambiguity aversion. The
agent optimization problem is












subject to robustness constraint and the dynamics of Y.






























Here (∗) ≡ 2
(∗)2 + 2()(0)2 +2 ∗()0 and  is a relatively complicated function of ,
√
,and  (we
refer the interested Reader to Sbuelz and Trojani (2008) for the expressions for , 2
 and ). Hence, ambiguity
aversion has a direct impact only on the myopic and the hedging demands for equity. While in the absence of ambiguity

































appears. The impact on the equity demand is state-dependent in a non-standard way: when equity risk barely pays oﬀ,
and there is scarce need for hedging, or equity is an inadequate hedging tool, the preference for robustness generates
the ﬁrst order risk aversion (FORA) eﬀect, in the sense that desired equity holdings are small even if ambiguity
aversion is low. However ambiguity has no direct impact on the equilibrium equity price dynamics and it can only
aﬀect the parameters that enter the dynamic process of cum-dividend prices, i.e., equity expected returns, volatilities









































58The ambiguous expression “quasi-closed form” refers to the fact that the expressions that follow contain terms 

 and (∗)t h a t
depend in possibly complicated, non-linear ways on ,
√
,and .
63Hence the equity premium under the reference model is directly aﬀected by time varying ambiguity; speciﬁcally, it is
higher in presence of model uncertainty if and only if the sum of the standard and the ambiguity-speculative demands
for equity dominates over the corresponding intertemporal hedging demand (2
  |()|)o ri fa m b i g u i t y -
driven hedging implies a short position in equity (()  0). By contrast, the worst-case model equity
premium is indirectly aﬀected by ambiguity only through ,  and . Sbuelz and Trojani quantify the impact of
ambiguity by calibrating to real data some special cases, assuming approximately unit risk aversion and tiny amounts
of ambiguity aversion. Their simulation ﬁndings conﬁrm that ambiguity aversion reduces the risk-free rate but only
indirectly aﬀects equity returns and worst-case equity premia. In fact, log utility and worst-case equity premia remain
completely unaﬀected. The calibration shows that realistic amounts of ambiguity aversion give a substantial lift to
the equity premium already at low levels of standard risk aversion. This happens without upward pressure on the
risk-free rate, since the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is left unchanged.
Papers like Anderson et al. (2003), Maenhout (2004), and Sbuelz and Trojani (2008) have all derived key insights
for the equilibrium quantities and the empirical properties of the SDF. In this vein, Hansen (2007) has illustrated in
more general terms how statistical ambiguity–both intended as agents’ inability to fully characterize the probabilistic
model of reference, and as the econometrician’s inability to infer the model actually used by economic agents–may
create small errors that have however a potential to generate large asset pricing anomalies. Hansen’s (2007) novelty
consists in establishing a link between ambiguity aversion and the concept of Chernoﬀ’s (1952)’s entropy. Chernoﬀ’s
entropy is often used in statistics to test a particular model against a competitor and it is deﬁned as the rate at which
the logarithm of the probability of the test model being wrong drops to zero. Hence, lower values of the Chernoﬀ rate
indicate that the errors deriving from the choice of a particular model are relatively small, or, equivalently, that the
model is statistically indistinguishable from the “true” one. Using a simple framework, Hansen shows that models
characterized by low Chernoﬀ rates generate extremely diﬀerent Sharpe-ratios relative to a “real” data-driven model,
so that statistical ambiguity may greatly contribute to explaining a range of asset pricing puzzles.
Assume that the -dimensional random vector μ + Λv represents the returns provided by  assets, where the
vector v is normally distributed with mean zero and an identity covariance matrix. Therefore the matrix Λ determines
the priced risk exposures of each asset to each of the shocks and the covariance matrix of asset returns is Σ = ΛΛ
0.
Under the standard normal/CARA framework, the risk factors are lognormal and they can be characterized as a
transformation of the kernel
exp
µ






where  represents a given portfolio choice. Denoting by exp() the risk-free return, Hansen assumes that the
logarithm of the asset prices can be written as
ln(ω)=ω0μ −  − ω0Λq (173)
for some -dimensional vector q, whose components are the risk prices. Hence, q prices the exposure to shocks in v
and it is the compensation for risk exposure in terms of logarithms of the means. Let’s assume that Λ is such that,
whenever ω is a versor vector e (this is a vector that is zero everywhere but in its -th position, where a 1 appears),
then (e) = 1 and the logarithm of the excess return is ω0μ −  = ω0Λq (such that ω01 =1 ) . A s s u m i n gt h a t













(μ − ι)0Σ−1(μ − ι)0¤12
 (174)
In reality, the mean μ is not perfectly revealed to an econometrician or perhaps even to investors, that instead might
be able to estimate an alternative mean ˆ μ T h et w oS h a r p er a t i o s( a s s o c i a t e dt oμ and ˆ μ) are related as follows:
£




(μ − ι)0Σ−1(μ − ι)0¤12
≤
£




(ˆ μ − μ)0Σ−1(ˆ μ − μ)
¤12 i st h es q u a r er o o to f8t i m e st h eC h e r n o ﬀ entropy of model ˆ μ with respect
to model μ. Therefore, Small Chernoﬀ rates (that is, small errors in the estimate of ˆ μ) induce sizable variations of
the Sharpe ratio and large pricing anomalies. For example, a Chernoﬀ rate of 1% per annum increases the maximum
Sharpe ratio by about 014.
Barillas, Hansen and Sargent (2009) have followed up on Hansen’s (2007) intuitions and have attacked the problem
of using ambiguity to produce SDFs with properties that are consistent with the observed (high) mean excess returns
and (low) real risk-free rates from a diﬀerent angle. The equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles have been often














The ratio [+1] [+1] is commonly called the market price of risk and it is the slope of the mean-standard
deviation frontier for SDFs. The equity premium puzzle arises because to reconcile the HJ-bound with empirical
measures of the market price of risk, an unreasonably high relative risk aversion coeﬃcient () is needed. Moreover,
high values of  deliver high market prices of risk but also push the reciprocal of the risk-free rate away from the
HJ-bound, determining the risk-free rate puzzle. Noting the observational equivalence between Kreps and Porteus’
(1978) risk-sensitive preferences and MPP, Barillas, Hansen and Sargent have reinterpreted the coeﬃcient  calibrated
by Tallarini (2000) to match asset market data as a measure for the consumer’s doubts about the model speciﬁcation.
Consequently, the risk premia commonly estimated from asset market data would be measures of the beneﬁts of the
reduction in the uncertainty on the unknown model speciﬁcation, and not only of the aversion to stochastic, aggregate
endowment ﬂuctuations.59 To discuss the plausibility of the parameter for uncertainty aversion calibrated on asset
market data, Barillas et al. use detection error probabilities and ﬁnd that values of these probabilities that imply a
non-overly cautious attitude toward uncertainty yields market prices of risk that are compatible with HJ-bounds.60
59A similar point has been made by Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent and Williams (2002) in the context of a stochastic growth model under
uncertain growth, for which a high market price of uncertainty occurs not because of conﬁdence in low growth but rather because of
ambiguity about which growth regime rules the economy.
60Given a reference probabilistic model , and letting  be the distorted worst-case model associated with the ambiguity aversion
parameter ,c o n s i d e raﬁxed sample of observations on a problem-speciﬁc state variable ,  =0 − 1. Letting  be the likelihood




 6=  = 
Therefore, if we assume that model  has generated the data,  = (|)=( ≤ 0). Similarly,  =
(|)=(  0) The detection error probability associated with the ambiguity aversion parameter  is deﬁned
as ()=1
2 ( + ).
654.4. Smooth Ambiguity Preferences and the SDF
There is another strand of the ambiguity literature that has tackled the typical asset pricing questions–i.e., how to
obtain plausible properties for the SDF in general equilibrium, how to rationalize high equity premia with low real
interest rates along with high and strongly time-varying volatility–using ambiguity preferences of the KMM type.
For instance, Ju and Miao (2008) have developed a pure exchange economy in which aggregate consumption follows
a hidden Markov regime switching process, and the agent is ambiguous about the hidden state process. Preferences
are represented by a recursive dynamic generalization of KMM preferences, see Section 3.5 for details. Ju and Miao
(2008) work with the recursive functional












where  is the realization of a hidden state  at time .  follows a -state Markov chain, and each of the realizations
can be interpreted as a possible state of the economy: diﬀerent realizations corresponds to diﬀerent probability
measures in the set . The risky asset pays dividends  and has gross return +1 over the interval [ +1 ] .
There is also a risk-free bond whose return is +1. In equilibrium, consumption and dividends will be the same and
consumption growth is governed by a Markov switching process:
ln(+1)=+1 + +1  ∼ (01) (178)
Setting  ()=1−(1 − ), ()=1−(1 − ), and
(R)=
h




0a n d ∈ (01), (179)
the decision maker displays ambiguity aversion if and only if  .  can be interpreted as an ambiguity aversion
parameter,  is the standard risk aversion coeﬃcient, and 1 represents the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Under this particular functional speciﬁcation, assuming that  can take only two possible state values (1 or 2 with 1
being a recession and 2 an expansion), beliefs are updated using Bayes’ Rule that in this case reduces to
Pr(+1 =1 |)=
11 (ln(+1)1) + 21 (ln(+1)2)(1 − )
 (ln(+1)1) +  (ln(+1)2)(1 − )
 (180)
where  is the transition probability of ,  (ln(+1)) is the probability density of log-consumption growth
when the mean is = ( =1 2), and the variance is . By standard principles, the corresponding pricing kernel is

















where +1 denotes the expectation operator conditional on the history  and the state +1. The last multiplicative
factor in the deﬁnition of the SDF reﬂects ambiguity. In the case of ambiguity neutrality,  = , this term vanishes.
When the representative agent is ambiguity averse, a recession (=1) is associated with a high value of the pricing
kernel. Intuitively, the agent has a lower continuation value +1 in a recession state, causing the adjustment factor in
+1 to take a higher value. This pessimistic behavior reduces the stock price and raises the expected stock return;
66furthermore, it reduces the risk-free rate because the agent wants to save more for the future. Because stocks do
poorly in recessions when agents put more weight on the pricing kernel, ambiguity aversion generates high negative
correlation between the pricing kernel and stock return that increases the equity premium:











while a high conditional mean for the SDF decreases the real interest rate. In Ju and Miao (2008), ambiguity aversion





the equity risk premium. A calibration shows that the model can match mean excess stock returns on the market
portfolio, the mean risk-free rate, and the observed volatility of excess return and its relationship with the (conditional,
state-dependent) equity premium.
4.5. Issues with Asset Pricing Applications of Models of Ambiguity
Although the papers we have reviewed yield a number of insights, a few contributions have cautioned against the
dangers of careless applications of the some of basic insights from models of ambiguity. For instance, Gollier (2009)
has warned that generalizations of the qualitative (calibration) results in papers such as Ju and Miao (2008) may be
problematic, because some of their implications for the equity premium may derive not from KMM-type ambiguity
per se, but also from the speciﬁc parametric models for risk and uncertainty that have been adopted. Gollier has
investigated the eﬀects of increases in ambiguity aversion on optimal portfolio allocation and equilibrium asset prices
using KMM preferences as in Section 2.4. While it has been suggested that ambiguity aversion will inevitably make
individuals more cautious, thereby oﬀering a potential explanation for the equity premium puzzle, Gollier proves
instead that an increase in ambiguity aversion does not necessarily imply a reduction in the demand for risky assets.
In particular, there exist suﬃcient conditions under which, ceteris paribus, an increase in ambiguity aversion reduces
the demand for the ambiguous asset, and raises the equity premium; however, absent those conditions not much can
be said on the eﬀects of ambiguity aversion on asset prices.
In particular Gollier shows that for particular sets of priors , the introduction of ambiguity aversion increases
the investor’s demand for the ambiguous asset. Indeed, the ﬁrst-order condition for portfolio optimality can be
interpreted as a standard Euler equation under (S)EU, with a distortion in the compounded probabilities. In particular,
under ambiguity aversion, the agent computes the compounded distorted probability assigning more weight on those
distributions yielding a smaller expected utility. This distortion is pessimistic and, under standard (S)EU-theory,
pessimistic deteriorations in beliefs are known to not always reduce the demand for the risky asset and do not necessarily
increase the equity premium. Therefore the general credence that ambiguity will always reduce the demand for risky
assets, possibly induce limited participation, and a higher equity premium may have been over-stated in the literature,
because of the use of speciﬁc parametric set ups which are of course hard to avoid in practice, but also carry much
more importance than it may have been commonly recognized.
In a similar vein, Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2009) have recently stressed that when building models that
feature non-expected utility preferences, deriving a formal representative investor may be diﬃcult and that even
simple models with heterogeneous, non-(S)EU investors may deliver implications for asset prices that are substantially
67diﬀerent from those that a matching representative agent model would give.61 In fact, Chapman and Polkovnichenko
examine a range of two-date economies populated by heterogeneous agents displaying some common forms of non-
expected utility preferences, including MPP, to show that the risk premium and the risk-free rate generated in the
models are sensitive to ignoring heterogeneity because of potential limited participation eﬀects a’ la Dow and Werlang
(1992). Chapman and Polkovnichenko compare the equilibrium prices derived in a model with two agents with diﬀerent
degrees of ambiguity aversion to the prices obtained with a single representative agent who has a wealth-weighted
average of the ambiguity aversion parameters of the two-agent economy. In their framework, there are two periods,
one for trading and one for consumption. Uncertainty is resolved at time 1, so that one of |Ω| possible states has
realization. Each agent receives a ﬁxed (known) endowment at time 0, and a further random endowment at time 1.
Agents can trade  contingent claims, each of which is in zero net supply, and a risk-free bond. The utility index has
a simple negative exponential form, while ambiguity is captured by MPP. Speciﬁcally, agents are assumed to have an
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for some speciﬁc  ≥ 0 where  = 0 corresponds to the standard (S)EU-framework. In their calibration,  is assumed
to vary over [0095]. The calibration of the price of the market portfolio and of the risk-free asset shows that the
single (weighted-average) agent model overstates the magnitude of the equity premium. The extent of this bias is
always increasing in the diﬀerence in ambiguity between the two agents, with the largest diﬀerence occurring if one
agent is (S)EU and the other has  =0 95. Similarly, when one of the agents is (S)EU, the risk-free rate is overstated
in the single-agent model (the overstatement is between 5.3% and 26.2% relative to the two-agent model), but this
eﬀect is weaker when both agents are ambiguity averse. Intuitively, more ambiguity averse agents may choose to not
trade, which leaves the pricing of risk to the remaining agents. In these cases, it is incorrect to use single average
agent pricing, since the risk premium is primarily determined by the agents who are most willing to bear risk, and it
will diﬀer considerably from the level implied by the “typical” preference parameters.
Trojani and Vanini (2000) have used their portfolio choice model with a concern for robustness described in Section
3.3 to study the eﬀects of ambiguity in a heterogeneous, production general equilibrium economy characterized by
two agents with power and logarithmic utility indexes, and ambiguity parameters 1  0 2 =0  1  0, 2 =0 ,
respectively. This means that the ﬁrst investor is an ambiguity-averse, power utility agent and the second investor an
EU maximizer with unit relative risk aversion coeﬃcient. Of course, their examples suﬀer from a tight parameterization
and therefore are subject to the Gollier’s (2009) critique. Yet, imposing speciﬁc parametric assumptions helps in
developing results for the eﬀects of heterogeneity in preferences on equilibrium asset prices. Trojani and Vanini (2000)
analyze a robust version of the classical Merton’s (1969) model in continuous time. In their set up, a representative
agent can invest either in a riskless asset, with risk-free rate , or in a risky asset, whose price dynamics is described
by a simple GBM. The risky asset is a share of stock that gives ownership of the production technology with constant
61The analysis of the interaction between ambiguity and heterogeneity is one of the leading research themes for the future. In an
experimental setting, Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli and Zame (2010) study the eﬀects of ambiguity on equilibrium asset prices. Their
results show that attitudes toward ambiguity (characterized through CEU max-min preferences) are heterogeneous across the population,
and suﬃciently high degrees of ambiguity aversion generate open intervals of prices for which these agents refrain from trading. Contrary
to the standard (S)EU framework, investors are not infra-marginal, since ambiguity averse investors who decide to not trade still have an
indirect eﬀect on prices because the per-capita amount of risk that has to be borne by those who are left trading is aﬀected.
68return to scale. They ﬁnd that in production economies, it is possible to ﬁnd a threshold level for the cross-sectional
wealth distribution  = 1(1 + 2), below which only agent 2 trades the risky asset. In particular, if  falls
below the threshold, agent 1 leaves the security market, so that prices reﬂect the preferences of the log-utility investor
only. Such a threshold is a decreasing function of the volatility- (risk) to-ambiguity ratio, hence, when the asset’s
volatility is large relative to the amount of ambiguity, both agents tend to trade. Indeed, while risk aversion induces
agents to trade in order to diversify risk, ambiguity prevents trade.
4.6. Ambiguity and Learning
Epstein and Schneider (2008) have extended the results on asset pricing under ambiguity to derive insights on the
eﬀects of the quality of information. Financial market participants absorb on a daily basis a large amount of news
(signals). Processing a signal involves qualitative judgments: news from a reliable source should lead to stronger
portfolio changes than news from an obscure source. When their quality is diﬃcult to evaluate, signals are treated
as ambiguous. Epstein and Schneider have considered a simple, three-period asset pricing model populated by a
representative agent with recursive MPP ` a la Epstein and Schneider (2007) who can observe past prices of a risky
asset (say “”), dividends and an additional ambiguous signal that is informative about future dividends of the asset.
Consider a market in which 1 shares of  are traded, where each share is a claim to a dividend that follows the
process  =  +  + ; additionally, a portfolio composed of all the other available assets is traded, with dividend
process ˜  =˜ + +˜ .H e r e and ˜  are the mean dividends of the two assets/portfolios,  is an aggregate shock,
and  and ˜  are idiosyncratic, asset-speciﬁc shocks. All shocks are mutually independent and normally distributed



















While trading in the assets occurs at time 1–when a signal  on  is revealed–at time 2 dividends are realized. The
signal  has structure  =  +  + ,w h e r e ≥ 0 measures the degree to which the signal is speciﬁct oa s s e t.
If  = 0, then the news is 100% company-speciﬁc, that is, while it helps to forecast company cash ﬂow , the signal
is not useful for forecasting the payoﬀ ˜  of other assets. Because of ambiguity on signal quality, the variance of  is







. There is a single normal prior for μ, the two-dimensional parameter
μ ≡ [ + ]0, that agents try to infer from the signal , and a set of normal likelihoods for  parameterized by 2
.




The set of posteriors about μ at date 1 is calculated using standard rules for updating normal random variables.
Denoting by (2
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,t h ec o e ﬃcient (2
) also varies,
tracing out a family of posteriors. The coeﬃcient (2
) is commonly used to measure the information content of a
signal relative to the volatility of the parameter, since it determines the fraction of prior variance in μ that is resolved
by the signal. Hence, under ambiguity, (2
∗)a n d(∗2
 ) provide bounds on the (relative) information content, while,
69in the Bayesian case, (2
∗)=(∗2
 ), so that agents know how much information is conveyed by . Under ambiguity,
the larger is the diﬀerence (2
∗) − (∗2
 ), the less conﬁdent the investor is about the true information content.
For simplicity, Epstein and Schneider focus on the case in which the representative agent is risk neutral and does
not discount the future; additionally, she derives utility only from consumption at time 2. In the standard Bayesian
case, this assumptions imply that the prices of asset  at dates 0 and 1 are given by

()
1 ()= +ˆ 
 +ˆ 






respectively. At date 0, the expected present value is simply the prior mean dividend , while at date 1 it is the
posterior mean dividend, provided that the signal is informative ((2
)  0). The implied equilibrium prices are
diﬀerent under ambiguity. The price of the asset at time 1 is:














1 () is a piece-wise linear functions kinked at  = 0 and with lower slope over  ≥ 0, diﬀerently from

()
1 () which is simply linear in (2
). The arrival of an ambiguous signal at date 1 is anticipated at date 0, and
since the date 1 price is concave in the signal , the date 0 conditional mean return is minimized by selecting the
highest possible variance ∗2
  This yields the expression:

































  0 (189)
directly related to the extent of ambiguity measured by (2
∗)−(∗2
 ). Such a premium is increasing in the volatility
of fundamentals, including the volatility of idiosyncratic risk. Ambiguous company-speciﬁcn e w si n d u c eap r e m i u m ,
whose size depends on total risk. Further, prices depend on the prospect of low information quality, in the sense that
if it is known today that information on asset  will be diﬃcult to interpret in the future, asset  will be less attractive
(and cheaper) already today, while, in the standard Bayesian framework, any feedback of future information quality
on current utility is precluded. Moreover, while under (S)EU the law of large numbers implies that the variance of
the market portfolio tends to zero as  becomes large, so that the value of any portfolio converges to the mean 
under ambiguity the market portfolio does not become less uncertain as the number of assets increases, since the
ambiguity-averse investor acts as if the mean was lower, regardless of the number of assets.
This simple three-period model can be embedded into an inﬁnite-horizon framework by chaining together a sequence
of short learning episodes, in which the agent observes just an ambiguous signal about the next innovation in dividends
before that innovation is revealed. Because of risk neutrality, in equilibrium the riskless interest rate  equals
1(1 + ), where  is the intertemporal discount rate. Assume a standard mean-reverting process for dividends,
 = ¯ +(1−)−1+ where ¯  is the unconditional mean dividend, (1−) measures mean reversion, and  is IID
Gaussian. Every period an ambiguous signal about the value of next period’s shock +1 is observed. For simplicity,
the distinction between systematic and idiosyncratic shocks is omitted so that  = +1 + 









. In equilibrium, the price of the stock is:









[+1 + +1] (190)
Focusing on stationary equilibria and conjecturing a price function with structure  = ¯ ++(2
),E p s t e i n
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( − ¯ ) (192)
This is the present discounted value of dividends: without ambiguity, prices are determined only by current interest
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The ﬁrst term captures the response to the current, ambiguous signal. As before, this response is asymmetric, so that
b a dn e w si si n c o r p o r a t e di n t op r i c e sw i t has t r o n g e re ﬀect. In addition, the strength of this reaction depends on the
p e r s i s t e n c eo fd i v i d e n d s :i f is smaller (i.e., shocks to dividends are highly persistent), the eﬀect of news on prices
is stronger since the information becomes more important for later payoﬀs. The second term captures anticipation
of future ambiguous news and, as before, it may reﬂect compensation for asset-speciﬁc shocks. Next, Epstein and
Schneider examine the properties of per-share excess returns ˆ 
+1 ≡ [




+1 + +1 − 
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The ﬁrst term is the response to the current, ambiguous signal. The second term reﬂects the realization of dividends,
and it is proportional to the diﬀerence between the current innovation to dividends +1 and the response to last
period’s projection about that innovation. These two terms are independent of each other because +1 and +1 are.
The last (constant) term represents a constant premium that investors obtain for enduring low information quality in
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  0 (196)
71which is to be contrasted with ∗[ ˆ 
()
+1 ] = 0 which must obtain in a risk-neutral framework in which there is no
aversion to ambiguity. Moreover, the presence of ambiguous news induces an ambiguity premium which is increasing




), the derivatives of the volatility of equilibrium returns under ambiguity   ∗[ ˆ +1]w i t h
respect to both (2
∗)a n d(∗2
 ) are positive. This is in sharp contrast to the Bayesian case, where price and return
volatilities move in opposite directions. Further, the volatility of prices and returns can be much larger than the one of
fundamentals, since, if the range of precisions contemplated by ambiguity-averse agents is large, they will often attach
more weight to a signal with respect to agents who know the true precision. Hence, ambiguous information can cause
large price ﬂuctuations. This ﬁnding relates to the excess price volatility puzzle literature started by LeRoy and Porter
(1981) and Shiller (1981). Finally, because ambiguity-averse market participants respond asymmetrically to news, the
model has also the potential to produce skewed distributions for prices and returns, even though both dividends and
noise have symmetric (normal) distributions. Interestingly, negative skewness should be more pronounced for stocks
for which there is more ambiguous information. This feature helps explaining the existing evidence on skewness in the
cross-section of stocks, see e.g., Harvey and Siddique (2000). In Epstein et al.’s model this means that large cap stocks
are “in the news” more, so that traders have to elaborate more ambiguous information. In contrast, small stocks are
not widely followed by the media and information mostly arrives in the form of the occasional earnings report, so that
one would not expect a lot of negative skewness.
Illeditsch (2009) has extended the results in Epstein and Schneider (2008) in a number of directions: investors are
allowed to be averse to both risk and ambiguity, they are heterogeneous in their aversion to risk and ambiguity and
they can learn from ambiguous signals over time.62 The model assumes that investors know the marginal distribution
of fundamentals (the aggregate dividend) but are ambiguous about the conditional distribution of the signal given the
dividend (the precision of the signal). The incorporation of both risk and ambiguity aversion turns out to be important:
not only risk and ambiguity aversion generate very diﬀerent qualitative implications for the equilibrium signal-to-price
maps, but risk aversion also ampliﬁes the eﬀects of ambiguous information on the conditional distribution of stock
returns, determining an interesting non-linear compounding eﬀect. Moreover, because of investors’ heterogeneity,
Illeditsch (2009) also proves interesting results for limited participation and market “freezes”–i.e., absence of active
trading in response to large shocks (here, signal realization s ) –i nt e r m so ft h ee x i s t e n c eo fa ni n t e r v a lo fp r i c e ss u c h
that investors do not participate in the market because of ambiguity.
4.7. Eﬀects of Ambiguity on Other Asset Classes
Recent years have witnessed a ﬂurry of papers that have taken applications of decision making under ambiguity to
asset pricing well beyond the narrow boundaries of questions concerning equilibrium stock prices, interest rates, the
equity premium and its relationship with volatility. Although this literature is in no way negligible for its applied
62In Illeditsch (2009) investors share the same information but their interpretation varies because of heterogeneity in risk and ambiguity
aversion. A novel avenue for research is the case in which information is asymmetric. For instance, using a setting characterized by
asymmetric information and both ambiguity averse and (S)EU-agents, Caskey (2009) has shown that mispricings may occur because
ambiguity averse investors may prefer to reduce the perceived ambiguity using aggregate signals, even at the cost of losing some of
the available information. Under these circumstances, equilibrium prices may fail to reﬂect all the available information, so that proﬁt
opportunities for (S)EU-agents arise and under/over-reactions to announcements may occur.
72contributions or the elegance of the ambiguity frameworks proposed–see e.g., the applications by Autore, Billingsley,
and Schneller (2009), Benigno and Nistico (2009), Boyarchenko (2009), Kleshchelski and Vincent (2007), Miao and
Wang (2006), and Uhlig (2009)–we will limit our treatment in this sub-section to four papers that–by necessity and
besides their speciﬁc merits–have to be taken as mere examples.
Liu, Pan, and Wang (2002) have examined the equilibrium implications of imprecise knowledge concerning rare
events that aﬀect the aggregate endowment using an approach that is inspired by HS robustness. They consider a
pure exchange economy with one representative agent, a perishable good and a stock which is a claim to the aggregate
endowment. The latter is aﬀected by two types of random shocks: one is diﬀusive in nature, capturing the daily
ﬂuctuations in fundamentals, while the other is a pure jump, representing rare events. While the probability law of
both types of shocks can be estimated using time series data, the attainable precision for rare events is much lower
than the one of diﬀu s i v es h o c k s .T h er a t eo fe n d o w m e n tﬂow  is assumed to be a one-dimensional Markov process





where  is a BM and  is a pure-jump process with intensity 0. Given a jump arrival at time ,t h e
jump amplitude is controlled by a normally distributed random variable with mean  and standard deviation .
Consequently, the mean percentage jump in  is  =e x p (  + 2
2) − 1 ≤ 0. Non-positivity is assumed to focus
on worse case scenarios. Shares of ownership of the aggregate endowment  a r et r a d e da ss t o c k sw i t hp r i c e while
the risk-free rate is 

 . Assuming that the that stock price has the form  = (),w h e r e() is a deterministic







 +  +( 
 − 1)− (198)
The alternative models that an ambiguity averse investor will entertain are deﬁned by the probability measure ,
where  is its Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to . This is a slight variation over Anderson et al.’s (2003)
framework. In fact, here  simply changes the agent’s probability assessment with respect to the jump component,
without altering her view about the diﬀusive component. Letting  be the entire collection of probabilities ,t h e























where  is the ambiguity aversion coeﬃcient, () is a normalizing factor, and ()=+ ( − 1). This speciﬁcation
implies that a preference for robustness aﬀects the representative agent in two ways. On the one hand, to protect herself
against model uncertainty, the investor evaluates her future prospect 
 [+∆] under a range of alternative measures
si n; she focuses on jump models that provide worse prospects than the reference one, hence the minimization
over . On the other hand, the reference probability measure  is the best representation of the data, so the investor
penalizes her choice  according to how much it deviates from the reference . In equilibrium, the equity premium can

















=( 1+)exp((∗ − )2
) − 1








¯  =( 1+)exp(−2
) − 1
73The ﬁrst premium depends on risk aversion only: therefore it approaches 0 when  → 0, and is positive for any
risk-averse investor. The magnitude of the rare event premium also depends on the risk aversion parameter of the
investor, but it is generated by uncertainty aversion, since 
∗
∗
 0f o r → 0, while 
∗
∗
→ 0f o r →∞ .












where  is the dividend payout rate, 
∗
 is a standard BM under ∗,  is a Poisson process with intensity 
∗
,
and–given jump arrival at time –the percentage jump amplitude is log-normally distributed with mean ∗
.L i u ,
Pan, and Wang prove that in this framework, European-style options can be priced using a simple modiﬁcation of the
celebrated Black and Scholes (1973) formula ((0 )):

























  =0 1 (201)
Liu, Pan, and Wang (2002) have actually veriﬁed that this option pricing formula may produce a sensible empirical
performance. They use one-month S&P 500 European-style options (with a ratio between strike and spot prices varying
from 09t o1 1) to test the pricing implications of their formula. Under the assumption that  →∞(no aversion to
uncertainty), at-the-money calls (with strike close to spot price) have an implied volatility of approximately 152%
while out-of-the-money put options have a slightly higher implied volatility, as a result of risk aversion. Hence, the
equilibrium model generates a “smile” curve–i.e., implied volatilities that are higher for options with strike prices
very diﬀerent from the current price of the underlying–that is however very feeble when compared to the pronounced
“smirk” patterns observed in actual markets. On the contrary, under the assumption that ∞ (ambiguity aversion),
at-the-money options have implied volatility of 155% and the model with uncertainty aversion predicts a premium
of about 2% for options away from at-the-money. Furthermore, this implied volatility premium becomes even more
pronounced for out-of-the-money puts, that are typically highly sensitive to adverse, rare events. This is another
feature that echoes what is commonly observed in equity options markets.
Another ﬁeld of asset pricing in which it appears natural to test the implications of ambiguity is the pricing of
ﬁxed income securities, such as long-term coupon bonds, and derivatives that have bonds as their underlying assets.
Gagliardini, Porchia and Trojani (2008) have extended the production economy of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985,
henceforth CIR) and allowed for ambiguity aversion. They model ambiguity as a preference for robustness following
Anderson et al. (2003) to capture a representative investor’s concern about misspeciﬁcation of the process of the
production technology shock. Gagliardini et al. adopt a setting in which the horizon is inﬁnite and uncertainty is
characterized in terms of a probability space (ΩF)a n da( +1)-dimensional standard BM B.  is the representative
investor’s reference belief and alternative probabilistic models are speciﬁed in terms of probability distributions ,
such that the process B
 = B +
R 
0 θ is a BM under  and the vector θ satisﬁes θ
0θ ≤ 2, for a given (constant)
ambiguity aversion parameter  ≥ 0. The asset menu is composed of a locally riskless bond in zero net supply with
return 

 ,a n d risky (real) bonds, also in zero net supply. Markets are complete and risk is characterized by the




= (Y) + σ0
(Y)B (202)
The  assets have a vector price process S that satisﬁes the stochastic diﬀerential equation
S = Iμ(Y) + Iσ(Y)B, (203)
where I =  [1 2]. The representative agent’s utility index is logarithmic,  ()=−ln,w h e r e
denotes consumption. As usual, the optimization problem consists of choosing the optimal investment in the technology
 a n di nt h e bonds (ω ≡ [
 ω
 ]0) and optimal consumption levels, considering the worst case scenario induced
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Σ()[B + θ] (204)
Here  is the wealth process and Σ() ≡ [0
(Y)σ(Y)]
0  An equilibrium is a consumption process, a model
contamination process, an instantaneous risk-free interest rate, and  asset return processes, such that these processes
solve the optimization problem and optimal consumption is ﬁnanced by a self-ﬁnancing trading strategy for which

 =1a n dω
 = 0 Denoting by  the optimal value function and by 5Y the gradient of  with respect to the




σ0(Y) 5 Y + (Y)
q
(σ0(Y) 5 Y + (Y))
0 (σ0(Y) 5 Y + (Y))
 (205)
In this expression, the ﬁrst term takes the standard CIR aﬃne form in which compensation per unit of risk is identical
to the volatility of the production technology. The second term is the market price of ambiguity, and its non-linear
form implies a (real) yield curve that is not aﬃne. The components of the product σ0(Y) 5 Y can change sign
over time. Therefore, bond excess returns can take both positive and negative values, consistently with the empirical
evidence. Finally, since the component of bond excess returns due to ambiguity is proportional to volatility, while the
component due to risk is proportional to variance, the former dominates the latter when aggregate risk in the economy
i sl o w .T h ed e p e n d e n c eo ft h em a r k e tp r i c eo fa m b i g u i t yo nt h et e r m( σ0(Y) 5 Y + (Y)) is due to non-myopic
portfolio behavior: the investor hedges her portfolio against future changes in the worst-case opportunity set, which
are in a one-to-one relation to the realizations of the worst-case drift distortion.
Given the expression for the market price of risk and ambiguity, any interest rate derivative can be priced by
standard arbitrage arguments. Compared to a completely aﬃne setting, ambiguity aversion alters the fundamental
pricing equation through the diﬀerent equilibrium interest rate process 

 = (Y)−σ0
(Y)π and the corresponding
change of drift. A simple calibration exercise to U.S. Treasury yield data shows that the model is able to reproduce
the deviations from the expectations hypothesis documented in the literature, without modifying in any substantial
way the nonlinear mean-reversion dynamics of the short interest rate. In contrast to completely aﬃne models, there
is no apparent trade-oﬀ between ﬁtting the ﬁrst and second moments of the yield curve. These ﬁndings suggest that
a small degree of ambiguity can have large implications for explaining the yield curve.
75Ulrich (2008) has investigated the eﬀects of ambiguity on the inﬂation process for the term structure of nominal
risk-free yields. Given their model of inﬂation dynamics, investors face inﬂation risk and require an inﬂation risk
premium for bearing unanticipated shocks to inﬂation. In bearing this inﬂation risk premium, investors take the
distribution, especially the conditional volatility of inﬂation, as known. Additionally, they may be uncertain about
the true statistical process of inﬂation and require an ambiguity premium to protect themselves against any change or
misspeciﬁcation in their underlying inﬂation model. Ulrich builds and estimates a dynamic, equilibrium three-factor
model for the nominal term structure which accounts for these two sources of inﬂation premia. The ﬁrst premium
is determined by the product of risk aversion and (negative of) the covariance between inﬂation and consumption.
The second premium is determined by the product of model uncertainty aversion and the volatility of inﬂation.
His paper diﬀers from Gagliardini et al. (2008) because the latter have proposed a real production economy where
the representative investor faces model uncertainty with regard to the production technology and only analyze the
impact of ambiguity on the term structure of real (inﬂation-indexed) bonds, while Ulrich (2008) models ambiguity as
concerning a monetary policy Taylor rule and characterizes the impact on the term structure of both real and nominal
bonds.
In Ulrich’s model, a representative agent has time separable and logarithmic preferences over consumption holdings
 and real monetary holdings . The agent holds a capital stock  and owns a linear technology  which produces
an output good  in a linear fashion,  = . The exogenous growth rate of the technology follows the process










with the stochastic technological innovation  driven by a stationary square-root process. The agent can invest  of
his wealth in this production technology and the remaining wealth  in a nominal risk-free bond. The real return
of the investment into the nominal bond is not known ex-ante, because inﬂation is stochastic. Inﬂation is aﬀected by
three random state variables: the productivity factor ,t h ei n ﬂation volatility factor ,a n dt h ei n ﬂation drift factor
. These three state variables make up the state space X of the model. The central bank is assumed to control an
additional monetary shock which is denoted  ˆ  and which is orthogonal to the state shocks. The agent maximizes
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subject to a standard budget constraint and the entropy bound 052(X) ≤ (X). The agent has a preference for
robustness because she insures herself against a worst case inﬂation distortion, (X), which the central bank chooses.
The entropy constraint speciﬁes that the investor wants to protect herself against conditional inﬂation drift distortions
w h i c ha r es m a l l e ro re q u a lt o(X). This upper bound is therefore allowed to be time-varying and stochastic. This
is diﬀerent from Gagliardini et al. (2008) who assume a constant bound. The general structure of the money supply
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where  is the correlation between money supply and volatility shocks, and ˆ  (ˆ ) are the growth (inﬂation) rate
objectives of the central bank. Ulrich proves that the optimal degree of inﬂation distortion that the ambiguity
76averse agent takes into account is given by ∗(X)=
p
2(X). Given this endogenous degree of robustness, the
agent adjusts his probability measure and solves a standard maximization problem obtaining the policy functions
∗
 =( 2 0 21) and ∗
 =( 1 21).I n ﬂation ambiguity does not aﬀect the policy function for consumption and
money demand. Instead, it aﬀects the expected excess return of the inﬂation-sensitive nominal bond. The mirror
image of consumption not being aﬀected by inﬂation ambiguity is that the real interest rate, ,a n dt h em a r k e tp r i c e
of output risk,  (), are not aﬀected by inﬂation ambiguity. These values coincide with a standard CIR (1985)
economy,  =  +  −  − 2
 and  ()=2

√
. The endogenous process for inﬂation is aﬀected by the









 + ∗(X))]0 (209)
where the endogenous degree of inﬂation misspeciﬁcation is given by (X)∗(X). At this point, it is possible to
determine the nominal interest rate () and the nominal market prices of risk  () that nominal assets have to



























where () is a real bond price. ˆ ()i st h es u mo ft h ei n ﬂation-adjusted real bond price and the covariance between
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption and the (negative) of the inﬂation rate, the inﬂation
risk premium.T h ed i ﬀerence between the nominal bond price and the product of real bond price and price deﬂator is
entirely attributed to the inﬂation risk premium. The closed-form solution for the equilibrium price of an ambiguity-
free nominal zero-coupon bond ˆ () is given by a log-linear function of the state variables. Ulrich shows that the








































where the reference (-) measure covariance is the ambiguity premium, the covariance between the nominal intertem-
poral marginal rate of substitution in consumption and the ambiguity kernel (the usual Radon-Nikodym derivative of
the -measure vs. the reference measure). Splitting up this term shows that in general, inﬂation ambiguity has two
channels of impact on the nominal term structure. One is through covariation of the ambiguity kernel with the IMRS
and the second is through the covariation of the ambiguity kernel with the price deﬂator. However, because the ﬁrst
covariance is zero because (by construction) the source of ambiguity,  ˆ ,a ﬀects only the price deﬂator and not the
IMRS–because it does not aﬀect consumption–the inﬂation ambiguity premium boils down to a simple covariance


























This means that the inﬂation ambiguity premium equals the distance between the ambiguity-adjusted expected inﬂa-
tion rate and the “true” expected inﬂation rate.
77Ulrich proves an equivalence between the inﬂation ambiguity premium and the inﬂation variance premium by






















The assumed entropy constraint preserves the simple aﬃne bond pricing structure that is known from models like
CIR, Vasicek (1977), and others. It also leads to the inﬂation ambiguity premium being proportional to the variance
of inﬂation. Intuitively, when the volatility of inﬂation increases, it becomes diﬃcult to estimate the drift of inﬂation
precisely. The agent therefore doubts his underlying inﬂation model more if he observes more dispersed inﬂation
realizations. The model is tested using data on US government bonds to ask whether there is evidence that investors
demand an inﬂation ambiguity premium and whether this premium helps to explain movements in the nominal yield
curve. Ulrich ﬁnds that the term structures of the inﬂation ambiguity premium are upward sloping. The inﬂation
ambiguity premium is negative for short-maturity bonds and positive for long-maturity bonds. The term structure
of inﬂation expectations is ﬂat and the term structure of the inﬂation risk premium is downward sloping, high for
short-maturity bonds and slightly negative for long-maturity bonds. The inﬂation risk premium is a measure for the
conditional covariation of inﬂation and consumption. This covariation is relatively high for a horizon of up to two years,
and quickly mean reverts to zero for longer maturities as inﬂation shocks have no persistent eﬀect on consumption.
Similarly to Gagliardini et al. (2008), inﬂation ambiguity and ambiguity premia help to explain deviations from the
expectation hypothesis. Finally, Ulrich ﬁnds that the estimated inﬂation ambiguity premium plays an important role
in explaining the variance of nominal yields. Variations in nominal yields are mostly driven by changes in expected
inﬂation and in the inﬂation ambiguity premium and not by changes in the consumption risk premium.
Ilut (2010) is an example of ambiguity paper addressing one of the most important outstanding empirical puzzles in
international ﬁnance, the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) puzzle. There is a UIP puzzle because while according to
a range of standard, rational expectations (S)EU models, high interest rate currencies should depreciate vis-a-vis low
interest rate currencies, in practice it has been widely observed that the opposite tends to occur (see e.g., Hansen and
Hodrick, 1980; Fama, 1984; Engel, 1996). Although the standard approach to the puzzle has been to assume rational
expectations but to model (often exogenously) time-varying risk premia, an empirical literature based on survey data
from the foreign exchange market has found signiﬁcant evidence against the RE assumption and challenged the idea
that sensible patterns of time variation in risk premium may be suﬃcient to explain the puzzle. Ilut proposes instead
a story built around the notion of ambiguity aversion: in equilibrium, agents invest in the higher interest rate currency
(investment currency) by borrowing at the lower interest rate currency (funding currency) because they entertain the
possibility that the data could have been generated by various sequences of time-varying signal to noise ratios.
Ilut (2010) proposes a typical MPP framework in which an ambiguity averse agent solves a signal extraction
problem under ambiguity on the precision (variance) of the signals she receives, similarly to Epstein and Schneider
(2007). The only source of uncertainty in the environment is the domestic/foreign interest rate diﬀerential,  = −∗
,
w h i c hi sm o d e l l e da sa ne x o g e n o u ss t o c h a s t i cp r o c e s sg i v e nby the sum of persistent and transitory components, both
unobserved. Under ambiguity aversion with a max-min preference functional, the agent simultaneously chooses a belief
about the model parameter values and a decision about how many bonds to buy and sell. The bond decision maximizes
78expected utility subject to the chosen belief and the budget constraint. The belief is chosen so that, conditional on the
agent’s bond decision, expected utility is minimized subject to the constraint that the variance considered must belong
to an exogenous ﬁnite set. The investor chooses this set so that, in equilibrium, the selected variance parameters are
not implausible in a likelihood ratio sense. The dynamics is captured through overlapping generations of investors
who each live two periods, derive utility from end-of-life wealth. There is one good for which purchasing power parity
(PPP) holds:  = ∗
 + ,w h e r e is the log of price level of the good in the Home country and  is the log of the
nominal exchange rate deﬁned as the price of the Home currency per unit of foreign currency. Investors are born at
time , they are risk-neutral over end-of-life wealth, +1, and face a convex cost of capital. Their preferences are










where  is the amount of foreign bonds purchased, and  parameterizes their cost of capital. The set  comprises the
alternative probability distributions entertained by the agents, who perceive the following state-space representation,
 =  +   = −1 +  (215)
where  and  are both Gaussian white noise,  are draws from a set Υ and  is the hidden state. In practice,
the investors’ problem is:













To capture the process of expectation formation, agents use the Kalman Filter which–given the Gaussian shocks and
the linear set up–is the optimal ﬁlter for the true data generating process. Under these assumptions, Ilut is able









 (+1) is the worst-case scenario expectation of future exchange rates. Faced with uncertainty, agents choose
to base their decisions on pessimistic beliefs so that, compared to the true but unknown underlying data generating
process, they underestimate the unobservable state driving the diﬀerential between the interest rate paid by the bonds
in the investment and funding currencies. In practice, because of ambiguity aversion, positive innovations are treated
as temporary shocks, while negative innovations are considered persistent. This systematic underestimation is at the
basis of the explanation for the UIP puzzle since it implies that agents perceive on average positive innovations in
updating the estimate, which creates the possibility of further increases in the demand of the investment currency and
its consequent gradual appreciation.
5. Ambiguity and Market Microstructure Research
A relatively new but promising sub-ﬁeld of ﬁnancial economics in which models of ambiguity have found fruitful
application is market microstructure, the microeconomic investigation of rational decisions by individual traders and
intermediaries, such as market makers. Easley and O’Hara (2010) have developed a model in which illiquidity (deﬁned
as the absence of trades despite the existence of bid and ask quotes) arises from ambiguity aversion. Speciﬁcally, in
their two-period (0 and 1), heterogenous agents framework,  investors display preferences (with exponential utility
index and unit risk aversion parameter) a’ la Bewley (1986) and, therefore, each of them is willing to trade if and
79only if the move from the status quo (i.e., the absence of trade) is expected to be utility-improving for every belief in
the set of priors that represents her preferences. The payoﬀ of the asset is normally distributed with variance 2,b u t
there is no general agreement on the mean of the distribution, so that each investor sets such a mean to .A tt i m e
1 an unanticipated shock that reduces each agent’s estimate  occurs, so that the new expected value of the payoﬀ is
1
 = , 1. However the magnitude of such a shock is unknown, so that agents are not able to derive a unique





. Hence, each of the investors holds a set of beliefs about
the future value of the risky asset and she trades away from the status quo (her current portfolio) only if the trade is
beneﬁcial according to every belief she considers. Denoting by 0 the optimal investment of agent  at time 0, Easley





investor  will refrain from trading so























. The left-hand-side of this no-trade inequality is the ratio of the most op-
timistic trader’s mean to the least optimistic trader’s mean perception. Thus, when there is more heterogeneity, an
equilibrium with no-trade is more diﬃcult to establish because the left hand side will be relatively large. In particular,
when prior opinions are diverse, the portfolios that traders bring into period one are diverse, and thus there is more
of an incentive for individual traders to move toward the mean portfolio in response to a decline in expectations of
future prices. The right-hand side of the no-trade inequality is instead the ambiguity about the percentage decline in
future mean values. The maximum (minimum) price in the no trade interval is the lowest (highest) price at which
some trader is willing to sell (buy) the risky asset, hence it represents the ask (bid) price. Speciﬁcally, denoting by 
supply at time 0, and by ˆ  the average (across agents) expected payoﬀ at time 0, Easley and O’Hara show that:

























Intuitively, the trader who is most optimistic (pessimistic) about the largest (smallest) possible decline in the value
of the asset sets the bid (ask) price. Therefore in this model the bid-ask price diﬀerence is an ambiguity spread, in
contrast to the standard asymmetric information spread (see e.g., the literature reviewed in O’Hara, 1994). Indeed,
in the presence of asymmetric information, the spread reﬂects the informational advantage that some traders have
with respect to knowledge of the asset’s true value, while, under their ambiguity averse model, no trader has an
advantage and there is no learning from prices. Yet, a bid-ask spread will exist because of the existence of ambiguity.
Finally, the midpoint of the bid-ask spread is a reasonable approximation of the fair value of the asset, since the
ask and the bid prices can be thought of overestimate and underestimate, respectively, of the true value of the asset.
This may be clearly useful in valuation applications of the model, when only bid and ask quotes are observed, but









and (1 − )(1 − 
)–will cause ﬂuctuating levels of liquidity.
Rutledge and Zin (2009) have examined the eﬀects of ambiguity on liquidity and shown that as the framework
of analysis grows more realistic, it is hard to conclude that–albeit this remains intuitively sensible–ambiguity will
80decrease liquidity and/or be the cause of market break-downs. Their basic motivation is the identiﬁcation of ﬁnancial
crises with the lack of liquidity that typically follows extreme market outcomes. Rutledge and Zin observe that these
breakdowns in liquidity seem particularly acute in markets where traders heavily rely on complex and yet uncertain
empirical models for the cash ﬂows processes, as it happens for instance in derivative markets. This evidence suggests
a link between ambiguity and liquidity, since severe reductions in the provision of liquidity seem to result from model
uncertainty. Therefore they propose a model in which a monopolistic ambiguity-averse market maker sets bid and
ask prices for a European call option, and the bid-ask spread is used as a measure of liquidity. Ambiguity concerns
the probability distribution of the underlying security (whose price is ), and the market maker displays MPP. Time
is discrete and, at any date, the market maker observes the orders from the traders and consequently sets her own
strategy  ∈ {−101} (respectively short, no-trade, or long strategy) and the size of her trade . The demand for
the derivative is summarized by the arrival of a random willingness-to-trade ˜  signal. If ˜  is greater (lower) than
or equal to the posted ask (bid) price,  (), then a buy (sell) order is received, and the market maker must set
 = −1(  =1 ) .I f˜  lies between the bid and ask prices, no trade takes place ( = 0). The willingness to trade is
a s s u m e dt ob ea nI I Dp r o c e s sw i t hΦ()=P r ( ˜   ). The bid and ask prices determine the likelihood of a trade in
t h ed e r i v a t i v es i n c eP r (  = −1) = [1 − Φ()], Pr( =0 )=[ Φ() − Φ()], and, Pr( =1 )=Φ(). Apart from the
trading activity, the market maker also chooses optimal consumption () and investment in the underlying security
() levels at each date. Importantly, the investment in the risky asset after observing a trade in the derivative gives
to the market maker the opportunity to partially hedge the realized position in the derivative market.
For concreteness, let’s examine a two-period framework. For given choices of , ,a n d,a tt i m e1t h em a r k e t
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 if  = −1
0i f  =0
− if  =1
1 = 1 + (1) (219)
where  is a discount factor, 0 is the exogenous income deriving from other trading operations, and  is the set of
probability distributions under consideration.  is the dividend paid by the risky asset, and  i st h ei n c o m e( p r o ﬁt
stream) of the market-maker in period . Hence,  () is the maximal (indirect) utility for given (). At time
0, optimal bid and ask prices are chosen by solving:
max

{[1 − Φ()] +[ Φ() − Φ()]0 + Φ()}
 =( −1)  =( 1) 0 =( 0) (220)
Choosing a high (low) value for the ask (bid) price generates a higher payoﬀ should a high (low) value order arrive;
however, it also lowers the probability of such a trade actually occurring, so that the period 0 income eﬀect is oﬀset
by the period 1 income eﬀect of the derivative’s payoﬀ.T h e ﬁrst order conditions of the problem reveal that the
presence of ambiguity lowers the baseline level of utility a market makers may attain in the absence of trades. For
example, in the case where the optimal portfolio with no position in the derivative yields consumption that is close
to riskless (and hence is not aﬀected by ambiguity), the level of such a baseline utility (call it 0) for an ambiguity
81averse and an ambiguity neutral market maker are approximately equal, while the ambiguity bid-ask spread is larger.
However, if 0 is aﬀected by ambiguity, then it is possible that the ambiguity-averse market-maker posts a bid or ask
that is more aggressive. This occurs when the derivative position “hedges ambiguity.” In particular, the diﬀerence
0 −=0–where =0 is the total indirect utility from a short position in the derivative when no period 0 ask price
is received– may be smaller for an ambiguity-averse market-maker if the worst-case distribution in the 0 case diﬀers
from the one in the =0 case, so that the ambiguity-averse market-maker may post a more aggressive (lower) ask
price. Hence, uncertainty aversion does not always produce markets that are less liquid.
Ozsoylev and Werner (2009) propose a diﬀerent approach to connect ambiguity to liquidity and trading volume
in a typical micro-structure model that emphasizes the interaction between uncertainty and private information.
In Ozsoylev and Werner’s static framework, all investors have ambiguous beliefs (represented by MPP) about the
probability distribution of the asset payoﬀ. While informed agents receive a private signal that resolves the ambiguity,
arbitrageurs, instead, cannot observe such a signal and extract information from prices, so that their beliefs continue
to be aﬀected by ambiguity. Interestingly, while in the learning model by Epstein and Schneider (2009) investors have
unambiguous beliefs prior to the arrival of information and their posterior beliefs become ambiguous because of the
signals, for the informed traders in Ozsoylev and Werner’s model, ambiguity disappears because of the arrival of the
signal. Ozsoylev and Werner show that if the asset’s supply is deterministic, the equilibrium is fully revealing, otherwise
it is only partially revealing, which echoes standard (S)EU ﬁndings. However, there exists a range of values of the signal
and the random asset supply such that the arbitrageurs choose not to trade. When there is ambiguity, under limited
participation the sensitivity of prices to the signal and to the random supply is lower than under full participation.
Using reciprocals of price sensitivities as measures of market depth, they show that limited participation also induces
lower market depth. When comparing the standard (S)EU-case with the ambiguity framework, their results show that
ambiguity leads to high liquidity risk, lower trading volume, and lower market depth.
Another phenomenon that has attracted the interest of microstructure researchers is herding, the tendency of
traders to simultaneously implement similar strategies, which may cause severe market disruptions. For instance,
Ford, Kelsey, and Pang (2005) have proposed a simple herding model where full rationality is relaxed by considering
agents’ attitudes towards informational ambiguity introduced through neo-additive capacities (as in Chateauneuf et
al., 2002). In their model, trades are assumed to occur sequentially and prices are determined endogenously at each
trade. Neither market makers nor traders know exactly the value of the assets. In particular, market makers form
their expectations on the basis of public information, while traders receive private information that enables them to
update public beliefs.
Ford et al. show that a consistent signal reduces conﬁdence less than an inconsistent one. Intuitively, although the
arrival of enough public information will improve informational eﬃciency in decisions, the arrival of an inconsistent
(and yet informative) signal on public disclosure may, paradoxically, make decisions worse. In particular, as argued in
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), in the process of aggregating the information of fewer individuals, further
additional information can encourage agents to fall into a cascade sooner, so there is no presumption that the signal
will improve decisions. First, Ford, Kelsey, and Pang (2005) assume asymmetric ambiguity, meaning that only traders
and not market makers display ambiguity aversion. This asymmetry is shown to rationally generate history-dependent
behavior and contrarian behavior diﬀerent from those described by the traditional (S)EU literature on herding. Next,
82they allow for ambiguity averse market makers. Under this condition, ambiguity is responsible for herding. Further,
herding only leads to short-run mispricing in ﬁnancial markets since informational eﬃciency holds in the long-run.
6. Policy Implications
Ambiguity may be responsible for such far-reaching eﬀects on optimal ﬁnancial decisions and equilibrium asset prices,
that it is natural to conjecture that a literature must have taken an active interest in the implications of ambiguity for
macroeconomic policies, ﬁnancial regulation, and market and security design. In this section we turn our attention to
a few such examples, even though many Readers will have found already quite natural to stop and ponder the eﬀects
of ambiguity for the optimal design of policy and markets in the course of our earlier review.
Easley and O’Hara (2009, 2010) have discussed how a carefully designed market microstructure can reduce the
negative eﬀects of ambiguity. In their model with mixed populations of (S)EU and ambiguity-averse investors, Easley
and O’Hara (2009) have shown that deposit insurance, NYSE and NASD suitability rules, Rule 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, and the Investment Act of 1940 can play a surprisingly eﬀe c t i v er o l eb yi n d u c i n ga m b i g u i t y - a v e r s e
investors to participate in the banking and ﬁnancial system.63 Interestingly, Easley and O’Hara have stressed that
these rules/provisions eﬀectively limit themselves to rule out extremely negative events which have very low probability
to occur, so that the rules become rarely binding. Nonetheless, their existence can induce higher participation by simply
convincing investors to disregard extremely pessimistic scenarios.
Easley and O’Hara (2010) have used these intuitions to ask when will it be the case that regulated markets emerge
in equilibrium over un-regulated (say, over-the-counter) markets. Within the framework proposed in Easley and
O’Hara (2009), they consider two stock markets,  and ,w h i c hd i ﬀer from each other in terms of the services they
provide to listing ﬁrms and investors: Market  is simply a trading platform, while Market  is an exchange that
provides a certiﬁcation service that can reduce company-speciﬁc ambiguity by limiting which ﬁrms it allows to trade.
Speciﬁcally, the exchange examines companies that apply to be listed and only agrees to list those that meet some
minimum standards.64 For ambiguity averse investors, this corresponds to a higher minimum expected return (min)
and a lower maximum variance (2
max) of the stock’s distribution. Each ﬁrm must choose a market on which to list
its stock. Listing in Market  implies a per-share fee , which is deduced from the investors’ payoﬀ. In this case the
ambiguity averse investors’ demand function  for the risky assets in market  will be given by (27) where min and
max are replaced by min− and max−, while the risky asset demand  in the simple platform OTC  is exactly
as in (27). Easley and O’Hara (2010) show that if Market  is characterized by limited participation–when only the
(S)EU investors trade–the equilibrium price will be 
()
 =ˆ  − ˆ 
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in case of full participation, where  is the percentage of investors that are ambiguity averse. In market ,t h e s e
63Rule 16(b) requires an insider, deﬁn e da sa no ﬃcer, director, or 10% shareholder, to return any proﬁts made on a trading position held
for less than six months. The Investment Act of 1940 limits a mutual fund to holding no more than 5% of its assets in any one issue to
enforce some minimal degree of diversiﬁcation.
64Practical examples are listing rules, delisting rules, trading halts, aﬃrmative obligations of market makers, transparency requirements,
price collars and daily limits, public comes ﬁrst rules, clearing house rules and margin requirements, fast market rules, etc.
83expressions are diﬀerent: 
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in the case of full participation.
These expressions oﬀer powerful insights. Because a ﬁrm will list its stock where the price is higher, and given
that it is trivial to show that if Market  is in limited participation equilibrium so is Market , in the case of limited
participation no ﬁrm will choose to list on Market . This means that when ambiguity averse traders choose to stay
on the sidelines, the “bad” market will completely crowd out the “good” market, which is an obvious result, as (S)EU
traders would have to pay the cost of a regulated market but would derive no beneﬁts because they do not suﬀer
from ambiguity aversion. This situation is very likely to occur when  is small so that nearly all investors are (S)EU
maximizers, as to them the guarantees oﬀered by Market  have no value. With few new potential investors that
might be induced to trade by listing a stock on Market , there is little or no gain to the stock price and consequently
all ﬁrms will trade on Market . On the contrary, when nearly all investors are ambiguity averse (as  → 1), then, if
the stock is to be publicly traded at all, equilibrium requires a share price low enough to attract the ambiguity averse
investors. Firms will list on Market  o n l yi ft h ei n c r e a s ei nt h em i n i m u mm e a np a y o ﬀ that  oﬀe r si sl a r g e rt h a nt h e
regulation cost . For an intermediate composition of the population of traders (say  away from both 0 and 1), the
listing decision will depend on the relative costs and beneﬁts in each market. The greater (lower)  is, the more likely
it is that listing on  () will dominate as the equilibrium outcome. Additionally, ﬁrms with moderate ambiguity
(measured by small diﬀerences  −
min and 
max −) will beneﬁt from paying the listing fees to access Market ,
provided that the certiﬁcation is suﬃcient to attract ambiguity averse traders.65
In a similar set up, Guidolin and Rinaldi (2009) have focussed on the policy options available to improve the
equilibrium outcomes of asset markets populated by a fraction  of MPP-type traders. The ﬁrst type of policy that
may be pursued is to try and aﬀect the proportions of ambiguity averse (AA) and (S)EU-maximizers which compose
the economy,  and 1−.66 Guidolin and Rinaldi’s results make it clear that the eﬀect of such policies will depend on
the initial conﬁguration as represented by the equilibrium price function and the level of participation. For instance,
suppose that initially both groups of investors participate in the market, so that the equilibrium price is .E v e n
though the policy maker ﬁnds a way to instantaneously decrease the fraction of AA agents, , because 2
 ≤ 2
max
and min  , the numerator of the expression for  increases; viceversa its denominator declines. Therefore, on
the whole  increases. However, as this happens it is possible for the condition (min + )(1 + )   to
start being violated and  may enter the region ((min + )(1 + ) (max + )(1 + )). When this occurs,
participation from the AA investors will cease and the pricing function will switch to ()   Therefore, an
attempt to decrease  and simply increase the proportion of (S)EU-maximizers represents a policy approach with
mixed outcomes. On the one hand, it is certain that such an intervention will increase equilibrium prices, which may
65Viceversa, if ambiguity is low, investors may opt to participate even if the stock trades on Market . Because if Market  is in full
participation equilibrium so is Market , ﬁrms will choose to list their stocks in Market . For intermediate situations, listing on Market
 is chosen provided that the certiﬁcation is necessary and suﬃcient to attract ambiguity averse traders and 
  
 . Finally, there
exists a threshold size  below (above) which ﬁr m sc h o o s et ob el i s t e di nM a r k e t ().
66Causing changes in  means that AA investors are selectively given (or taken away) enough information for her perception of ambiguity
to disappear. We interpret the notion of “taking information away” as identical to “confusing” the investors on purpose, which–as
counterintuitive as this may sound–in a MPP environment may produce some beneﬁts.
84be attractive for ﬁrms because this will lower the cost of capital. On the other hand, it may end up penalizing the
overall participation to the market and reduce liquidity and trading volume.67 The intuition is that if very few AA
agents are left in the market, the equilibrium price will mostly reﬂect the fundamental risk assessments expressed by
(S)EU investors, and the resulting price will end being “too high” for AA investors to participate.
Suppose instead that initially only (S)EU investors were present in the market. If  is reduced, the price increases
and that makes the stock even less attractive to AA investors. As a result the limited participation equilibrium
would not be aﬀected and the risk premium would decline. However, if a policy-maker tried to increases  in such
an environment, this will lead to a decrease in the equilibrium price, so that if  increases enough, the equilibrium
p r i c ew i l lf a l lb e l o wt h et h r e s h o l d( min + )(1 + ), and both groups will be be willing to trade in the stock
market, which will actually increase the stock price. Guidolin and Rinaldi (2009) compute a threshold ¯  such that
when  is raised suﬃciently, then the equilibrium switches from limited participation by (S)EU-maximizers only to
both agent types. These results reveal a clear asymmetry in the ability to use policy to aﬀect equilibrium outcomes.
While increasing  is always possible and it implies that while equilibrium prices decline, more participation may be
ultimately attained, decreasing  has non-linear eﬀects: a threshold exists, such that if  declines below such threshold
and the equilibrium price increases enough, then the market may switch to an (S)EU-only participation regime and
this may cause a sudden drop in trading and liquidity.
Guidolin and Rinaldi also discuss a policy that simply consists–similarly to Easley and O’Hara (2009)–of con-
vincing the ambiguity averse investors that certain sensitive scenarios can be ruled out. For instance, if the policy
makers manage to increase min and only (S)EU agents were initially trading, it is possible to switch to a new equi-






(1 − ). In that
case, the equilibrium price will jump down from () to  and the risk premium will increase. The implication
is that starting from situations of (S)EU-only participation, it will take large jumps in ¯ min for the equilibrium to
be signiﬁcantly aﬀected; however, when this happens, one can also expect a detrimental eﬀect on risky asset prices.
This is surprising: even though the policy action consists of ruling out the worst possible scenarios increasing min,
for an action of suﬃcient magnitude its eventual eﬀect on equilibrium prices will be negative and the cost of enforcing
a participation equilibrium will consist of a higher risk premium. This means that when a market has fallen into a
state of disruption (a (S)EU-only equilibrium), bringing it back to higher liquidity and orderly functioning through
a reduction in the amount of perceived ambiguity may actually go through further reductions in equilibrium prices.
However, it is also possible to prove that when initially a full participation equilibrium rules,  will increase con-
tinuously as min is increased while increasing min has no eﬀect on the participation constraint, which will still be
satisﬁed. In the presence of full participation, reducing the amount of ambiguity has only positive eﬀects on prices
and will reduce risk premia. It seems then that they key objective of any policy maker ought to prevent equilibria
with limited participation to appear in the ﬁrst instance.
One ﬁnal implication of the analysis in Guidolin and Rinaldi (2009) is that–assuming policy makers have full
control over the realized inﬂation rate (which is quite optimistic)–it is impossible for governments to try and inﬂate
67Notice that there is no contradiction in this claim: starting from a situation in which 100% of the potential investors (including the
AA fraction 0) participate to the market trading stocks, by suﬃciently decreasing  (say, to 0 − ∆) the policy-maker may induce a
switch to an equilibrium in which only 1 − 0 + ∆1 of the potential investors participate. Unless ∆ = −0 this implies a loss in
participation.
85their way out of a situation characterized by market breakdowns. When the inﬂation rate allowed to surge, it always
(i.e., independently of whether the initial equilibrium was characterized by limited participation) strengthens the
segmentation and produces ambiguous eﬀects on risky asset prices. Intuitively, this happens when inﬂation becomes
so high that–given a perception of uncertainty as represented by 2
max–the real expected payoﬀs from the risky asset
become insuﬃcient to compete with the real, riskless rate of return guaranteed to AA investors by the money market
account. Therefore, inﬂation as a policy tool seems either ineﬀective or perverse because it cannot relax participation
constraints while it may depress real equilibrium prices. On the contrary, a substantial reduction of the inﬂation






[(1 − )( − min)]–may lead to increased participation, but lower
asset prices. Clearly, if the economy were to start from an equilibrium of full participation, there is no a chance
that the participation constraint may stop being satisﬁed: if both (S)EU and AA agents were initially trading in the
market, this remains the case in a regime with lower inﬂation. Therefore low inﬂation has only virtues.
Easley and O’Hara (2009, 2010) and Guidolin and Rinaldi (2009) have insisted on examining either market design
issues or the eﬀectiveness of policy interventions that try and remedy to a ﬁnancial crisis characterized by shrinking
liquidity. A handful of other papers have used ambiguity to explain phenomena that lie at the intersection between
ﬁnance and macroeconomics. For instance, Mukerji and Tallon (2000) have developed an ambiguity model to motivate
the little practical use of indexation in ﬁnancial securitization. In particular, they extend the results in Mukerji and
Tallon (1999) by specifying what forms of idiosyncratic risk may lead to trading breakdowns in equilibrium. For an
i n d e x e da s s e t ,s u c ha ni d i o s y n c r a s yi sr e p r e s e n t e db yt h ep resence of “irrelevant” goods (irrelevant in the sense that
the agents trading the asset neither consume nor are endowed with them) in the indexation bundle. In a two-period
competitive monetary general equilibrium model for goods, bonds and money market, agents display CEU-preferences.
Nominal and indexed bonds are both available for trade and prices of all goods and bonds are determined endogenously.
A ﬁrst group of agents (say, agents of type )t r a d e so nﬁnancial markets, while a second group (say, agents of type
) has no access to any ﬁn a n c i a lm a r k e t s ,a n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,i ts i m p l yc o n s u m e sa l lt h er e v e n u ef r o me n d o w m e n t .T h r e e
goods are available, , ,a n d.A g e n t s o f t y p e  consume only goods  and  while agents of type  consume
only goods  and .A g e n t s have real endowments composed of goods  and .A g e n t s have real endowments
composed of goods  and . Uncertainty is realized at the beginning of the second period, agents 1’s endowment is
uncontingent in both periods, while the endowment of agents 2 is contingent in the second period for good .M o n e y
supply in period 0 is ﬁxed at 0, but may take on two values in period 1, say 
1 or 
1,w i t h1 = 10,w h e r e
1i st h ei n ﬂation rate, that can be high or low. Finally, there are two ﬁnancial assets traded at time 0: the ﬁrst is
a nominal bond that pays oﬀ one unit of money in all states; the second is an indexed bond, that pays oﬀ a bundle of
goods in each state in period 1. Agents do not know the probability distribution over Ω; nevertheless they are given
a convex capacity  over it. Without ambiguity, for generic ﬁrst period aggregate endowments, there is trade in the
indexed bond whenever  6= 1. However, in the presence of ambiguity, there exists a bound ¯ 1, such that, if ¯ ,
there exists ¯ ,0 ¯ 1, such that, if A()  ¯ , in equilibrium the indexed bond is not traded while the nominal
bond is. Hence, when the indexation bundle contains at least one good which is not consumed by any of the agents
who actively trade in the ﬁnancial market, and beliefs about the change in the price of these goods relative to the
average price level are suﬃciently ambiguous, trade of indexed bonds does not occur in equilibrium, provided that
inﬂation is bounded above. Additionally, it does not matter whether ambiguity concerns also nominal bonds. These
86implications are consistent with the fact that typically, indexed bonds are traded almost exclusively under extreme
inﬂationary circumstances, as reﬂected by the necessary condition ¯ .
7. Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have reviewed and discussed a number of works that have brought models of decision making under
ambiguity (sometimes also perceived as a preference for robust decisions) at the forefront of research in ﬁnancial
economics. A number of insights have emerged. Of course, a lot of work remains to be done. On the one hand, a
few papers (e.g., Gollier, 2009, or Chapman and Polkovnichenko, 2009) have cautioned that we should hesitate before
generalizing some of the implications of models of ambiguity outside the tight parametric set ups in which these results
have been derived. This appears particularly important in the perspective of policy-makers and market regulators
that are facing a complex reality that will hardly adhere to the restrictive but simplifying assumptions exploited in
the literature to derive crisp results. Therefore, an obvious avenue for future research consists of generalizations–for
instance using ﬂexible or general models for the stochastic processes driving the state variables, and rich asset menus
that may also shed light on the cross-sectional, cross-asset structure of risk premia and volatility dynamics–of the
existing portfolio choice and asset pricing models. For instance, we are currently blessed with a range of insights
derived from models in which a single state variables follows a Geometric Brownian motion and in which the asset
menu is simply composed of a single risky asset and one riskless bond. There is an obvious need for extensions and
generalizations. However, let us stress that it is comforting to notice that diﬀerent Authors using diﬀerent preference
speciﬁcations that capture ambiguity aversion (e.g., MPP, smooth KMM preferences, but also robustness preferences)
have all delivered results for asset allocation and asset pricing that are qualitatively similar. On the other hand, the
literature appears to be still in a stage in which the need to approach technically complicated problems and to deal
with deep logical issues (e.g., how beliefs should be updated in dynamic models) has advised to build models that are
specialized to the objective at hand. For instance, papers on ambiguity and the equity premium and risk-free rate
puzzles are technically sophisticated because they solve dynamic GE models, but have usually kept the asset menu
ﬁxed to two assets only. However, a few papers that have derived implications for either large-scale portfolio decisions
or for cross-sectional asset pricing have had to focus on large asset menus, but often in simple static models or giving
up the elegance (ultimately, necessity) of GE models. Similarly, most of the policy and regulatory implications from
the literature emerge from simple, two-period models. One wonders how safe policy implementation may be when
complicated intertemporal eﬀects (if not dynamic games between investors and policy-makers) are ignored. Therefore
it is legitimate to expect that in the future new and even more ambitious papers will pursue more complicated and
interconnected questions using dynamic GE models with rich asset menus.
Our review has also isolated a number of research topics on which only the ﬁrst initial steps have been moved and
for which it is legitimate to expect intense eﬀorts at extending what we currently understand. Even though it is often
the case that the most important breakthroughs may happen exactly where they are not expected, in our minds it
appears safe to say that considerable progress should be welcomed from papers that explore the interaction between
ambiguity aversion and the presence of asymmetric information. For instance, Condie and Ganguli (2009) show that if
an ambiguity averse investor has private information, then portfolio inertia a’ la Dow and Werlang (1992) may prevent
87the revelation of information by prices in set ups in which we would observe substantial revelation under (S)EU; Mele
and Sangiorgi (2009) have studied the ﬂip side of the same coin, i.e., on the incentives for information acquisition in
markets under ambiguity. Although Section 3 has highlighted a range of implications for asset allocation decisions
that are robust to the speciﬁcs of the parametric models proposed, it is diﬃcult to deny a need to work on general
frameworks for the process of asset returns–for instance, nesting within each other the cases of no predictability,
of linear predictability, as well as of non-linear predictability (as in Garcia, Detemple and Rindisbacher, 2002)–able
to derive general results for the eﬀects of ambiguity aversion on myopic vs. hedging demands. Finally, while a
limited number of researchers straddling the macroeconomics and ﬁnance camps (e.g., Backus et al., 2004, Hansen
and Sargent, 2007, and more recently Ulrich, 2009) have made eﬀorts at structuring their ambiguity models to allow
easy connections to existing estimation methods for dynamic GE asset pricing models, an overwhelming majority of
the papers we have reviewed still content themselves with solving models, and then simulating empirical outcomes
from calibrated versions. Although this has been useful to allow researches from all backgrounds to understand what
the qualitative implications and salient mechanisms of ambiguity aversion are, models of ambiguity oﬀer rich sets of
empirical restrictions–often (especially in the case of MPP, see Epstein and Schneider, 2010) qualitatively diﬀerent,
for instance of a non-linear type, from (S)EU–that should be tested giving us a possibility to reject the proposition
that ambiguity aversion aﬀects portfolio/consumption choices and are priced in equilibrium.
Ad i ﬀerent issue is whether and how the ever growing class of ﬁn a n c i a lm o d e l sw eh a v er e v i e w e di nt h i sp a p e r
has already impacted the way in which applied (ﬁnancial) economists, policy-makers, and commentators perceive
and interpret economic phenomena. We must admit that–because the topic of the existence of “risks” in economic
decision making that are hardly quantiﬁable in a (S)EU perspective had been addressed by a few of the founding
fathers of economics and decision theory alike, among them Arrow, Hurwicz, Keynes, Knight, Raiﬀa, and Wald
(in no order whatsoever)–even though research on decision making under ambiguity has witnessed an acceleration
during the 1990s, informal arguments connecting poorly understood phenomena to aversion to uncertainty have been
appearing among both academics and practitioners at least since the 1930s. Yet, besides an informal appreciation that
investment and pricing decisions may reﬂect an aversion to poor information, it is only recently that these arguments
have been made formal and have started impacting the way in which applied economists view markets. For instance,
Epstein and Schneider (2008) have used their model to show that taking ambiguity into account may go a long way
towards explaining price movements–especially large market slides–that would otherwise represent genuine puzzles
in standard asset pricing models. They propose an intriguing explanation of the behavior of the stock prices around
the 9/11 events, in 2001. The analysis is interesting because a standard Bayesian model with known signal quality
would have enormous diﬃculties at explaining the initial slide in prices on 9/11 and the following days. The terrorist
attack increased uncertainty about future economic growth and news about terrorism and foreign policy, which were
less important in the minds of traders earlier on in the month of September, suddenly became crucial. It therefore
became diﬃcult to assess the importance to assign to information ﬂows during that week. Under ambiguity the signal
precision is unknown, and bad news is treated as extremely reliable, so that a much less extreme sequence of signals
is suﬃcient to account for extremely low stock prices, as those registered in the ﬁrst week after the attack.
Similarly, given the existence of a handful of papers that have explored how policy makers may deal with ambiguity,
it is natural to ask whether there is so far any evidence that these normative ideas have broken into the concerns of
88policy makers in practice. Even though it is hard to interpret the minds of policy makers, we think that the reaction
of a number of central banks and governments to the great ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-2009 showcases features that may
be as a minimum interpreted as being consistent with the typical actions that may eﬀectively contrast the disruptive
eﬀects of ambiguity. For instance, with reference to papers such as Easley and O’Hara (2009) and Guidolin and Rinaldi
(2009), a handful of policy measures may be interpreted as attempts at lowering min and/or 2
max, i.e., to reduce the
“amount” of ambiguity. For instance, in the Spring of 2008 the U.S. Treasury announced a temporary guarantee of
the share prices of money market mutual funds and, beginning in October 2008, it used authority granted under the
2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act to purchase preferred shares in a large number of depository institutions.
Similar policies have been enacted in Canada and in a number of European countries.
As far as market and security designs are concerned, it is clear that contracting cannot solve the participation prob-
lems induced by ambiguity aversion, because it would involve probability speciﬁcations for states of the world whose
very existence would make complete contracting prohibitively expensive. A related diﬃculty concerns the enforcement
of optimal contracts, since, even if complete contracting were feasible, enforcement would not be automatic. Similarly,
disclosure cannot solve ambiguity-induced problems because of the diﬃculty in attaching a probability to unlikely
states. Indeed, under ambiguity aversion, disclosure can even exacerbate problems by scaring away potential market
participants. Further, the palliative role of arbitrage is limited because ambiguity aversion induces non-participation,
and not merely mispricing. Interestingly, regulation may play an important role in ruling out aberrant outcomes
caused by ambiguity aversion. As stressed by Easley and O’Hara (2009) with reference to exchanges’ rule books, there
are a myriad of rules and requirements, some so arcane as to be rarely, if ever, actually binding in practice. Yet, such
obscurity is perfectly consistent with the ambiguity-resolving role explained in Section 6.
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